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Although a large body of literature has proposed various models to identify an impending 
financial crisis by studying systemic risk and contagion, scarce previous research has 
considered the possibility that banks can protect themselves during a financial crisis and 
therefore affect the propagation of losses through financial linkages, such as the interbank 
market. Drawing upon a subset of U.S. bank accounting ratios from 1992Q4 to 2011Q4, the 
thesis investigates banks’ preemptive actions by analysing significant structural shifts in 
response to crises at the aggregated bank level. We’ve found Bank size does matter in 
context of applicability of banking accounting ratios serve as early warning signals. The 
results show that certain indicators such as ‘leverage’ and ‘coverage’ ratios are appropriate 
indicators for the detection of banking system vulnerabilities all banks. And nonperforming 
loans ratio (NPLs) additionally serves as an indicator for the timing of a crisis. The thesis 
also finds that whereas capital levels were closely monitored, heavy reliance of banks on 
wholesale funding is often overlooked. Banks accumulate liquidity to protect themselves 
from liquidity shocks and therefore contribute to (or mitigate) the onset of a crisis. 
Therefore, the impact of bank size and interbank lending on bank risk-taking are carefully 
examined; and a nonlinear (U-shaped) relationship is found. It adds empirical weights to the 
‘too big to fail’ phenomenon. In addition to this, preemptive actions of large banks are found 
in the interbank market during the financial crisis. In other words, interbank lending is 
associated with substantially lower risk taking by borrowing banks in financial crisis, which 
are consistent with monitoring by lending banks. Finally, the thesis considers banks’ 
liquidity creation during the interbank lending crunch. The author finds those same factors 
leading to precautionary liquidity hoarding also contributed to a decline in interbank 
lending: banks with net interbank borrowing positions rationed lending due to self-
insurance motives and they offered higher rates to attract external funding; net lenders 
hoarded liquidity due to heightened counterparty risk. The author also proposes two on-
balance proxies for liquidity risk: (i) the unrealized security loss ratio and (ii) the loan loss 
allowance ratio. Banks choose to build up liquidity in anticipation of future expected losses 
from holding assets. On the policy frontier, besides credit and securities lending programs 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
What does banks do? The answer to this varies country by country because of different 
legal systems. Smith (1776[1937], p305) defined the critical economic function of the 
banking industry as an intermediary that can maximise profits: 
 
“The judicious operation of banking, by substituting paper in the room of a great part of this gold 
and liver, enables the country to convert a great part of this dead stock into active and productive 
stock; into stock which produces something to the country.” 
 
Banking is a major outcome from the development of modern society. Banks, by their 
nature, are important not only for individuals’ finances, but also for national stabilization 
(Heffernan, 1996). However, events occasionally strain the banking system: such as 
physical disruption on 11
th
 September 2001 as well as financial crisis of 2007/08. 
 
The recent subprime mortgage crisis, which started from 2007, had a similar cause as that 
of the Scandinavian crisis 1980s: the boom and burst of the housing bubble; however, it has 
also raised puzzles as it was believed that the subprime market was too small to trigger the 
propagation of losses in the entire U.S. financial market, while, it was characterized as one 
of the worst credit crises since the Great Depression (Mishkin, 2008). The subprime 
mortgage crisis started from the housing markets, and then spread to the subprime mortgage 
market that was merely a small sector in the global financial market. It further affected the 
financial institutions. Take HSBC - the largest bank at that time - for an example, it wrote 
down 10.5 billion dollar holding in subprime-related mortgage-backed securities according 
to the BBC (2008). The failures of some crucial financial institutions, such as Lehman 
Brothers, pushed the crisis to its peak and thus brought the global financial market to 
collapse. Consequently, as reported by the IMF, U.S. banks accounted for approximately 
60% of total losses, and 40% for UK and European banks (Reuters, 2009).  
 
Even though the lessons are learnt from the past financial crises, financial crises still take 
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place. Reflecting the high costs of banking crises and their increased frequency, the 
banking industry stability is one of particular interest and the debate emerging from it is 
still on-going. However, scare previous literature have considered the possibility that banks 
could make actions to protect themselves during the financial crisis and therefore affect the 
propagation of losses through the financial linkages, such as interbank market. Therefore, 
this has been a main motivation for conducting a comprehensive investigation into bank 
behaviour in this thesis; and thus to identify an impending crisis. First, we analyse 
structural changes of bank accounting ratios in response to crises at aggregate bank-level. 
Moreover, the impact of bank size and interbank lending on banks’ risk-taking are 
examined. Finally, we study how banks managed the interbank lending crunch that 
occurred during the financial crisis of 2007-2008 by adjusting their holding of liquidity 
assets, as well as how these efforts to the storm affected funding ability.   
 
1.1 Bank Activities and Financial Crisis 2007/08 
 
According to modern banking theory, a bank plays an intermediary role in the economy by 
reallocating capital, and providing liquidity services as well as risk management (Freixas 
and Rochet, 2008, p2). 
 
First, a bank provides an intermediary role by taking deposits and granting loans 
(Heffernan, 2005). It plays a core role in reallocating capital because of the economies of 
scale: Banks can access more privileged information on borrowers; therefore the 
information economies of scale would enable banks to lending at lower cost compare to 
other financial institutions (Heffernan, 2005). On the other hand, although firms may 
finance in a more sustainable way by issuing bonds, external liquidity from banks would be 
also preferred: it gives a good signal to the market (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1988). However, 
banks may also face the challenge of risk-taking due to their nature.  
 
Banks can monitor the risk level of borrowers and charge a loan rate with a risk premium 
due to the economies of scope. Banks also need to pay a deposit rate to depositors. Here, 
we define the interest margins as the difference between the loan rate and deposit rate 
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(Heffernan, 2005).  What will happen if the volatility of interest rate could make costs of 
short-term funding higher than interest incomes from long-term loans?  In this case, a 
higher interest margins will be required to cover additional costs including operation costs, 
intermediation fees and risk premiums (Ho and Saunders, 1981). And, in order to maximise 
returns at lower costs, banks may increase non-traditional activities - such as investment 
banking, venture capital, security brokerage, insurance underwriting and asset securitization 
- to offset the losses of traditional bank actives, which bring more diversification as well as 
high risk (Valverde and Fernandez, 2007). In the past three decades, the banking industry 
has showed a trend to the diversification of financial services and consolidation of financial 
institutions, especially prior to the financial crisis in 2007/08.  
 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was proposed in 1999 in the United States, which allowed 
banks to engage more freely in providing more non-traditional activities (Mishkin, 2002). 
Modern economists believe that a large number of new lines of non-traditional financial 
services cause higher risk-taking, thus further tiger bank failure and financial instability 
(Stiroh, 2006; Saunders and Walter, 1994; Welfens, 2008). In contrast, some other 
academic studies to look at the question (e.g., Fahlenbrach et al., 2011; Cole and White, 
2012) concluded that the causes and nature of banks’ financial weaknesses during the 
recent subprime mortgage financial crisis were similar to those observed at banks that 
failed or performed poorly during previous banking recessions. Banks that engaged in risky 
non-traditional activities also tended to take risk in their traditional lines of business, 
suggesting that deregulation was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for bank 
failure during the crisis. 
 
Move to U.S. banks’ balance sheet data. Figure 1 presents net interest income for 
commercial banks in United States from 1992 to 2014. Figure 2 shows the non-interest 
income to total income for U.S. banks from 1998 to 2013. Figure 3 displays net income for 
commercial banks in United States from 1984 to 2014. Overall, all three figures increased 
significantly before the end of year 2006. Net income for commercial banks then 
experienced a sharp decline in bank returns in 2007 due to the financial crisis and it reached 
the bottom in 2010. There was a dive in non-interest income at the beginning of year 2007, 
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which is consistent with the situation of financial markets. However, the decline of net 
interest income was mild and happened around 2010 (post crisis period). Thus, from those 
on-balance data, there’s no strong evidence showing all U.S. banks moved completely 
away from traditional activate to non-traditional services to achieve higher income. The 
reason for this might be the serious regulation that restricted the establishment of branches 
(Hagen, 2005; Mishkin, 2002; Saunders and Walter, 1994; Welfens, 2008). In the United 
States, although a large number of financial institutions had existed since the 1980s, the 
number decreased due to a national consolidation through which banks could increase their 
size in order to benefit from the economies of scale (Mishkin, 2002). It also maybe some 
banks considered the switching costs from traditional bank activities to new activates, 
therefore they still focus on traditional services but make an effort to improve the efficiency 
of financial operations (Cole and White, 2012; Stiroh, 2006). Thus, in these cases, banks 
have more incentive to become large through consolidation in order to benefit from 
economies of scale (Canals, 2006; Dinger and Hagen, 2005). This leads to a discussion of 




Figure 1: Net Interest Income for Commercial Banks in United States from 1992 to 2014 






































































































































































































Figure 2: Non-Interest Income to Total Income for US banks from 1998 to 2013  




Figure 3: Net Income for Commercial Banks in United States  
Source: OECD, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
 
Figure 4: 3-Month Interbank Rates for the United States from 1992 to 2014 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Another core service provided by banks is a liquidity service (Heffernan, 2005; Matsuoka, 
2012). Banks bridge savers and borrowers with their different liquidity preferences.  For 
example, a bank lends funds to a firm which is commonly financed by deposits; while, the 
maturity of those deposits might be shorter compared to loans. In this case, the liquidity 
preferences of borrowers and savers are simultaneously satisfied through bank services. 
Moreover, interbank market works as the most immediate liquidity source within banks 
(Castiglionesi, Feriozzi, Lóránth, and Pelizzon, 2014); and the overnight interest rate can be 
a core indicator of market risk (Allen, Carletti, and Gale, 2009; Iori et al., 2008).  
 
 
In a downturn, insufficient bank liquidity could lead to inadequate allocation of capital, 
which increases a higher interbank rate as well as a higher market risk level (Iori et al., 
2008; Matsuoka, 2012). Figure 4 documents 3-Month Interbank Rates in the United States 
from 1992 to 2014. It plunged twice over the time: one happened in 2001 (‘The early 2000s 
recession’, which affected the United States in 2002 and 2003) and another one was around 
2007 (Subprime Crisis 2007-2008). The later one as an example here: a decline of the 
interbank rate can be observed in late 2006 (even during the financial crisis period from 
2007 to 2008) in order to support the refinance of problematic banks through the interbank 
market; while it slightly increases around middle of 2009 after the period of the ‘panic of 
2008’, following the scenario in the financial market that banks demanded a higher interest 
rate due to a high level of uncertainty about the future availability of liquidity and fearing 
insolvency of their counterparts. It did decrease by the end of year 2007 due to the US 
government interventions. However, funding markets experienced significant distress again 
during the fall of 2008 after Lehman Brothers and AIG failed, and Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were placed under conservatorship. As Gorton (2009) argues, the financial crisis 
resembled a banking panic that took the form of a run of financial institutions on other 
financial firms. The panic centered on the repurchase agreement market, which suffered a 
run when lenders withdrew their funds by declining to roll over their loan agreements, and 
by raising their repo haircuts. This created an indiscriminate distrust of counterparties to 
any financial transactions. Concerned about the size and location of the exposure to 
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Bank regulation also plays key role in development of the banking industry. According to 
the Basel Capital Accord proposed in 1988 and 2004, banks were required to increase the 
amount of capital holding against potential risk-taking. To be “well capitalized” under the 
Basel definition, a bank holding company must have a Tier 1 ratio of at least 6%, a Tier 1 
Leverage Ratio of at least 5%, a CAR ratio (combined tier 1 and tier 2 capital) of at least 
10%, and an Equity Capital to Total Asset Ratio of at least 4% to 6%, and not be subject 
to a written agreement to maintain a specific capital level. In the United States, according 
to FDIC guidelines for an "Adequately Capitalized institution”, a bank is expected to meet 
a minimum requirement of qualifying Tier 1 Leverage Ratio of 4.0%, total risk-based 
ratio of 8.0%, of which at least 4.0% should be in the form of Tier 1 core capital. From 
the figure 5 below, Equity Capital to Total Asset Ratio fluctuated all the time and it was 
much higher than that of their required minimum level during the past 19 years. Despite 
certain mild fluctuations, it experienced a gradual and lasting rise before year 2007, which 
was approximately 10.0%; and then from then on, they decrease constantly, hitting 9.6% 














1.2 Research Motivation  
The main motivation for this study stems from the recent subprime mortgage crisis in 2007-
08, which was characterized as one of the worst credit crises since the Great Depression 
(Mishkin, 2008). The crisis of 2007-2008 echoes earlier big international financial crises 
with many similarities to those of the past which were all triggered by events in the U.S. 
financial system; including the crises of 1857, 1893, 1907 and 1929-1933. However, it also 
has some important modern twists. The panic in 2007 was not like the previous panics, in 
that it was not a mass run on banks by individual depositors, but instead of a run by firms 
and institutional investors on financial firms. Reflecting the high costs of banking crises 
and their increased frequency, banking sector stability has increased attention in policy 
discussions in past decade.  
 
One of key questions emerging from those discussions is how to best identify an impending 
crisis, so that appropriate measures can be taken well in advance. Various studies have 
proposed early warning indicators of impending turmoil in banking systems (e.g., Alessi 
and Detken, 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 1999, 2005; European Central 
Bank, 2005; Frankel and Saravelos, 2012; Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu, 1998; Hutchinson and 
McDill, 1999; Hutchinson, 2002; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Laeven and Valencia, 
2012; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Schularick and Taylor, 2011; Simaan, 2017; Taylor, 
2013). However, full agreement on how to measure systemic banking problems and which 
explanatory variables to include has not yet been reached. Therefore, given the common 
threads that tie together apparently disparate crises, it can be useful to take a step back from 
the practical imperatives of maximizing goodness of fit and instead consider the conceptual 
underpinnings of early warning models. It is interesting to see whether a set of aggregate 
bank accounting ratios is sufficient to explain the emergence of a banking crisis? If so, 
additionally, we investigate whether these ratios convey important information on the 
timing of financial crises. This is the first motivation of this thesis. More specifically, we 
examine a broad set of balance sheet indicators for early warning purposes, and assess their 




In addition, the contagion risk in this financial event has been emphasised, since the failure 
of a bank may result in a banking panic, especially in the context of the interbank markets 
(Fourel et al., 2013; Karas and Schoors, 2013; Krause and Giansante, 2012). The current 
research arising from this area is manifold; but, the banking systems in those network 
models as developed so far are free of any actual dynamics. By consequence, scarce 
previous literature have considered the possibility that the banks could make preemptive 
actions to protect themselves from a common market shock and therefore affect the 
propagation of losses through the banking system. For example, how interbank loans are 
granted, extended, and /or withdrawn in response to a financial crisis with the high level of 
uncertainty and increased counterparty risk during the financial crisis. Therefore, my 
second purpose of our study is to investigate how the actual behaviors of banks contribute 
to or mitigate the onset of a banking crisis. We investigate real banks’ preemptive actions 
by looking significant structural shifts of banking ratios in response to the crisis at 
aggregate bank-level; even if the interactions themselves are unknown, we are aim to 
understand how banks react during the recent financial crisis.  
 
What’s more, interbank markets are a critical element of modern financial system (Iori et 
al., 2008). Within the United States, interbank market is usually one of the most liquid 
aside from short-term U.S. government borrowing market. More particularly, as one of the 
most important but vulnerable systems in the whole economy, over the last 20 or so years, 
there has been a significant growth of interest in the question whether the U.S. interbank 
markets amplifies shocks to the whole banking sector or individual banks.  
 
Through the interbank market, banks can coinsure against idiosyncratic liquidity risk by 
reallocating funds from those with an excess to others with a deficit (Allen, Carletti, and 
Gale, 2009; Angelini, Nobili and Picillo, 2011; Castiglionesi, Feriozzi, Lóránth, and 
Pelizzon, 2014; Gorton and Metrick 2009). However, it was predicted according to some 
recent economic theoretical models that the interbank lending market would freeze at the 
beginning of summer of 2007 just following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as it did 
during the Asian banking crisis of the late 1990s. This may impose adverse implications on 
the whole financial system as it could be contagious and spills over from one to the others. 
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Therefore, Central bank as a lender of last resort (LLR) must conduct large-scale 
interventions to prevent a large scale of economic deterioration under this circumstance 
(Bagehot, 1873). However, the observed evidence in the Fed funds market in the immediate 
aftermath the collapse of Lehman Brothers did not support the hypotheses above. In 
addition, the run on Northern Rock very likely reflected not the failure of the Bank’s lender 
of last resort policy but inadequacies in the UK’s provision of deposit insurance, the ill 
thought out separation of financial supervision and regulation from the central bank and 
political pressure (Milne and Wood, 2008).  On the other hand, a moral hazard problem is 
generated from LLR intervention: it encourages al banks to make an effort to be large by 
increasing the capacity of bank activities in order to benefit from TBTF (too-big-to-fail); 
while, the expansion of bank activities, especially non-traditional activities, may increase 
risk. Given that Central bank as a lender of last resort (LLR) might fail in conducting large-
scale interventions to prevent a large scale of economic deterioration under this 
circumstance, we are interested at answering following two questions: How the actual 
behaviours of banks in interbank market contribute to or mitigate the onset of a banking 
crisis? Does an increase in interbank lending lead to higher risk-taking of banks, 
particularly considering the bank size effect? 
 
In addition, in the absence of a well-functioning interbank market, idiosyncratic liquidity 
risks may be hard to coinsure against (Castiglionesi et al., 2014), leading to credit 
rationing, liquidity hoarding for self-insurance, and higher funding costs. As a result, a 
large number of financial institutions found it increasingly difficult to access interbank 
funding and manage their liquidity risk: the number of lenders in the Federal funds market 
fell from approximately 300 in the summer of 2008 to 225 after Lehman Brothers’ default, 
and the Fed funds rate experienced a one-day jump by more than 60 basis points on 
September 15, 2008, the date on which Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy (Afonso, 
Kovner, and Schoar, 2011). However, previous studies on the liquidity hoarding and 
funding ability in the interbank market offer mixed results (Acharya and Skeie, 2011; 
Castiglionesi et al., 2014; Cornett et al.; 2011; McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang, 2008; 
Taylor and Williams, 2009), motivating us to conduct a further study in this area; which 
would allow further proposal of more reliable policy implications. 
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1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
 
This thesis combines three empirical studies on U.S. bank accounting ratios, interbank 
lending and liquidity hoarding. The empirical studies are based on U.S., including the run-
up to the recent financial crisis 2007-2008, the episode of the crisis, and post stage of the 
crisis. In this research, the micro-level datasets used in this research are obtained from the 
FDIC call reports 
1
provided by FDIC. The sample includes 16520 banks 
2
and the time span 
has been restricted from fourth quarter of 1992 to the last quarter of 2011. The remainder of 
the thesis is organized as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 firstly provides a brief overview of the financial crises and systemic risks; and 
then the current state of the literature on interbank market as well as the main empirical 
studies on the interbank lending are outlined. In what follows, we present recent literature 
on liquidity hoarding. 
 
Chapter 3 starts by presenting research designs. Drawing upon a subset of aggregate U.S. 
bank accounting ratios from 1992Q4 to 2011Q4, in this study, Parametric and 
nonpararametric techniques are introduced to investigate the structural shifts of a set of 
bank ratios in response to the recent crisis. In what follows, we investigate whether those 
ratios convey important information on banks’ preemptive actions. We also discuss the 
consequence of ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) and show differences in the applicability of 
banking accounting ratios for the identification of banking problem between large and 
small banks. 
 
The interbank market plays a role in risk-sharing between banks with credit linkages,  
however, contagion from one bank to the next could be propagated via the interbank 
                                                 
 
1
 In the United States, for every national bank, state member bank and insured nonmember bank, quarterly 
basis consolidated reports of condition and income are required by the FFIEC (Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council). 
2
 16520 is the total number of banks existed during the period of 01-09-1992 to 31-12 -2011. In total 16520 
banks, some of them have been a failure, or been merged by other banks. To deal with mergers and 
acquisitions, in chapter 4 and 5, I drop bank observations with asset growth greater than 10 percent and 
winsorize variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles (13973 banks included).  
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markets, in Chapter 4, we examine how interbank lending affect the propagation of losses 
through financial linkages. Given that Central bank as a lender of last resort (LLR) might 
fail in conducting large-scale interventions, we also discuss the impact of interbank lending 
on bank risk-taking, particularly considering the bank size effect. Our empirical work in 
this chapter is based on the theoretical model introduced by Dinger and Hagen (2005) and 
our empirical results in previous chapter; here, we also consider the effect of policy of 
TBTF suggested by Freixas et al. (2000) in the context of U.S. interbank markets.  
 
In Chapter 5, we examine the impact of the disruption of the interbank market on banks’ 
liquidity creation and funding ability by splitting our whole sample into two subgroups: Net 
Lenders and Net Borrowers. We include the heterogeneity across different categories of 
liquid assets. We also propose two new on-balance proxies for banks’ liquidity risk: the 
unrealized security loss ratio and the loan loss allowance ratio. Compared with previously 
suggested proxies for banks’ liquidity risk-such as the proportion of unused loan 
commitments to their lending capacity-exposure to future losses in their balance assets 
represents more accurate measures of liquidity risk associated with the run in repo markets 
during the financial crisis. We use regression frameworks similar to that in Cornett et al. 
(2011).   
 
In Chapter 6, we highlight a summary of the answers to the research questions, and indicate 
the main conclusions based on the empirical results. Our research contributes to the recent 











Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Historical Crises 
2.1.1 Three Historical Crises Before 1930s 
First devastating slumps - starting with the America’s first panic, in 1792, following with 
first a global crisis, in 1857, and ending with the world’s biggest crisis, in 1929 - highlight 
two big trends in financial evolution. 
 
In 1790, Alexander Hamilton, the first treasury secretary of the United States, wanted a 
‘state - of - the art’ financial set up, like that of Britain; which meant American new bonds 
would be traded in open markets and the first central bank of the United States (BUS) 
would be publicly owned. It was an exciting investment opportunity. However, the 
expansion of credit by the new bank prompted massive speculation in bank shares and 
government debts by an Englishman William Duer and others. Rumours of Duer’s troubles, 
combined with the tightening of credit by the central bank, led U.S. banking market into 
sharp descent.  
 
Hamilton took American first bank bail out by using public fund to buy government bonds 
and pup up their prices, helping protected the banks and speculators who had bought at 
inflated prices (Sylla, 2007). All banks with collaterals were ensured sufficient borrowing 
at a penalty of 7%. From 1792 crisis, public firstly learnt that the products such as central 
banks, stock exchanges, and deposit insurances are cobbled together at the bottom of 
financial cliffs without a careful design. 
 
By the middle of 1900s, the whole world was getting used to financial crises. Britain 
experienced on a one crash every decade rule: the crisis of 1837 and 1847 followed by 
panic in 1825-26. However, the railroad crisis of 1857 went differently: it was the first 
global crisis.Entranced by financial and technology innovation, British investors piled into 
rail companies whose earnings did not match up to their valuations. In late spring 1857, 
railroad stocks began to drop due to high leverage and overexposed. American financial 
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system had failed in October 1857. A shock in America Midwest tore across the country 
and spread from New York to Liverpool and Glasgow, and then London. Financial 
collapses jumped from London to Paris, Hamburg, Copenhagen and Vienna. It was more 
severe and more extensive than any crisis that had before (Garber, 2001; Kindleberger, 
1986). 
 
A Wall Street crash happened around year 1929 to 1933, which is the worst slump America 
had ever faced before (Calomiris and Gorton, 1991). Financial markets were booming in 
1920s and stocks of firms exploiting new technologies, such as aluminium, were expected 
to continue to increase in value. However, at the same time, consumer prices fell and most 
of established businesses were weaker. The speculative boom of the roaring 20s came to 
end when the central bank raised interest rates in year 1928 to slow markets, and bank 
failures came in waves. Nearly 11,000 banks had failed between year 1929 and 1933 in 
USA. And eventually a fraud in London triggered a crash. De-risk the system was done by 
injecting massive public supplied capital. The Federal Deposit Insurance Commission 
(FDIC) was found on 1
st
 January 1934 to manage bank runs once and for all. It took more 
than 25 years for Dow to reclaim its historical peak in 1929. Although the exact causal 
sources are often hard to identify, and risks can be difficult to foresee beforehand, looking 
back other financial panics are rarely random events. The large scale bank distress in the 
1930s was traced back this way to shocks in the real sector. Banking panics more likely 
occur near the peak of the business cycle, with recessions on the horizon, because of 
concerns that loans do not get repaid (Gorton 1988; Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Depositors, 
noticing the risks, demand cash from the banks. As banks cannot (immediately) satisfy all 
requests, a panic may occur. 
 
2.1.2 1931 German Crisis 
The 1931 German crisis was a critical turning point in the great depression. Schnabel 




It was primarily domestic in origin; and that the cause of failure was more political than 
economic (Ferguson and Temin, 2015).  It was a currency crisis rather than a banking crisis 
in the first place. The vulnerable German banking system was struck by excess inflows and 
outflows of foreign capital (Adalet, 2003). Deposits were dominated by foreign currencies, 
and then investors lost confidence in Germany’s ability to repay the foreign debt triggered 
by domestic political actions and international economy constrain. Germany defaulted on 
most of its foreign debt in 1932, following with highly restricted capital flows of which full 
convertibility was reach again until long after World War II (Schnabel, 2004). Banks 
suffered from reserve losses due to a run on the German currency and they turned to the 
Reichsbank (the central banks of Germany, from 1876 to 1945) for liquidity. 
 
German banks, especially those highly interconnected large banks would adversely effect 
on the other financial intuitions and even the whole economy when they face potential 
failure. Therefore, the ‘too big to fail’ theory asserts that those banks must be supported by 
German government.  However, the Reichsbank failed to act as the ‘lender of last resort’. 
The banking and the currency crisis became increasingly intertwined as the crises went on 
at this stage. This twin crises imposed sever adverse effects on German economy: 
unemployment was over 4 million in 1932 (Schnabel, 2004).  The 1931 Germany crisis had 
emerged as pivotal events in the propagations of the Great depression.  
 
Banking crises are quite common, but perhaps the least understood type of crises. Financial 
institutions are inherently fragile entities, giving rise to many possible coordination 
problems (Dewatripoint and Tirole, 1994). Because of their roles in maturity transformation 
and liquidity creation, financial institutions operate with highly leveraged balance sheets. 
Hence, financial intermediations can be precarious undertakings. Fragility makes 
coordination, or lack thereof, a major challenge in financial markets. Coordination 
problems arise when investors and/or institutions take actions - like withdrawing liquidity 
or capital - merely out of fear that others also take similar actions. Given this fragility, a 
crisis can easily take place, where large amounts of liquidity or capital are withdrawn 
because of a self-fulfilling belief: it happens because investors fear it will happen (Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983). Small shocks, whether real or financial, can translate into turmoil in 
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markets and even a financial crisis; and it have long been recognized, and markets, 
institutions, and policy makers have developed a number of defensive mechanisms.  
Although regulations can help, when poorly designed or implemented, they can increase the 
likelihood of a banking crisis- distortionary effects (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2008). Moral 
hazard due to a state guarantee (e.g., explicit or implicit deposit insurance) may, for 
example, lead banks to assume too much leverage. Institutions that know they are too big 
to fail or unwind, can take excessive risks, thereby creating systemic vulnerabilities 
(Baldacci and Mulas-Granados, 2013; Laeven, 2011). For example, Ranciere and Tornell 
(2011) modelled how financial innovations can allow institutions to maximize a systemic 
bailout guarantee, and reported evidence supporting this mechanism in the context of the  
U.S. financial crisis 2007/08. 
 
2.1.3 Savings and Loan Crisis 
The Savings and Loan crisis happened in America of its 1980s and 1990s, which is not 
systemic banking crisis. Savings and Loans associations (S&Ls) are known as ‘building 
societies’ in U.K. Like most of commercial banks, S&Ls take deposits issue loans as well 
as making most of other financial activities. The deregulations of S&Ls in 1980s gave them 
more capabilities. Although it was hard to identify the control fraud, about thirds of 
Savings and Loans associations were technically insolvent in 1980s (Hellwig, 2009).  
 
Felsenfeld (1990) demonstrated that the main cause of this crisis was the interest 
impairments happened among those Savings and Loans associations:  the real cost paid for 
to access to their deposits is much higher than the profit they earned. They had held a large 
amount of mortgages, which issued to households in 1960s with same maturities if around 
40 years at fixed rates of interest, typically around 6%. At the same time, the interest rate 
S&Ls had to pay their depositors had raised to above 10% due to the high inflation in late 
1970s. In order to cover this discrepancy in their annual balance sheets, those S&Ls acted 
more imprudent in real estate lending, which made them are more vulnerable to defaults 
and bankruptcies (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).  
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The number of Savings and Loans associations jumped from 3,234 to 1,645. And it ended 
up with a large budget deficit of US in the early 1990s due to the bailout plan for those 
insolvent Savings and Loans associations. It was accumulated to about 124 billion dollars 
of a net loss to taxpayers by the end of 1999 eventually (Curry and Shibut, 2009). These 
crises imposed serious adverse impacts on America financial system, however it is not 
systemic. An individual failure ended within the financial intuition itself, but did not spread 
to others banks; also the crisis did not tear across other sectors, making them more 
vulnerable. One possible explanation of this is banks were better regulated and governed 
than S&Ls were. 
 
2.1.4 Scandinavian Banking Crisis 
The Norway, Swedish and Finland banking markets crashed in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s after a spate of deregulation caused a rapid rise in credit upswings which 
subsequently triggered a bubble burst in real estate prices.  
 
They were initiated by bank deregulation: a sustained increase in asset prices that 
unwarranted by their fundamentals results from overly rapid credit expansions (Englund, 
1999). Finally, at some point, the bubble burst. The failure in real estate market spread to 
the banking markets via the credit linkages between banks and firms. And thus, 
Scandinavian economies experienced even larger widespread bankruptcies and a severe 
reversal of country- specific credit cycles after a shift towards a tightening policy of 
monetary in Sweden and Finland. Huge deleveraging followed the lending boom of the 
1980s in Scandinavia. Eventually, the financial sectors were struck by a banking crisis 
interacted with a currency crisis. 
 
The first economy to turn down was Norway. More severe macro downturns followed, 
especially in Finland, which was more than twice what was occurred in Sweden and 
Norway. For Sweden, this crisis cost all taxpayers around 2% GDP directly (Englund, 
1999), while the government budget deficit reached 10% of GDP by 1994 (Persson, 1996). 
The governments ultimately had no choice but to intervene dramatically to save the 
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banking systems: significant injections of capital into the financial systems, the 
abandonment of currency pegs, and recapitalizations of banks.                  
 
2.1.5 Introduction of the Crisis of 2007-2008 
The question of what happened in the financial crisis started in 2007, though the most basic 
and fundamental of all, seems very difficult for most people to answer. In this section, we 
will attempt to address this question by beginning with an overview. 
 
The recent crisis started in the U.S. with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in 
early 2007. Lax regulatory oversight, a relaxation of normal standards of prudent lending 
and a period of abnormally low interest rates, and etc.: all of these had contributed to the 
housing boom (Bordo and Haubrich, 2012; Delis, 2012). Households were stimulated to 
purchase house on mortgages in the boom of housing bubble, and they became speculative 
by obtaining subprime mortgages as they were confident that houses would continue to 
appreciate. At the same time, investment banks and hedge funds issued large amount of 
debt and invested the proceeds in mortgage-backed securities(MBSs), hoping the house 
prices to rise in order to keep high profiability on balance sheets (Welfens, 2008). 
However, the housing bubble started to burst, borrowers found it more difficult to refinance 
their periodic payments for mortgages (Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013). Defaults on 
a remarkable proportion of subprime mortgages caused spill-over effects over the world via 
the securitized mortgage derivatives into which they were bundled, to the financial 
statements of investment banks, hedge funds and conduits
3
that worked as intermediators 
between mortgages and other collateralized commercial paper. The uncertainty of the value 
of the mortgages backed produced uncertainty soundness of the loans. All of this resulted in 
the freeze of the interbank market around August 2007 and thus substantial liquidity 
injections subsequently by the Federal Reserve and other central banks (Welfens, 2008). It 
also spilled over into the real economy through a virulent credit crunch which has been the 
most likely cause of a significant recession.  
 
                                                 
 
3 Conduits are bank-owned entities but off their balance sheets. 
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The most of the central banks, like the Fed, have responded in a classical way via flooding 
the financial markets with liquidity to improve bank system solvency, and bailed out some 
templates like the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the 1930s, Sweden in 1992 and 
Japan in the late 1990s (Welfens, 2008). Since then the Fed both extended and expanded its 
discount window facilities and cut the funds rate by 300 basis points. However, it worsened 
in March 2008 following the rescue of the Investment bank-Bear Stearns-by JP Morgan 
Chase pushed through by the Federal Reserve. A number of new discount window facilities 
with broadened collaterals which investment banks could access were created after the 
March crisis. A Federal Reserve Treasury bailout and partial nationalization of the 
insolvent GSEs, Fannie and Freddie Mac were justified in July on the grounds that they 
worked significant functions in the mortgage industry (Delis, 2012).  In September 2008, it 
took a turn for the worse when the Treasury and Fed allowed the investment bank, Lehman 
Brothers, to fail which broke up the traditional beliefs that “all insolvent institutions would 
be saved in an attempt to prevent moral hazard. It was argued that Lehman exposure to 
counterparty risk less extensive but in worse shape than Bear Stearns. Although it was 
initially rejected by the Congress a week ago, the bill of the Troubled Asset Relief Plan 
(TARP) worth up to $700 billion, sponsored by the US Treasury was finally passed in the 
midst of continued financial turmoil by the encourage of senate. This was devoted to 
purchase of heavily discounted mortgage backed and other securities to remove them from 
the banks’ financial positions and restore bank lending (Heffernan, 2005; Delis, 2012). The 
following day the authorities nationalized the insurance giant, AIG, to avoid the systemic 
consequences for collateralized-default swaps 
4
if it were allowed to fail.   
 
The fallout from the Lehman bankruptcy then spilled the liquidity crisis over into the global 
financial markets as interbank lending effectively seized up, on the fear that no banks were 
safe. In early October 2008, the crisis spread to Europe and to the emerging countries as the 
global interbank market ceased functioning. The UK and EU governments responded in 
kind by pumping equity into their banks, guaranteeing all interbank deposits and providing 
massive liquidity. Then on 13th October 2008, the US Treasury injected another $250 
                                                 
 
4 They are insurance contracts on securities. 
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billion into the banks, to provide insurance of senior interbank debt and unlimited deposit 
insurance coverage for non-interest bearing deposits. Time has shown that most of these 
plans are similar to earlier, mainly successful, rescue templates like the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation in the US in the 1930s, the Swedish in the 1992 and Japanese rescues 
in the 1990s mentioned earlier, and may solve the solvency crisis. 
 
The crisis of 2007-2008 echoes earlier big international financial crises with many 
similarities to those of the past which were all triggered by events in the U.S. financial 
system; including the crises of 1857, 1893, 1907 and 1929-1933. There is more historical 
evidence to be viewed (Heffernan, 2005). Figure11 describes a picture over the past 
century: the upper panel from 1953 to December 2009 indicates the monthly spreads
5
- a 
measure of credit risk as well as information asymmetric (Mishkin, 1991). Figure 7 
displays a longer period view of the Baa
6
 corporate bond rate and the ten-year TCM rate 
from 1921 to September 2008. Also, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
recession dates (proxies by vertical lines in the figures) and major financial market events 
such as stock market crashes, financial crises, and some major financial market relevant 
political events are marked in both figures. The lower panels of both Figures represent 
policy interest rates - the Federal funds rate for early 20th century and the discount rate 
since 1921 respectively. From the upper panel of figure 6, the peaks are often lined up with 
the upper turning points in the NBER reference cycles. Moreover, in many cases, especially 
the 1930s banking crisis, most market stock crashes happened close to those peaks. The 
tightening of policy before the bust and loosening in reaction to the oncoming recession 
afterwards can be observed as well. It can been learnt in the recent crisis: in September 
2008, the spread hits the level comparable to that reached in the last recession 2001-02 and 
above that of the credit crunch of 1990-91. It was just below the spreads in the early 1980s 
recession after the Volcker shock and President Carter’s credit restraint program. All of 
these events were associated with significant recessions. 
                                                 
 
5 It is the spread between the Baa corporate bond rate and the ten-year Treasury constant maturity (TCM) 
bond rate. 
6 Credit rating is a financial indicator to potential investors of bonds, which are assigned by credit rating 
agencies such as Moody’s, S&P and Fitch rating. Moody’s assigns bond credit rating of Add, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, 
B, Caa, Ca, C with WR and NR as withdrawn and not rated. 
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Figure 6: Federal funds rate and the spread between the Baa corporate bond rate and 10-year 
TCM bond rate (Bordo, 2008) 
Figure 7: Discount rate and a monthly spread between the Baa corporate bond rate and the 
long-term composite rate7(Bordo, 2008) 
Much has been written about the causes of the recent crisis (e.g., Calomiris, 2009; 
Claessens et al., 2012; Feldstein, 2009; Gorton, 2009; Teslik, 2009). While observers differ 
on the exact weights given to various factors, the list of factors common to previous crises 
is generally similar. Four characteristics often mentioned in common are: (i) asset price 
increases that turned out to be unsustainable; (ii) credit booms that led to excessive debt 
                                                 
 
7
 It is unweight average of bid yields on all outstanding fixed-coupon bonds neither due nor callable in less 
than 10 years. 
 22 
burdens; (3) build-up of marginal loans and systemic risk; and (iv) the failure of regulation 
and supervision to keep up with financial innovation and get ahead of the crisis when it 
erupted. Those countries that had experienced the greatest increases in equity and house 
prices during the boom found themselves most vulnerable during the crisis. For example, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) demonstrate that the appreciation of equity and house prices in 
the U.S. before the crisis was even more dramatic than appreciations experienced before the 
post-war debt crises. 
 
However, it also has some important modern twists. The panic in 2007 was not like the 
previous panics, like the crisis of 1907, or that of 1837, 1857, 1873 and so on, in that it was 
not a mass run on banks by individual depositors, but instead of a run by firms and 
institutional investors on financial firms. Because it was not observed by anyone, including 
regulators, politicians, and the media and so on, other than those trading or otherwise 
involved in the capital markets because the repo market 
8
 does not involve ordinary 
Americans, but firms and institutional investors.  This has made the events particularly hard 
to understand.  
 
There have been a number of previous crises where banks as the credit intermediaries in 
financial market played a crucial role such as Spain in 1997, Norway in 1987, Finland in 
1991, Sweden in 1991 and Japan in 1992, Australia in 1989, Canada in 1983, Denmark in 
1987, France in 1994, Germany in 1977, Greece in 1991, Iceland in 1985, Italy in 1990, 
New Zealand in 1987, United Kingdom in 1974,1991,1995, United States in 1984, and 
Asian banking crisis from 1998 to 1999. Credit intermediation, in the traditional banking 
system, occurs between savers and borrowers in a single entity. Savers entrust their savings 
to banks in the form of deposits, which banks use to fund the extension of loans to 
borrowers. On one hand, relative to direct lending (that is, savers lending directly to 
borrowers), credit intermediation provides savers with information and risk economies of 
scale by reducing the costs involved in screening and monitoring borrowers and by 
facilitating investments in a more diverse loan portfolio. On the other hand, when the savers 
lose confidence in a bank, they withdraw their deposit from the bank and if everyone does 
                                                 
 
8The repo market is the place where the liabilities of interest are sale and repurchase agreements. 
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that, there will be a run on that bank and finally lead to the breakdown of the whole 
banking system (De Gregorio, 2013; Pozsar et al., 2012). 
 
The risky side of the credit intermediation for banks is one of the reasons to explain the 
fragility of the financial market. Since the activities and profitability of banks are regulated, 
on one hand, there will always be other institutions replacing the role of banks as the credit 
intermediaries to some extent, considering the credit demand of the financial market. On 
the other hand, regulations, for instance about the “Credit Risk Transfer” in Basel II  
allowed lower capital requirements for banks if they could transfer their credit risk to the 
third party such as non-bank financial institutions (FIs). In this way, non-bank FIs actually 
do provide credit intermediation as well as risk transfer. 
 
However, non-bank FIs do not absorb deposits to be the guarantee of their capital as banks 
do and conduct higher risk activities to create infinite credit and transfer unlimited risk due 
to the lack of proper regulations. In addition, financial liberation and globalisation have 
connected the distinct institutions, nations and markets in an unprecedentedly close 
relationship. Therefore once a single or a few non-bank FIs with potential high risks fail 
due to an extreme event, banks will be immediately involved by the interconnections, and 
thus banks and non-banks altogether would pose panic to the whole financial market. For 
example, during the fall of 2008, some mutual funds “broke the buck” when their net asset 
value fell below par. This triggered sharp outflows from individual investors and many 
other mutual funds (Wermers, 2012). This “run”, in turn, led the government to provide a 
guarantee against further declines. These guarantees constituted a continued source of fiscal 
risk as the government might be forced to step in to prevent a run again. Other investment 
vehicles specializing in specific asset classes in emerging markets also experienced sharp 
outflows as there was a general “flight to safety”. There were more demand for advanced 
countries’ government bonds and T-bills. More generally, the Subprime mortgage crisis 
2007/08 has been interpreted by many as a widespread liquidity run (Gorton, 2009; Pozsar 
et al., 2012). 
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2.2 Systemic Risk: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Literature  
 
The global crisis 2007/09 has shown how a shock that originates in one country or asset 
class can quickly propagate to other markets and across borders: the nature of the balance 
sheet linkages between financial institutions and markets will affect the size of spill overs 
and their direction of propagation (Abiad et al., 2013). With fast globalization, however, 
financial linkages and channels of propagation are more complex. Much of the data needed 
for identifying and tracking international linkages, even at a rudimentary level, is not yet, 
and the institutional infrastructure for global systemic risk management is inadequate or 
simply non-existent. Therefore, systemic risks command much attention as the 
preoccupation of the banking industry. The objective of this part is to review different 
forms and originals of systemic risks. 
 
2.2.1 Systemic Events and Systemic Risk 
In order to reach a definition of systemic risk in financial system, we firstly clarify a 
definition of a systemic event. Then, the various notions of system risk will be introduced 
as follows. According to Bandt and Hartmann (2000), they define a systemic event both in 
the narrow sense and in the broad sense. In a narrow sense, a systemic event is defined as 
an event, where  a bad shock affecting a certain or some random financial institution(s) or 
market(s) leads  a chain reaction to affect others or whole markets. Another one follows an 
event, where a macro-economic shock simultaneously causes a shared negative reaction 
among the large scales of the financial institutions and markets. In both cases, contagion 
plays a core role in spreading a systemic event and turning it into a financial crisis, which 
can be reacted as a bank run, a decline in credit, a dramatic drop in financial asset prices, 
and so on. There are various nations of systemic risk. First of all, based on the two types of 
systemic events proposed by Bandt and Hartmann in 2000, systemic risk is defined as the 
threat engendered by one or several systemic events that can trigger repercussions, and then 
can become a financial crisis.  
 
Another approach views crises as random events that are unrelated to types of 
economic development. This entails self-fulfilling beliefs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). 
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Here, expectations play a crucial role in determining whether a systemic event might 
occur. A co-ordination issue is raised by the existence of expectations that may develop, for 
example, because of a signal that from the very outset might be independent of those 
economic variables that can actually influence financial fragility. The signal connects to the 
situation in which the financial institutions actually find themselves might also be an 
imperfect one.  In any event, co-ordination around this signal brings the financial system to 
an equilibrium that may be rational at an individual level but which is socially harmful. The 
problem of co-ordination thus raises the possibility of multiple equilibriums, or at least of a 
whole array of states that can characterize a variety of financial situations. Financial 
fragility is described by this possibility of multiple equilibriums. Nevertheless, co-
ordination around crisis equilibrium is a fortuitous occurrence. A run on the banking 
system will take place if people do indeed panic, but it won't if they don't (as long as the 
banks are able to satisfy "normal" withdrawal needs). 
 
With the respects to the macroeconomic side, Aglietta and Moutot (1993) defined systemic 
risk as the risk that may shift an economy from a "normal" equilibrium to an "abnormal" 
condition characterized by severe damage. Similarly, Minsky (1982) considers that 
financial crises are related to the economic cycle, in which case the events that 
initiate them are endogenous. Here crises are part of a dynamic that leads to the 
materialization of economic instability. In the financial system, it also can be defined as 
the likelihood that customary types of disturbances, which may cause disproportionately, 
negative after-effects if they happen in fragile financial systems 
9
(Davis, 1995). He also 
points out that financial fragility depends on the endogenous interaction between credit and 
asset values during the course of the economic cycle. This process does not revolve around 
the notion of multiple equilibriums. It is possible to have financial dynamics that 
unavoidably lead to crisis equilibrium. According to his study, particularly, financial 
fragility is the interdependency of those behaviors that can engender instability (i.e., it is a 
dynamic that causes a crisis). 
                                                 
 
9
 Financial fragility is the arena in which shocks become systemic events.  It leads to externalities in the 
transmission of shocks, externalities that can provoke non-linearity (i.e. a cumulative strengthening of and 
discontinuity in) the ensuing shifts (Hellwig, 2009). 
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All in all, diverging perceptions of the systemic events that trigger such processes lead to 
formal differences in the crises’ representation. However, the hypothesis of fragility is 
essential in all approaches. 
 
2.2.2 The Financial Fragility Hypothesis and Systemic risk 
Based on the definitions of systemic risk, the initial thinking for a framework of systemic 
risk related theories is to develop at least one hypothesis as to “why certain financial 
relationships are structured in such a fragile manner”. A large number of systemic risk 
models are distinguished by the using of the different hypothesis of fragility. Their main 
contribution to describing the way in which a harmful shock is propagated can be denied; 
however, to understand the nature of shocks that striking fragile systems is also important, 
in order to distinguish main approaches to the origins of financial crises (Gale, 2000). Now, 
let us go back the hypothesis of financial fragility; two main factors drive financial 
fragility: liquidity and the asymmetry of information. 
 
Liquidity is mainly related to models with multiple equilibriums as the liquidity of a 
financial intermediary or of a market that originates in a problem of co-ordination. As a 
starting point for a number of extrapolations, the basic model used by Diamond and 
Dybvig defines a crisis as a run on bank deposits; which is originated from a 
microeconomic conception of banking, as any agent who agrees to transform its liabilities 
into currency unconditionally and at a fixed-price; whilst convert its liabilities into illiquid 
assets. The unconditional nature of this promise makes the bank to apply a process of ‘first 
come, first served’. Financial panic stems from self- referential beliefs by individual 
depositors that other depositors will prematurely attempt to make a withdrawal 
simultaneously. However, the liquidity-related co-ordination exclusively in terms of the 
deposit agreement
10
, neglects the role of the financial markets. It only explains a run on a 
single bank, not contagion throughout the financial system.   
 
                                                 
 
10 Here, the deposit agreements are used by economic agents to protect themselves from the uncertain nature 
of the demand for liquidity. 
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Contagion from one bank to the next is propagated via the interbank markets (Rochet and 
Tirole, 1996; Allen and Gale, 2001); which has been manifested in the settlements systems 
(Freixas and Parigi, 1998). The interbank market reapportions excess liquidity towards 
other banks that may have shortages only in case of no overall excess demand for 
liquidity, as interbank deposits cannot increase the aggregate liquidity. The lender of last 
resort will be the only solution if the interbank market fully freezes. If this lender is 
apathetic, those banks who would be the first to experience difficulties with a large 
numbers of withdraw depositors, thus propagating fragility and spreading panic through the 
interbank market, especially where there is a chain of bilateral relationships in this market 
where the gross outstanding positions (rather than the net ones) are exposed to liquidity 
risk. In addition, the net amount based settlement systems can cause the chain reactions 
with blinding speed if those payments are not secured. Based on this, net multilateral 
positions need to be settled via the Central bank’s clearing system to ensure that the final 
payments are indeed being made. As the price of being benefit from this collective service, 
those direct member banks in these secured systems must follow certain prudential 
constraints and agree to share in the losses in case one of them fails. In a continuous gross 
amount settlement system, systemic risk cannot be triggered by a chain reaction of failures 
payments. But, a freeze on settlements can spread via the financial linkages if one bank’s 
inability to pay at a certain juncture puts other banks into the same situation at a later time. 
It may be possible to freeze settlements to preclude crisis equilibrium; therefore the central 
bank has to provide liquidity in the form of collateralised inter-day loans. 
 
Although central banks can overcome liquidity-related co-ordination problems in the 
interbank settlement systems, the same does not apply to markets, at least not within a 
sphere of current financial organization; because markets have become (or have once again 
become) large-scale providers of liquidity (Davis, 1994). Yet a co-ordination problem 
results in market liquidity closely reliant on the expectations of future prices (Masson, 
1999). Market liquidity is the key as banks sell their assets to meet uncertain liability-side 
withdrawals. However, Genotte and Leland (1990) argued that expected future prices 
would no longer be co-ordinated on the basis of the given security’s fundamental value 
when there is doubt about market’s liquidity. The fear of lower prices results in unilateral 
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selling and thus the drops of prices. It follows withdrawal from the market or else 
abstaining from buying by financial institutions. A panic equilibrium will be the result in 
extreme price volatility. 
 
Although the issue of credit is not included in the aforementioned framework of financial 
fragility, it does play a crucial role in the second factor - the asymmetry of information - 
with its two corollaries, contrarian strategies and moral hazard (Mishkin, 1991). In 
particularly, the Asian crisis documented the change from an abundance of credit to an 
extreme rationing thereby forming a sort of discontinuity (Marshall, 1998). Treating 
financial fragility as a function of the economic cycle, there is the interaction between 
credit and the financial markets. During financial crises, a plethora of commentaries has 
been made on the significance of this interaction by those historians; such as financial 
deregulation and the shaping of a single capital market in Europe (Kindleberger, 1996). 
 
Under this process, the asymmetry of the contract of indebtedness is the micro-economic 
foundation. The limited liability of debtors on the loans they have received constitutes to 
an asymmetrical configurations of profits and losses. The asymmetry of information is a 
consequence of the legal form under the assumptions of indebtedness. When investors 
leverage up to buy securities, they are transmitting partial downside risk to the lenders, 
whilst keeping all of the upside potential for themselves. During the credit expansion 
phase, this triggers financial fragility because the asset price produced is systematically 
higher than their fundamental value (Allen and Gale, 2001). Given that the credit 
expectation decides assets’ future price and itself is something uncertain, the rise in the 
size of the bubble matches the rise in uncertainty. In the aforementioned configurations, a 
bubble can translate the existence of unrealistic profit expectations, and thus a slow credit 
growth rate may be enough to burst the bubble. Here it is a financial crisis. Inasmuch as 
the systemic event - the collapse in asset prices comes up with the problem of the 
possibility that they can be liquidated in order to reimburse debts.  
 
Systemic risks would be considered only in a decentralized financial environment in which 
financial institutions create credit risks in their mutual transaction. And there are various 
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ways for banking regulator to prevent systemic risk. Traditionally, governments implicitly 
rescue insured distressed banks via discount loans, nationalization, and so forth. However, 
it may lead to substantial cross-subsidies from healthy financial institutions to frail ones 
through the government - mediated mechanism, it also bring out moral hazard problem. 
An alternative method of reducing the exposure to systemic failure would consist in a 
strict collateral requirement in derivative market. In this case, to what extent that the 
government would be affected by a bank failure in a centralized system depends on the 
constraints it puts on banks. Last, centralizing banks’ liquidity management eliminates 
systemic risk. The central bank bears the credit risk if the banks defaults and the defaults 
cannot propagate to the other banks through interbank linkages. It guarantees the finality 





















2.3 U.S. Interbank Lending During the Crisis 
2.3.1 Introduction of the Interbank market 
Interbank market is a critical element in modern financial system. It helps banks meet large 
volumes funding liquidity requirements, and allows banks with a temporary surplus of cash to 
invest it reliably for period maturities from overnight to one year.   
 
This market differs itself from other financial sectors due to its distinct policies for finding 
liquidity, its close unique relationship between financial institutional participants and its unique 
over - the - counter (OCT) structure. Also, interbank market is acting and central hubs for 
complex financial networks, connecting all financial institutions in banking sector (Iori et al., 
2008). 
 
Inside the United States, interbank market is usually one of the most liquid aside from short- 
term U.S. government borrowing market: outstanding transactions to other banks averaged 
close to $440 billion in 2009. Interbank transactions mainly include overnight and term 
interbank loan in the Fed funds market or its equivalents, intraday debits on payment systems, 
and contingent claims in OCT market. 
 
The interbank market is one of particular interest because the overnight rates (shortest term) are 
determined in this market; hence it has a significant influential power on the longer maturities 
rate. Overnight segment of interbank market is where banks look to mitigate any risk that 
driven from short-term liquidity short, and thus to ensure that trading day us closed with a 
balanced position. Here, the behaviour of the overnight interest rates emerges from the results 
of the rules and practices governing the refinancing operations run by central banks. The 
interest on interbank loans also is a critical guide for other type of loans and for the pricing 
stocks and bonds. For example, under Eurosystem, the way financial organizations behave in 
the interbank market is directly driven by the governances from the operational framework that 
created and enforced by the European Central Bank (ECB) for implementation of their 
monetary policies (Temizsoy et al., 2015). For specifically, ECB uses four ways of operations 
to implement the policy: the main (MROs), structural operations, and longer-term (LTROs) 
refinancing operations as well as fine-tuning (FTOs) (Temizsoy et al., 2015). In this way, the 
Eurosystem controls liquidity and manages interest rate in their money market with the help of 
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the open market operations (OMOs). This operational framework requires all financial 
institutions to hold minimum reserve during a specific reserve maintenance period (RMP) in 
order to allow the Eurosytem operational framework to stabilize money market interest rate and 
create structural liquidity storages. And the minimum reserve requirements are calculated on 
the basis of banks’ individual balance sheet. 
 
Interbank lending makes a great contribution to the efficiency of financial markets generally. 
There are two way for those interbank transactions to resolve short-term imbalances of supply 
of demand. In any normal day, some banks receive more deposits than expected, while others 
receive more-less than expected. Similarly, some banks experience an unexpected demand for 
loans such as from homeowners or investors in equities; while other banks face the opposite 
situation. If banks could not reliably lend and borrow on any particular day to offset those 
unanticipated ebbs and flows, a large volume of cash would be need to hold to insure itself 
against the possibility of unexpected payment inflows or outflow. However, having extra-large 
amount of cash holdings is a big waste as those recourses could be invested profitably 
elsewhere. The interbank market helps banks to solve this problem in satisfying temporary, 
localized excess demand for funding liquidity that is needed for the smooth function of other 
financial organizations.  
 
Even for many banks that are mostly funded by deposits, interbank loans may be a critical 
marginal source of additional funds. Usually, the rate of interbank loans is lower than for other 
trading partners as banks are seen as low-risk confidence borrowers; investors require a smaller 
risk premium and even without collateral. However, events occasionally strain the interbank 
lending: such as physical disruption on 11
th
 September 2001 as well as financial crisis of 2007-
09. Uncertainty about banks’ own needs combined with concerns about potential shortfalls 
prompted banks to be more unwilling to lend for more than a few days, and even then only at 
every high interest rates. The higher rate and reduced availability of interbank lending would 
create a vicious circle of over caution, extraordinary increase in demand for liquid, reduced 
willingness to lend and higher cost. For the neither collateralized nor insured against interbank 
loans, one financial institution’s failure may trigger a chain of subsequent failures and 
eventually force the central bank to intervene to stop the contagion process in the bud. 
Interbank lending also could reduce the transparency of the data of banks’ balance and off-
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balance sheet and complicate the measurement of actual banking liquidity and solvency ratios 
for prudential purposes.  
 
2.3.2 U.S. Interbank Lending During the Crisis 
More particularly, as one of the most important but vulnerable systems in the whole economy, 
over the last 20 or so years, there has been a significant growth of interest in the question 
whether the U.S. interbank markets amplifies shocks to the whole banking sector or individual 
banks. 
 
Although the interbank markets malfunction occasionally, they still have significant influence 
on the modern economy through monetary policy (Matsuoka, 2012). In the U.S., the Fed funds 
rate, also known as overnight interbank rate, is worked as main channel in monetary policy. In 
addition, interbank market works as the most immediate liquidity source within banks; 
therefore it can be a core indicator of the functioning of the banking market. Insufficient bank 
liquidity leading to inadequate allocation of capital could happen if any problems happen in this 
market. 
 
It was predicted according to some recent economic theoretical models that the interbank 
lending market would freeze at the beginning of summer of 2007 just following the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers as it did during the Asian banking crisis of the late 1990s. This may 
impose adverse implications in the whole financial system as it could be contagious and spills 
over from one to the others. Therefore, Central bank must conduct large-scale interventions to 
prevent a large scale of economic deterioration under this circumstance (Bagehot, 1873). 
 
However, the observed evidence in the Fed funds market in the immediate aftermath the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, did not support the hypotheses above. Figure 8 below shows 
daily amounts of transactions and daily interest rate in the Fed funds market. Four key dates are 
highlighted in figure 8: BNP Paribas limits withdrawals on 9
th
 August 2007; JP Morgan 
announces Bear Stearns acquisition on 16
th
 March 2008; Lehman Brothers goes bankrupt on 
15
th
 September 2008; and First effective day of interest on reserve balances on 9
th
 October 
2008. Although the rates spiked and loan terms became more sensitive to bank risk, not only 
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the amount of transactions
11
 but also the cost of funds remained stable overall
12
. It seems likely 
that the aggregate market did not expand to meet extraordinary demands for funds. This was 
also examined by Afouso et al. (2010) and the conclusion remains: the market did not freeze.  
    
Figure 8: Daily amount of transactions ($billions) and Fed funds rate in Federal funds market 
(Afonso et al., 2011) 
 
While, it cannot be denied that the Fed market did not grow to meet the expected high demand 
as other sources of funding dried up; for example, credit terms tightened especially for large 
banks with worse performance in the two days following the failure of Lehman. In contrast, it 
did not happen to small banks. However, immediately before the Federal Reserve’s $85 billion 




, the spreads between the demands and 
supply of funds for large banks returned to pre-crisis levels or below, although borrowing 
amounts remained lower. It suggests that the market has changed their beliefs of ‘too big to 
fail’ (TBTF). 
 
Besides, more mixed impacts of the recent crisis through interbank market have been 
documented in Table1 below:  
                                                 
 
11
 The daily amount of transactions only began to fall after the interest on reserves (IOR) period begins.  
12
 After Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, the weighted average rate then jumped with substantially more widening of 
the distribution.  
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Acharya & Merrouche 2013 Precautionary hoarding by settlement 
banks 
Wetherilt et al.   2009 Fewer interbank lending relationships 
during the crisis 
 Halsall et al.  2008 Shifts in timing of interbank loans during 
the sub-prime turmoil 
Germany Memmel & Stein 2008 Low risk of interbank contagion 
Italy Angelini, Nobili & Picillo 2011 Interbank rates become more sensitive to 
borrower characteristics 
US Gorton & Metrick 2009 “Run on repo” with increased haircuts in 
the $10 trillion repo market especially for 
lower quality assets 
Table 1: Mixed impact of the recent crisis through interbank market 
 
What is more important is, are there any lessons to be learnt from the recent crisis? The answer 
is positive: those financial institutions (FIs) should be properly regulated. First FIs should be 
stopped from exposing to distress, not only in detecting management fraud in order to maintain 
the health of balance sheets, but also in setting up a stricter requirement of capital buffer. In 
addition, more attentions should be paid on the liquidity risk that raised from the maturity 
mismatch between short term financial instruments and long-term ones. In August 2007, the 
central banks reacted quickly in the Bagehot manner to deal with the freezing of the interbank 
markets in August 2007. The ECB flooded the European money market with respect to 
liquidity as did the Fed, which lowered the discount rate by 50 basis points. It seems likely that 
the first part of Bagehot’s lesson to lend freely was heeded but not quite on the second part of 
lending at a penalty rate. The run on Northern Rock very likely reflected not the failure of the 
Bank’s lender of last resort policy but inadequacies in the UK’s provision of deposit insurance, 
the ill thought out separation of financial supervision and regulation from the central bank and 
political pressure (Milne and Wood, 2008). Moreover, it has been pointed out that one of 
deepest problem facing the financial system is solvency which stems from the difficulty of 
pricing securities backed by a pool of assets. As a result, in the credit market, it is the inability 
to determine which firms are solvent and which are not as the portfolios they hold are filled 
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with securities of uncertain value, derivatives that are so complex the art of pricing them has 
not been mastered. 
 
2.3.3 Models of Systemic Risk in Interbank Lending 
Recall section 2.2., we’ve learnt that in financial system, systemic risk could lead to systemic 
failure at a large enough scale through different channels. According to literature, there are 
three main sources for systemic failure. First, given that financial institutions hold in similar 
types of investments, a large enough failure by one bank would lead to a decrease in the prices 
of their assets and affect the solvency of other FIs which hold the same investments (Allen and 
Gale, 2000; Edison, Luangaram and Miller, 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998). The second 
aspect of systemic risk arises from a bank run: depositors and investors attempt to withdraw 
funds at the same periods of time leading to a collapse of the financial system (Calomiris and 
Kahn, 1996; Diamond and Dybvig, 1985; Donaldson, 1992; de Bandt, 1999). Third, the inter-
locking exposures among banks, create the potential for one bank’s failure to have ‘knock on’ 
effects on the financial health of the banks rather than forming a basis for mutual insurance 
(Allen and Gale, 2000). Here, we focus on the third one. 
 
The following part further to review the existing theoretical and empirical literature about 
systemic risk: Examples include Kaufuman and Scott (2003), Chan-Lau et al. (2009), Bandt 
and Hartmann (2000), and etc.; and thus identify areas in which areas in which future research 
efforts are needed. 
 
First of all, the significant effects of reduced liquidity upon the speed of banking failures are 
recorded in some theoretical models. The concept in such models is that banks suffer losses in 
the value of assets because of ‘fire sales’ stemming from their liquidations by failing banks. 
This affects the assets of non-failing banks, causing loses which can exceed their capital base, 
and in turn render them vulnerable to collapse (Allen and Gale, 2001; Diamond and Rajan, 
2005). Another thread of models focus on how interbank loans can be used to reduce systemic 
risk. It works so by encouraging banks to monitor each other’s reactions as their exposure to 
interbank loans renders them susceptible to other bank failures (Rochet and Tirole, 1996). 
Another study by Freixas et al. (2000) demonstrates how interbank lending can be used as a 
tool to lessen the impact of depositors’ withdrawals. An empirical study was made to underpin 
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such models by Cocco et al. (2009). Moreover, an investigation conducted by Eichberger and 
Summer (2005) shows rising capital adequacy can actually serve to increase systemic risks in 
equilibrium. These models have ‘equilibrium model’ in common; and they are based on the 
assumption of acknowledged interactions between a particular bank and other banks so that 
they are not modelled explicitly therefore the effects of interbank loans cannot be studied 
directly, especially in the networks properties and structures. 
 
In contrast to those equilibrium models, more recently and popularly, explicit models treat 
financial interactions between banks as networks and simulation techniques are commonly used 
to indicate the spread of possible bank failure. The application of network models range widely. 
For example, Vivier-Lirimont (2004) employed network model to assess the optimal network 
structure of interbank loans from the banks point of view. While it might only work in 
explaining the existence of specific network structures, rather than in the understanding of 
systemic risks; also, a strand of models still, focus on the implications of ‘liquidity effects’, are 
similar to the equilibrium models mentioned above: the only difference is that they explicitly 
use the network structure of financial connections to work out the spread of banking failures 
due to liquidity effects (Cifuentes et al., 2005). Haldane (2009) gives a general overview of the 
limitations of such modelling methods. 
 
Unlike all of the above mentioned models describing the behavior of banks themselves in a 
rather rudimentary fashion, models presented in Eboli (2007), Gai and Kapadia (2007), Nier et 
al. (2007), Battiston et al.(2012), and May  and  Arinaminpathy (2010) explicitly consider the 
banks’ balance sheets, and then how a bank failure spreads through the system via interbank 
lending. In these models, assumptions about the properties of banks, their network structure and 
how failures propagate themselves are made. For example, it is commonly assumed that all 
banks follows an Erdös-Renyi randomized network, so that the banks are same in size and 
capital base therefore all interbank loans are identical: empirical facts about the real banking 
system and the heterogeneity of banks are not taken into account. Besides, because of the 
limitations of these assumptions, a comprehensive overview of the determinants of financial 
crises cannot be achieved, relying as they do on average field estimates based on a small 
number of common parameters. A common conclusion of such models is that increased bank 
connectivity can enlarge the spread of failure, yet in the case of very high connectivity this can 
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be reduced again. A more obvious result is that a higher capital base reduces the scale of 
banking crisis. In addition to the literature above, Sui (2009) investigated the relevance of 
network structure in the spread of banking failure; and also took into account the significance 
of the originator of the crisis in a rather stylized approach. Lastly, the distribution of losses in 
such a model is described by Canedo and Jaramillo (2009a). 
 
Furthermore, a large scale of empirical papers have attempted to provide more sights on the 
vulnerability of a particular banking system to systemic risks, usually by focusing on individual 
countries and either using the real structure of interbank lending (with data observed from 
central banks) or at least estimate such a structure. The papers addressing this aspect include 
Sheldon and Maurer (1998), Elsinger et al.(2001), Blavarg and Nimander (2002), Wells (2002), 
Graf et al.(2004), Upper and Worms (2004), Lyre and Peydro-Alcalde (2005), Mistrulli (2005), 
Elsinger et al.(2006), Gropp et al (2006), Iori et al.(2006), Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006), 
Degryse and Nguyen (2007), Estrada and Morales (2008) , Canedo and Jaramillo (2009b), and 
Toivanen (2009). Empirical literature of interbank loan networks reveals a power law tail in 
their connections (Boss et al., 2004a). Analysis of the US Fed wire system shows a degree 
distribution that follows power law with a power law exponent (λ) 1.76 among the 9000 banks 
(Soramäki et al., 2007; Becher et al., 2008). Austrian interbank system that consists of more 
than 900 banks again is analyzed by Boss et al. (2004b) and Cajueiro and Tabak (2008) and 
finds a λ of 1.85 for the out degree for the period from 2000-2003. In the Brazilian banking 
system, a tail range of between 2.23-3.37 is indicated in a study between June 2007 and 
November 2008 of more than 600 banks (Edson and  Cont, 2010). The investigations of smaller 
banking systems in Italy and the UK, conducted by Becher et al. (2008) and Iori et al. (2008), 
find there a high level of tiering, that is to say a small number of banks control most of others. 
The Swiss interbank network is a relatively small system (around 100 banks). In this case, there 
was a rather distorted system of the distribution of links: just 2 large banks control the 
interbank loan market, which suggests an extremely small power law exponent (Müller, 2006). 
Craig and Von Peter (2014) analyzed the larger German banking system in detail by a core-
periphery model. They found the German network has a high-tiered structure: just 2% of the 
banks dominate the core. The result was very consistent from 1999 to 2007 by using bilateral 
exposures. As mentioned above, there is a board range indicated in the different size of banks 
and also their interconnections, which doubts the assumptions of random networks and banks 
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of equal size. Upper (2007) contains comprehensive overviews of empirical methods and 
disparity results provided in many of these papers mentioned early. With the various properties 
of banking systems in each country, it is of course the case that there is a wide range of 
systemic risks due to interbank lending. There is a requirement for a comprehensive tool to 
examine systemic risks in need of taking into account all this variation. Krause and Giansante 
(2012) further enhanced an explicit model of a more realistic banking system with 
heterogeneous banks of different sizes, balance sheet structures, and the sizes of interbank loan 
as well as network topologies.  
 
Apart from focusing on systemic risks triggered by interbank loans, there has also been 
modelling of particular areas related to estimating systemic risks:  Eisenberg and Noe (2001), 
and May et al. (2008) looked at the payment networks; Markose et al. (2008) investigated 
counter party exposures in credit default swaps and Battiston et al. (2007) examined trade 
credits between companies. However, the banking systems developed in recent literature are all 
free of any actual dynamics in the network itself. It would be worth to investigate how the 
actual behavior of banks contributes to or mitigates the onset of a financial crisis. For example, 
the liquidity hoarding - a mechanism whereby shocks can be propagated is by banks taking 
fright and being reluctant to lend - is thought by some to the main problem at present literature. 
Therefore, the literature on liquidity hoarding will be presented in the next section.  
 
2.3.4 Liquidity Hoarding in the Interbank Market 
This section briefly reviews literatures associated liquidity hoarding with the financial turmoil 
of 2007-2009. Bank liquidity hoarding is not a new phenomenon. For example, in the aftermath 
of the Great Depression, and particularly during the late 1930s, U.S. commercial banks 
accumulated substantial amounts of voluntary excess reserves. As Ramos (1996) points out, 
during and immediately after a severe liquidity crisis, banks hoard excess cash to self-insure 
against further drains of cash and to send markets a strong message that their solvency is not at 
risk and that bank runs are not justifiable. The situation during the banking crisis of the 1930s 
clearly resembles the bank behaviour during the most recent financial crisis. As suggested at 
that time, banks sought to build up liquidity buffers to reduce their risk exposure on the asset 
side of their balance sheets at times when capital and debt was very expensive.  
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The financial crisis started in August 2007 when interbank markets froze and the market for 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) collapsed: from $1.2 trillion in August to about $850 
billion by year-end. The dry-up of liquidity continued in 2008 as investors became concerned 
about the credit quality and the liquidation value of collateral backing ABCP transactions 
(Covitz, Liang and Suarez, 2013). Similarly, outstanding volumes in the unsecured commercial 
paper market for financial firms plunged by about $350 billion after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers and the bailout of AIG in October 2008. 
 
In the face of fear and uncertainty in financial markets, large institutional investors withdrew 
their funds from the collective pool of cash by declining to roll over their loan agreements.  In 
normal times, this can be done without causing significant effects on interest rates. However, 
with deepening concerns about the credit quality of counterparties and the fact that the 
magnitude of the exposure to subprime-related assets was unknown, investors withdrew their 
funds en masse. This withdrawal created a huge shortage of collateral, which forced institutions 
to sell securities to meet the increased demand for liquidity. As the repo and interbank markets 
shrunk, the increased sale of securities drove their prices further down.  Such deterioration in 
the value of securities (most of which were being used as collateral in repo transactions) was a 
natural source of liquidity risk leading to the precautionary hoarding of liquid assets. 
 
In an effort to ease conditions in interbank and credit markets, the Federal Reserve provided a 
significant amount of liquidity to the banking sector via several new facilities. These new 
facilities include the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF), the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), the Fed’s Term 
Auction Facility (TAF), the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), the Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility (PDCF), the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), and the temporary 
liquidity swap arrangements between the Federal Reserve and foreign central banks.  
 
For example, TAF, introduced  in  December  2007, was  a  new  approach  taken  by  the  Fed  
to  address concerns of stigma attached to the discount window (Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar, 
and Shrader, 2014). TAF delivered term funds through auctions to banks that were in need. It 
expanded immediately following Lehman Brothers’ default. Previous studies on the 
effectiveness of TAF in mitigating liquidity problems in the interbank market offer mixed 
results (McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang, 2008; Taylor and Williams, 2009).  
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As the functioning of financial markets improved, many of the liquidity programs expired or 
were closed in 2009. The composition of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet continued to shift 
in the second half of 2009 and early 2010, when the liquidity supports to markets took the form 
of purchases of Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities. The considerable decline in the 
credit extended through the various liquidity programs was more than offset by the increase in 
securities holdings. 
 
Combined with an approximately $220 billion capital injection through the Capital Purchase 
Program (TARP), a total of about $820 billion was provided to the banking industry during 
2008 and 2009. Interestingly, most of the funds received by banks resulted in an increase in 
excess reserves of $765 billion over 2008 and $318 billion in 2009. This information suggests 
that banks decided to keep the injected funds in the form of reserves at the central bank. 
 
The build-up of excess reserves held at the central bank during the implementation of the 
liquidity programs provides the first piece of evidence of liquidity hoarding in the U.S.. 
Moreover, this evidence is consistent with the argument that injecting more excess reserves into 
the banking sector does not necessarily lead to more bank lending. As Martin, McAndrews, and 
Skeie (2011) argue, in the context of interest paid on bank reserves and no binding reserve 
requirements, excess reserves may end up contracting lending. This is the case when interest 
rates are very low (almost zero) so that the marginal return on loans is smaller than the 
opportunity cost of making a loan. The adverse effect on lending is more apparent when banks 
face increased balance sheet costs associated with agency costs or regulatory requirements for 
capital or leverage ratios. Using a related argument, Hancock and Passmore (2011) contend that 
when the cost of capital is high and banks are capital constrained, additional excess reserves 
impose a tax on the banking sector because they tie up capital for a low profit or unprofitable 
use. As mentioned above, a large accumulation of excess reserves at the central bank after 
monetary expansions is also found using data for settlement banks in the U.K. and the 
unsecured euro interbank market. 
 
Several theoretical papers have examined the motivation for banks to hoard liquid assets.  For 
example, banks may decide to hoard liquidity for precautionary reasons if they believe they will 
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be unable to obtain interbank loans when they are affected by temporary liquidity shortages 
(Allen and Gale, 2004). Precautionary liquidity hoarding has also been modelled as the 
response of banks to the fear of forced asset liquidation, as in the frameworks of Diamond and 
Rajan (2009), Gale and Yorulmazer (2011). By the study of Diamond and Rajan (2009), banks 
hoard liquidity in anticipation of future liquidation of assets which, in the context of severe 
disruptions in funding markets, provide a high expected return from holding cash. In the model 
of Gale and Yorulmazer, banks hoard liquidity to protect themselves against future liquidity 
shocks (precautionary motive) or to take advantage of potential sales (strategic motive). 
Acharya and Skeie (2011) develop a model in which banks hoard liquidity in anticipation of 
insolvency of their counterparties in interbank markets (rollover risk). 
 
Another strand of the literature derives liquidity hoarding as a result of Knightian uncertainty 
when due to increased uncertainty banks make decisions based on worst-case scenarios 
(Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008)—and contagion in financial networks. For example, 
Caballero and Simsek (2009) propose a framework in which banks operate in complex network 
structures. In those market structures, the information that banks normally collect to assess the 
financial conditions of their trading partners becomes insufficient. To learn more about their 
counterparty risks, they have to collect information on the health of the trading partners of the 
trading partners of the trading partners, and so on.  During times of financial distress, this 
process becomes extremely costly. Moreover, the confusion and uncertainty that follows a 
liquidity shock can trigger massive flight-to-quality episodes, and force illiquid banks to 
withdraw from loan commitments and illiquid positions. As the flight-to-quality unfolds, the 
financial crisis spreads. 
 
In a similar vein, Zawadowski (2011) uses the idea of financial contagion in network structures 
to show that uncertainty in short-term funding markets among interconnected institutions can 
lead to excessive liquidity hoarding. The author shows that, after a liquidity shock, uncertainty 
about not being able to roll over interbank loans leads to inefficient liquidation of assets, which 
causes no default in equilibrium but a significant drop in lending. The novelty in his analysis is 
that uncertainty is capable of spreading and magnifying the impact of liquidity shocks through 
an interbank network. This network works as an interwoven structure in which each bank 
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finances several other banks, so that uncertainty about funding in one bank spreads to more and 
more banks in the consecutive layers of intermediation. 
 
Recent empirical evidence on liquidity hoarding is provided by Acharya and Merrouche (2013), 
Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2008), De Haan and Van den End (2011), and Wolman and 
Ennis (2011). Using data for large settlement banks in the U.K., Acharya and Merrouche 
(2013) show that banks significantly increased their liquidity buffers after August 2007.  This 
increase in liquid assets occurred when the interbank markets started to dry up and bank 
borrowing costs ballooned. Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2008) also provide evidence of 
liquidity hoarding in the euro interbank market.  Unlike the very small spreads and infinitesimal 
amounts of excess reserves in normal times, they show that the unsecured euro interbank 
market exhibited significantly higher spreads leading to a dramatic increase in banks’ excess 
reserves. Using a panel Vector Autoregression (p-VAR) approach, De Haan and Van den End 
(2011) find that in response to funding liquidity shocks, Dutch banks reduce wholesale lending, 
hoard liquidity in the form of liquid bonds and central bank reserves, and conduct fire sales of 
equity securities. Finally, Wolman and Ennis (2011) using data on U.S. commercial banks find 
that banks holding large excess reserves at the Federal Reserve since the fall of 2008 also 
increased their holdings of other liquid assets such as short-term securities. Furthermore, their 
findings indicate that banks holding high levels of liquidity have enough capital to expand their 



















Reflecting the high costs of banking crises and their increased frequency, banking sector 
stability has increased attention in policy discussions in past decade. Bank runs have occurred 
in many countries throughout history. In the U.S., bank runs were common during the banking 
panics of the 1800s and in the early 1900s during the Great Depression. The crisis of 2007-
2008, while it was characterized as one of the worst credit crises since the Great Depression, 
echoes earlier big international financial crises with many similarities to those of the past which 
were all triggered by events in the U.S. financial system; including the crises of 1857, 1893, 
1907 and 1929-1933. However, it also has some important modern twists. The panic in 2007 
was not like the previous panics, in that it was not a mass run on banks by individual 
depositors, but instead of a run by firms and institutional investors on financial firms. It has 
also raised puzzles as it was believed that the subprime market was too small to trigger the 
propagation of losses in the entire U.S. financial market (Mishkin, 2008). 
 
While there are many benefits in knowing whether and if so when a crisis may occur, it has 
been a challenge to predict crisis. Recall our work in literature review, various studies have 
proposed early warning indicators of impending turmoil in banking systems (e.g., Alessi and 
Detken, 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 1999, 2005; European Central Bank, 
2005; Frankel and Saravelos, 2012; Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu, 1998; Hutchinson and McDill, 
1999; Hutchinson; 2002; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Laeven and Valencia, 2012; Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2008, 2009; Schularick and Taylor, 2011; Taylor, 2013). However, full agreement 
on how to measure systemic banking problems and which explanatory variables to include has 
not yet been reached. Given the common threads that tie together apparently disparate crises, it 
can be useful to take a step back from the practical imperatives of maximizing goodness of fit 
and instead consider the conceptual underpinnings of early warning models.  
 
In addition to this, although a large body of literature has proposed various ways for identify an 
impending crisis by studying systemic risks as well as contagion models via different channels, 
scare previous literature have considered the possibility that banks could make actions to 
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protect themselves during the financial crisis and therefore affect the propagation of losses 
through the financial linkages. In order to combine the dynamics into existing contagion model 
with valid explanatory variables, studying the real banks’ preemptive actions in the crisis 
thereof is also essential.  
 
Drawing upon a subset of aggregate U.S. bank accounting ratios from FDIC call reports, in this 
chapter, we present an econometric analysis of the applicability of those ratios for studying 
banks’ preemptive behaviours by using. The sample period has been restricted from the fourth 
quarter of 1992 to the last quarter of 2011; and 16520 banks are included. More specifically, we 
firstly examine a broad set of balance sheet indicators for early warning purposes, and assess 
their relative likelihood of success. It aims to provide an organizing framework for selected 
indicators of vulnerability to crises, especially those that are associated with banks more 
generally. In what follows, we will also investigate real banks’ preemptive actions by looking 
their significant structural shifts in response to the crisis at average bank level; even if the 
interactions themselves are unknown, with the aim to understand how banks react during the 
recent financial crisis. The characteristics of banks’ balance sheets during the crisis may help 
explaining the behaviors of the banks during the crisis will be investigated: more specifically, 
















3.2 Literature Review 
 
There is much to be gained from better detecting the likelihood of a crisis: it can help put in 
place measures aimed at preventing a crisis from occurring in the first place or limiting the 
damage if it does happen. A thorough analysis of the consequences of and best responses to 
crises has become an integral part of current policy debates as the lingering effects of the latest 
crisis are still being felt around the world. Yet, in spite of much effort, no single set of 
indicators has proven to explain the various types of crises or consistently so over time. And 
while it is easier to document vulnerabilities, such as increasing asset prices and high leverage, 
it remains difficult to predict with some accuracy the timing of crises. This section presents a 
short review of the evolution of the empirical literature on prediction of crises. 
 
There is a large literature on early warning indicators for crises, described well in Chamon and 
Christopher (2012). The emerging economy crises of the 1990s gave impetus to the work, 
which has been further developed in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis that 
engulfed the advanced economies as well as emerging economies. The literature to date could 
be described as being eclectic and pragmatic. It has been eclectic in that the exercise involves 
appeal to a wide variety of inputs, covering external, financial, real, and fiscal variables, as well 
as institutional and political factors and various measures of contagion. In their overview of the 
literature as of 1998, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) catalogue 105 variables that had 
been used up to that date.  
 
The literature has also been pragmatic in that the exercise has focused on improving measures 
of goodness of fit, rather than focusing on the underlying theoretical themes that could provide 
bridges between different crisis episodes. The pragmatic focus has also meant that traditional 
regression techniques, such as the probit model as used in Berg and Patillo (1999), has given 
way increasingly to non-parametric techniques that minimize the signal to noise ratio as in 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). The reason is that non-parametric techniques fare 
better when there are a large number of explanatory variables. And Breuer (2004) class them 
into four generations based on their often used. 
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Early warning models have evolved over time, with the first generation of models focusing on 
macroeconomic imbalances starts from Great Depression in the U. S. (Miskhin, 1978). Given a 
macroeconomic shock, it firstly adversely affects banks’ borrowers and subsequently impacts 
upon the depositories themselves; thereby trigger bank runs that ultimately lead to the failure of 
financial institutions. Calomiris and Mason (1997) deposit withdrawals by using data from the 
1932 Chicago bank panic: insolvency caused by contagion effects was found. 
 
Second-generation models draw upon depositor behavior and they treat banking crises as 
“sunspot” events: sudden changes in depositors’ expectations can trigger a crisis. Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) corroborated the randomness of bank runs. And they pointed out banking crises 
are unrelated to the business cycle. However, Gorton (1988) rejects this hypothesis in long run. 
He finds a systematic association between bank runs and recessions; which would cause 
depositors to change their perception of risk. In short sum, in the next generation of models, 
still largely geared towards external crises, balance sheet variables became more pronounced. 
Relevant indicators found include substantial short-term debt coming due (Berg et al. 2004).   
 
Third-generation models use predetermined (lagged) macro variables as leading indicators and 
they underscore the role of a boom and bust business cycle. Hardy and Pazarbaşioğlu (1998), 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999), and the European Central Bank (2005), confirms these 
findings. However, Gavin and Hausman (1996) reject. Contrary to the second-generation 
models, bank assets are taken into account in the analysis. During periods of economic 
upswing, banks engage in excessive lending against collateral such as real estate and equities 
that appreciate in value, thus facilitating a lending boom. A sudden bust results in collapsing 
asset prices and financial institutions scale back their lending. And thus borrower default rates 
increase. However, the institutional environment is ignored. Evidence for the impact of the 
institutional setting on the probability of observing systemic events in banking systems is, 
however, mixed.  
 
Contrary to the third-generation models, fourth-generation models aim to identify the impact of 
the institutional environment. An early warning system for banking crises that takes account of 
the institutional environment can be found in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998); and then 
these models are extended by Hutchinson and McDill (1999), Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), 
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and Hutchinson (2002). These models emphasize the role of the bureaucracy, protection of 
shareholder and creditor rights, rule of law and contract enforcement, sophistication of 
supervisory and regulatory frameworks, incentive schemes created by deposit insurance and the 
socioeconomic environment. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2005) additionally consider 
concentration in the banking industry for their analysis of banking crises; whereas Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine (2008) use a World Bank database for bank regulation and supervision. 
While the generous design of deposit insurance schemes tends to destabilize banking systems, 
especially in where the political setting is insufficiently developed (Demirgüç- Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2005). Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008) fall short in providing statistically 
significant evidence for the hypothesis that a strong regulatory environment bolsters financial 
soundness. Das, Quintyn, and Chenard (2005) finds that countries with a higher quality of 
financial sector policies perform better in responding to macroeconomic pressures on the 
overall level of stress in the financial system. Gropp et al. (2004) find market based indicators, 
such as the distance to default can be early warning indicators for banking problems on the 
micro level, whereas DeNicolo and others (2005) use the distance to default to assess the 
exposure to systemic risks. However, its sole reliance on the availability of market prices 
considerably limits its applicability to banking systems where such information cannot be 
obtained. Someone may argue that macroprudential indicators are good at capturing 
macroeconomic imbalances, while banking system indicator need to be used to identify bank 
problem. Demirgüç-Kunt (1989) provides a detailed account of the early literature in the field. 
Pazarbasioglu et al. (1997) firstly using bank-specific factors with macroeconomic indicators to 
measure individual bank soundness, and then aggregating the bank-by-bank estimates into an 
index of banking system soundness. Sahajwala and van den Bergh (2000) survey the early 
warning systems in place at supervisory agencies and bank regulators in various G10 countries, 
whereas King and others (2005) offer a synopsis of recent advancements in the literature. The 
time to failure of individual institutions was investigated by Lane and others (1986) and 
Whalen (1991). Some macroprudential indicators that can simultaneously embrace sources of 
banking vulnerabilities are introduced by Fox et al. (2005) to capture unsustainable departures 
of asset prices. An overview of statistically significant variables in selected third and fourth 
generation models is listed in Appendix 7. It emphasizes the importance of institutional 
variables in signaling failure of banks due to insufficiently control for the macroeconomic 
environment.  
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More specifically, one of the major purposes of those researches is to construct early warning 
models that identify risky banks prior to failure and signal bank supervisors to take corrective 
actions. Most of these studies have used data from the wave of bank and thrift failures during 
the late-1980s and early 1990s (e.g., Cole and Gunther, 1995; DeYoung, 2003; Oshinsky and 
Olin, 2005; Schaeck, 2008; Thomson, 1991; Whalen, 1991; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). 
These studies have identified a set of bank failure predictors: low asset quality (nonperforming 
loans), high concentrations of business or commercial real estate loans, illiquidity, cost 
inefficiency and/or poor management, rapid asset growth, reliance on non-core deposit funding 
and, not surprisingly, low profitability and low equity capital. Appendix 8 gives an overview of 
the financial soundness indicators (FSIs) identified in the Compilation Guide on Financial 
Soundness Indicators (IMF, 2004). And the precise definitions of the “core” and “encouraged” 
FSIs were introduced in the Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness Indicators (IMF, 
2004). Despite substantial progress in the recent past, there is still no universal database of 
“core” and “encouraged” FSIs to facilitate financial crisis. A set of appropriate tools are need to 
assess strengths and weaknesses of financial systems led to efforts to define sets of so-called 
“core” and “encouraged” (FSIs), designed to monitor the health and soundness of financial 
institutions and markets, and of their corporate and household counterparts (Sundararajan et al., 
2002). A small but growing set of studies have begun to apply these techniques to more recent 
data on bank failures during the financial crisis (e.g., Altunbas, et al. 2012; Berger, et al. 2016; 
Cole and White, 2012; Rossi, 2010). One of the central findings is that not much has changed. 
rapid growth in credit and asset prices is found to be the most reliably related to increases in 
financial stress and vulnerabilities, but still imperfect predictor. As Claessens et al. (2012) 
show, not all booms are associated with crises: only about a third of boom cases end up in 
financial crises. Others do not lead to busts but are followed by extended periods of below-
trend economic growth. And many booms result in permanent financial deepening and benefit 
long-term economic growth. While not all booms end up in a crisis, the probability of a crisis 
increases with a boom. Furthermore, the larger the size of a boom episode, the more likely it 
results in a crisis. 
 
A separate set of studies measures the impact of noninterest income on bank stability and risk. 
The earlier studies (e.g., Gallo et al. 1996; Jiangli and Pritsker 2008; Kwast 1989; Litan 1985; 
Uzun and Webb 2007; Wall 1987) tend to find that expansion into nonbanking activities such 
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as securities underwriting, securities brokerage, and asset securitization helps banks diversify 
away risk, at least partially. But more recent studies tend to find increased risk (Simaan, 2017). 
Allen and Jagtiani (2000) find that expanding into nonbanking securities and insurance 
activities increases both systematic risk and interest rate risk at bank holding companies. 
DeYoung and Roland (2001) show that noninterest income contributes positively to bank 
earnings volatility. Stiroh (2004, 2006) finds no substantial evidence of diversification benefits 
from pairing noninterest income with interest income. DeJonghe (2010) shows that noninterest 
income-intensive banks have higher tail betas and as such are more sensitive than traditional 
banks to extreme market and macro-economic swings; consistent with this, Clark et al. (2007) 
find that fee income from retail banking activities tends to be pro-cyclical. Elyasiani and Wang 
(2008) report that bank holding companies that generate large amounts of their incomes from 
fees are less transparent to investors. While Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find some 
evidence of diversification gains from low levels of noninterest income. DeYoung and Rice 
(2004) point out a number of fallacies regarding bank noninterest income, including the 
misconception that banks earn noninterest income chiefly by expanding into nonbanking 
activities or nontraditional banking activities. 
 
In addition to those, global factors also play important roles in driving sovereign, currency, 
balance-of-payments, and sudden stops crises. In practical terms, recent early warning models 
typically use a wide array of quantitative leading indicators of vulnerabilities, with a heavy 
focus on international aspects. Indicators used capture vulnerabilities are centered in the 
external, public, financial, nonfinancial corporate or household sectors, and combine these with 
qualitative inputs (IMF, 2010, 2014). Since international financial markets can play multiple 
roles in transmitting and causing, or at least triggering, various types of crises, as happened 
recently, several international linkages measures are typically used. Notably banking system 
measures, such as exposures to international funding risks and the ratio of non-core to core 
liabilities, have been found to help signal vulnerabilities (Shin, 2013). Since international 
markets can also help with risk-sharing and can reduce volatility, and the empirical evidence is 
mixed, the overall  relationship  of  international  financial  integration  and  crises  is,  
however,  much debated (Kose et al., 2010; Lane, 2012). 
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Overall, most of the econometric models for banking crises reviewed in this part belong to the 
early warning systems (EWS) literature, which focuses on crisis prediction. Although every 
distress or failure period is different, most are characterized by some patterns. The goal of the 
models is mostly to find these patterns and to enable accurate prediction of bankruptcy. 
However, prediction models have become more sophisticated over time and more complex and 
interdisciplinary. As a result, EWS models are becoming more difficult to interpret, which is 
going beyond their private usefulness in the view of Mayes and Stremmel (2012). What’s more, 
their findings to date are far from conclusive, highlighting a need to further assess a commonly 
agreed set of core indicators for the build-up of banking system vulnerabilities. Therefore, there 
is considerable scope for improvement as the number of supervise failures in the global 
financial crisis suggests.  
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3.3 Empirical Strategy 
My analysis aims to examine time-series variation of real banks’ preemptive actions 
before, during and after the financial crisis. More specifically, we investigate a broad set 
of balance sheet indicators for early warning purposes; and assess their relative 
likelihood of success by looking their significant structural shifts in response to the 
crisis first at average bank level and then in three sub-samples. To analyze the structural 
shifts and breaks, following tools and models are employed.   
 
3.3.1 Sample and Ratios selection 
Shin (2013) has outline three main broad sets of indicators for early warning purposes: 
 Indicators based on market prices, such as CDS spreads, implied volatility and other 
price-based measures of default or distress 
 Gap measures of the credit to GDP ratio 
 The Behaviour of banking sector asset and liability aggregates 
 
To anticipate my conclusions, the first approach (based on market prices) seems most 
appropriate for obtaining indicators of concurrent market conditions but unlikely to be 
useful as early warning indicators with enough time for meaningful remedial action. 
Empirical results also indicate that those based market prices, such as spreads on credit 
default swaps, do not give sufficient warning of a crisis (Shin, 2013; Claessens, et al., 
2013). The credit to GDP gap measure is a distinct improvement from the first as an 
early warning indicator, with a good pedigree from the work of BIS economists and has 
been explored extensively as part of the Basel III bank capital rules. Yet, there are 
doubts about its usefulness as a real time measure, or as a measure that yields a 
threshold that can be applied uniformly across countries. That leaves the third approach 
- one based on bank aggregates, including various components of balance sheet. Shin 
(2013) has also suggested that this third approach is the most promising, as it preserves 
the advantages of the credit to GDP gap measure but also stands a good chance of 
yielding indicators that can be used in real time. 
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In this research, the datasets used in this research are obtained from the FDIC call 
reports 
14
. The sample includes 16520 banks 
15
and the time span has been restricted 
from fourth quarter of 1992 to the last quarter of 2011. Data for some of the banks are 
only available for certain research time periods, which results from the re-structuring or 
failures of banks; and we give NIL under this circumstance. 
 
Furthermore, the research questions were explored firstly based on collected actual 
balance sheets data and financial ratios by using CAMELS 
16
approach. There are some 
micro-level models traditionally are widely considered in identifying individual failing 
banks by using CAMELS financial ratios and macroeconomic variables, such as stock 
prices. The CAMELS approach was developed by bank regulators in the United States 
as a means of measurement of the financial condition of a financial institution. The 
CAMELS analysis requires at least last three years and interim statements for the most 
recent 12-month period. The acronym CAMELS stands for:  
• Capital Adequacy  
• Asset Quality  
• Management  
• Earnings (Profitability)  
• Liquidity & Funding  
• Sensitivity to Market Risk (losses arising from changes in market prices) 
 
In our research, a set of curial financial ratios in first five subsections according to 
CAMELS approach have been drawn from our micro-level datasets mentioned as early 
as the fourth quarter 2011 and back to 1992; which are expressed as the primarily 
financial characteristics of the banks. The full definitions of financial ratios employed in 
this report are listed in Appendix 1. 
                                                 
 
14
 In the United States, for every national bank, state member bank and insured nonmember bank, 
quarterly basis consolidated reports of condition and income are required by the FFIEC (Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council). 
15
 16520 is the total number of banks existed during the period of 01-09-1992 to 31-12 -2011. 
16 In the U.S., since from the 1980s banks’ failure till now, CAMELS has been widely used as a crucial 
supervisory tool to examine the overall conditions of individual (Dang, 2011). Commonly, CAMELS 
rating system is an acronym made up of Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings (or 
Profitability), Liquidity & Funding and Sensitivity to Market risk; also, it is the uniform financial 
institution rating system which was launched on 13 Nov. 1979 by FFIEC. A Scale of one to five (one 
stands for best, and five is worst) is set for each part in an onsite bank health examination; and a single 
measure-the “composite” rating is assigned. 
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What’s next, parametric and nonpararametric techniques will be introduced to test 
whether a set of aggregate balance sheet indicators for early warning purposes is 
sufficient to explain the impending financial crisis, and assess their relative likelihood 
of success. It aims to provide an organizing framework for selecting indicators of 
vulnerability to crises, especially those that are associated with banks more generally. In 
what follows, we will also investigate real banks’ preemptive actions by looking their 
significant structural shifts in response to the crisis both at average and an individual 
bank level. Also, we discuss the consequence of ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) and show 
differences in the applicability of banking accounting ratios for the identification of 
banking problem between large and small banks. 
 
3.3.2 Unit Root Tests  
A strand of econometric tools is employed to examine the crucial financial ratios and 
then the dynamic changes of those financial characteristics of the banks in the next two 
parts. First, it is necessary to study the time series properties of the included variables. 
In order to generate a non-spurious regression, every variable included in the regression 
need to be stationary. If variables are found to be integrated one, regression in levels 
would lead to spurious results. And if a regression is spurious, the estimated parameter 
will be inconsistent and both t- and F-statistics will diverge (Phillips, 1988).   
 
Since we are dealing with financial variables, it is very likely that the interbank rate and 
many of the explanatory economic fundamentals are non-stationary in simple level 
form. Therefore, before running the models specified in the next section, we proceed 
with some tests of non-stationary (unit root). The unit root tests we run are: the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests (Dickey and Fuller 1979), KPSS (Kwiatkowski, 
Phillips et al., 1992), Ng-Perron test (Ng and Perron 2001) and Lee and Strazicich unit 
root test(Lee and Strazicich 2003). For fundamentals that are expected to grow over 
time, we specify the unit root tests with a constant and a time trend.  
 
The general empirical estimation of the models for unit root tests gives the form: 
∆𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑚 + 𝛽𝑚𝑋𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑚,𝑡+1 (3-1) 
Where 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 denotes the vector of independent variables; 𝛽𝑚 is a vector of parameters 
and 𝜂𝑚,𝑡+1 is a random term.  
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If the series is non-stationary and the first difference of the series is stationary, the series 
contains a unit root. A basic and widely used unit root test is the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests ((Dickey and Fuller 1979). It takes a unit root as the null hypothesis. 
Whereas the KPSS test due to (Kwiatkowski Phillips et al., 1992) provides an 
alternative for testing the null of a level- or trend-stationary process against the 
alternative of a unit root. Both these tests have been criticized for the poor size and low 
power(Caner and Kilian 2001). The Ng-Perron test by (Ng and Perron 2001) attempts to 
solve the size and power distortions of the ADF and KPSS test. 
 
The ADF test mainly concentrates on whether time series are affected by transitory or 
permanent shocks. The Modified Akaiake Criterion is used to determine the optimal lag 
length. Unlike the ADF test, the KPSS has stationary as the null hypothesis and a unit 
root as the alternative hypothesis. Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) argue that it can be of 
interest to test both types of hypotheses when investigating the dynamic properties of a 
time series. 
  
Both ADF and KPSS tests cannot distinguish very well between highly persistent 
stationary processes from non-stationary processes. Moreover, the power of these tests 
generally diminishes as exogenous regressors are added to the test regression. Ng and 
Perron (2001) have used modified AIC and BIC in choosing the optimal lag length. 
They demonstrate that the choice of lag length determines the best size and power 
properties of the unit root test. The traditional lag selection criteria such as AIC and BIC 
are not well suited with integrated data. By a series of simulation experiments, Ng and 
Perron recommend selecting the optimal lag length by minimizing the modified AIC. 
 
Appendix2 displays the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for the ratios tested. In 41out of 
85 cases, we fail to reject the null of a unit root using 95% confidence intervals. The 
fourth column shows results of the KPSS tests. This confirms the result from the ADF 
test. In 38 out of 85 cases, we reject the null of stationarity using 95% confidence 
intervals. But at the 90% confidence interval, there are only 34 out of 85 series which 
exhibit unit root. For all ratios, the series that are found to be non-stationary in their 
levels are found to be stationary in their first difference.  
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Fifth column shows the Perron-Ng test results. It can be seen from the table that the test 
performed better in terms of size and power. For individual series, the unit root null 
cannot by reject for most of the individual series, i.e. 35 out of 85 ratios are still I (1). 
Failure to incorporate structural changes in testing the unit root of these series may be 
the possible reason for bias in finding non-stationary. However, there is an 
improvement in the result with homogeneous coefficients. The Perron-Ng tests show 
almost variable is stationary at 10% confidence level. 
 
3.3.3 Structural shifts 
According to a new database about  the timing of systemic banking crises prepared by 
Laeven and Valencia (2012), the United states banks experienced two systemic banking 
crises started from 1988 and late 2007 respectively. More than 1,400 financial 
institutions and 1,300 banks failed in the earlier one; and over $180 billion were 
injected to clean them up. The collapse of U.S. sub-prime mortgage market pulled the 
trigger on another bank crisis in August 2007. Profits of U.S. banks declined 
remarkably from the fourth quarter of 2007 compared to previous year; and capital 
ratios increased following the requirements by the U.S. department of Treasury, after 03 
September 2009: financial characteristics of the banks’ balance sheets hardly qualifies 
as serious analysis during this ad hoc selection of time spans. In this case, under the 
assumption of stationary
17
 of data, the structural variation in time series (balance sheet 
indicators for early warning purposes) will be tested in order to assess their relative 
likelihood of success.  
 
To begin our discussion, the simplest dynamic model (Hansen, 2001) – the first-order 
autoregression
18– has been employed:   
     𝒚𝒕=𝛂 + 𝝆𝒚𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒆𝒕                   𝑬𝒆𝒕
𝟐=𝝈𝟐                                    (3-2) 
Where, 
 α, 𝜌, 𝜎2are the parameters, and  𝑒𝑡 is a serially uncorrelated shocks in a time series 𝒚𝒕. 
                                                 
 
17
 It stands for the constancy of parameters, such as the mean, variance and trend over time.  
18
 Before we applied all ratios in to the Hansen dynamic model, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit 
root tests were applied to the level series of financial ratios, then to the first differences and then to the 
error terms of the regressions of these series to test for stationarity or nonstationarity. There are 53 ratios 
out of 86 in total stationary in the first different (For more details see Appendix 2). 
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A structural break occurs when at least one of the parameters are not constant anymore 
at the breakdate over the time period; while it might need a period of time to take effect 
instead of immediately. In our study, for the rule of parsimony and simplicity, an 
immediate structural break has been assumed. Furthermore, a break may affect at least 
one of or all of parameters in the model, which may have different implications. The 
parameter ρ  implies the changes in the serial correlation in yt , and the intercept α 




example, if ytis the yield on earning asset, then changes in 𝜇 are probably the issue of 
primary interest as they are identical to changes in the trend; and 𝜎2 controls the 
volatility of this ratio. 
 
The Chow test (1960) is typically classical test for testing structural breaks by using an 
F statistic; but it only works if the breakdate is known. For unknown timing structural 
test, a research has to pick an arbitrary candidate breakdate or to pick a breakpoint 
based on some known characteristics of the dataset. But, the Chow testing could be 
misleading for both cases: in the first case, the point may be uninformative; and in the 
second case, an untrue breakpoint might be identified as the candidate point is 
endogenous
19  
when there is none. Here, the potential solution is Quandt (1960) if the 
breakdate is treated as unknown. In Quandt’s paper (1960), he advised using the largest 
Chow statistic over all possible breakpoints; and its construction can been seen by 
plotting the sequence of Chow test valves as a function of candidate breakpoints 
(Hansen 2001). With the ideal developed by Quandt and Hansen, and combining the 
Eview 7 tools; Break point Maximum LR/wald F-STATISTIC are applied to identify 
the potential breakpoints for each financial ratio in Appendix 2. In this paper, we also 
use Quant-Andres unknown break point test (1960) and Chow test (1960) to verify the 
breakpoints obtained by Break point Maximum LR/wald F-STATISTIC (see all details 
in Appendix 3).  
 
A well-known weakness of the conventional unit root tests is that they ignore the 
existence of structural breaks in the variables. Ever since the seminal article of (Perron 
1989),  researchers began to consider structural changes when testing for  unit roots. 
                                                 
 
19
 It is correlated with the data. 
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Perron (1989) shown in the presence of structural breaks, the unit root test, which is 
against trend stationary alternatives are biased to the non-rejection of the null 
hypothesis. His proposal is characterized by a single exogenous known break in the 
trend function. This assumption has been criticized by many author such as Cristiano 
(1992), Zivot and Andrews (1992), and Lumsdaine and Papell (1997). They argued unit 
root tests detect a structural change endogenously. As a consequence, they conducted 
different methodologies to endogenously determine the break. This involves estimating 
a Perron (1989) type equation over all possible breaks. 
 
Zivot and Andrews (1992) propose a modification of Perron’s test in which they allow 
one unknown structural break to be determined endogenously from the data. Lumsdaine 
and Papell (1997) extend the Zivot and Andrews (1992) model by allow for two 
structural breaks under the alternative hypothesis of a unit root. One limitation on these 
ADF-type endogenous break unit root tests is that they derive the critical values by 
assuming no structural break under the unit root null. Given this assumption, 
researchers might conclude the time series is trend stationary when in fact they are non-
stationary with breaks.  Furthermore, they tend to incorrectly select the break point (Lee 
and Strazicich 2003).  To address this issue, Lee and Strazicich (2003) propose a one 
break LM unit root test as an alternative to Zivot Andrew test and a two break minimum 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root test for the Lumsdaine-Papell test. The test starts 
with an assumption that the null hypothesis is a unit root with up to two breaks. It not 
only endogenously determines structural breaks, the alternative hypothesis also 
unambiguously implies the series is trend stationary(Glynn, Perera et al., 2007). The 
ability to permit up to two breaks in the null and two breaks in the level or slope of the 
alternative make this approach particularly flexible and attractive. Therefore, this study 
selects the Lee and Strazicich unit root test.  
The Lee and Strazicich (2003) procedures for the one- and two-break LM unit root test 
statistic is obtained from the following regression:  
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿
′∆𝑍𝑡 + 𝜙𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 (3-3) 
Where the vector of exogenous variables, Zt, takes the form [1, t, Djt, DTjt] 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 j =
1,2. we considered model A which is known as a ‘crash model’ and allow for time 
change in the intercept, Djt.model C allows for a shift in the intercept and change in the 
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trend slope under the alternative hypothesis. 
 𝐷𝑗𝑡 = {
1           𝑡 > 𝑇𝐵𝑗 + 1
0              𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 𝐷𝑇𝑗𝑡 = {
𝑡 − 𝑇𝐵𝑗      𝑡 > 𝑇𝐵𝑗 + 1 
0               𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (3-4) 
Where TBj is the time period of the structural break; The LM test statistic is given by: τ 
= t-statistic for test the unit root null hypothesis that  ϕ = 0 . The location of the 
structural break TB  is determined by selecting all possible break point s for the 
minimum t-statistic as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑀𝜆𝜏 = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝜆𝜏(𝜆) (3-5) 
The critical value for the one- and two-break minimum LM unit root test statistics are 
tabulated in Lee and Strazicich (2003). The limitation of the above test is that it does not 
account for potential structural breaks in the series. To address this issue, we first allow 
for one break in the LS unit root test, then for two breaks. See all summaries results in 
Appendix 4. 
To focus on the ad hoc periods around the break points, the financial ratios data listed in 
Appendix 2 was further regressed on a set of quarterly dummies
20
based on the structure 
break we found early summarized in Appendix 3&4. If we find that we can identify a 
significant structural break
21
 in a time series, in the next step we attempt to determine 
whether the sign of the trend is negative or positive and whether it is significant or not. 
Besides, it would be of interest to observe the level changes which are outlined by the 
structural breaks. 
 In order to determine how the trend has shifted over time, we proceed to model the data 
generating process in the manner conducted by Kellard and Wohar (2006)
22
. The 
financial ratio series are regressed against a constant (α), a time trend (t), a level dummy 
variable (D) and a slop dummy variable (Dt) corresponding to the results of the 
                                                 
 
20
 Dummy variables are applied in the OLS, D(t) = {
0, t ≤ 0
1, t > 0
 
21
 In recent study in the time series literature, test for the significance of the trend and level changes can 
be carried out irrespective of whether the data contains a unit root or not. See Harvey et al. (2007). In the 
context of this study, unit roots may be useful as they give the empirical support as to whether data 
contains stochastic trends or not. With root test with a single structural break may be suggested. 
22
 Kellard and Wohar (2006) conducted a study of the disaggregated commodity prices between year 
1900 and1998; and they also attempted to fit a trend stationary model. 
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𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷 + 𝛽3𝐷 ∗ 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                           (3-6) 
Where, 
 D and Dt denote the level and slope dummy respectively.  
 
In regression models, an appropriate method to estimate the parameters - including the 
breakpoint - is least squares (Hansen, 2001). Operationally, each sample is split at each 
possible breakpoint; the other parameter estimated by ordinary least squares, known as 
OLS (refer to Appendix 5 for further details). The changes of slope and or trends have 
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 The single structural break is assumed in this study. 
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3.4 Results and Analyses of Empirical Work 
A set of U. S. bank ratios
24
 has been analysed to help identify and understand how the 
actual behavior of banks made in response to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 
developing on the historical perspective: crucial financial ratios will be well described 
and discussed in five different subsections according to the CAMELS approaches with 
own modification. We assess their relative likelihood of success by looking their 
significant structural shifts in response to the crisis. Full definitions of financial ratios 
and their estimated parameters with structure breaks are listed in Appendix 1-6. 
 
3.4.1 Key Ratios for Examining Capital Adequacy 
First of all, capital adequacy is defined as the capital level expected to maintain balance 
with the risks exposures such as market risk, credit risk and operation risk, in order to 
absorb the potential losses and thus protect their debt holders. In 1930, FDIC defined a 
capital model in terms of capital-asset ratios because of the primary risk derived from 
default on loans. Karlyn argued, in 1984, and proposed the capital adequacy based on 
capital-deposit ratio as the depository risk arising from the bank run, with a large scale 
of deposit withdrawals is greatest risk. Currently, financial institution supervisors use 
the capital- asset ratio. In this subsection, capital adequacy is examined based upon the 
following three important measures: Equity Capital to Assets Ratio, Tier 1 Leverage 
Ratio and Total Risk-based Capital Ratio (more ratios for examining capital adequacy 
are listed in Appendix). Figure 9 below illustrates the key capital adequacy ratios from 
fourth quarter of 1992 to 2011 last quarter; and the estimated parameters by ordinary 
least squares are summarized in Appendix 5&6. 
 
Equity Capital to Assets ratio is a core index for judging capital health, and the Tier 1 
Leverage ratio is utilized by Federal and banks to determine if there is enough capital to 
cover potential losses on the asset side of balance sheet. Total Risk-based Capital ratio, 
namely CAR, is calculated as the total risk based capital as percent of risk-weighted 
assets. To be “well capitalized” under the Basel definition, a bank holding company 
must have a Tier 1 ratio of at least 6%, a Tier 1 Leverage Ratio of at least 5%, a CAR 
ratio (combined tier1 and tier2 capital) of at least 10%, and an Equity Capital to Total 
                                                 
 
24
 Here, we will mainly focus on early warning indicators we’ve selected based on FSIs and CAMELS. 
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Asset Ratio of at least 4% to 6%, and not be subject to a written agreement to maintain 
specific a capital level. In the United States, according to FDIC guidelines for an 
"Adequately Capitalized institution”, a bank is expected to meet a minimum 
requirement of qualifying Tier 1 Leverage Ratio of 4.0%, total risk-based ratio of 8.0%, 
of which at least 4.0% should be in the form of Tier 1 core capital. 
 
Here, we investigated banks’ overall performance from 4th quarter of 1992 to 4th quarter 
of 2011 on capital firstly. From the figure 9 below, all three ratios fluctuated all the time 
and were much higher than that of their required minimum level during the past 19 
years.  
 
Despite certain mild fluctuations, the Equity Capital to Assets ratio experienced a 
gradual and lasting rise before year 2007, which were approximately 10.0% for both; 
and then from then on the decrease constantly, hitting the 9.6% and 9.3% respectively in 
3
rd
 quarter of in late 2009. The regressions with dummy variables were conducted to 
identify the main changes in capital level during the crisis. From the Appendix 5, the 
dummy variables in level and dummy variables in trend are over 5% critical value, 
indicating the coefficients of the dummies in trend and level are significant. Therefore, 
the Equity Capital to Assets ratio as well as leverage ratio, the slump or structure break 
can be verified in late 2009. After the break date, both ratios constantly increased again. 
In contrast, the trend of Total Risk-based Capital ratio turned moderately downwards 
from the end of 1992 to later 2008, bringing the figures down to roughly 14% in 2008 
Q4; however, it was still much higher than the minimum capital level. It is worth 
mentioning that the figure climbed more quickly after 4
th
 quarter of 2008, reaching 
16.3% by the end of 2011.  
 
What is remarkable is how tranquil the Capital Adequacy ratios are before the crisis. 
There is barely a ripple in the series in the period 2004 to 2006 when the vulnerability to 
the financial crisis was building up. Even though all three ratios did show an obvious 
structure break and slump during the financial crisis, around late 2008, early 2009, those 
ratios performed generally more than well according to the minimum capital 
requirement under the FDIC definition; which failed in playing a key role of being a 
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crisis (GFC) and earlier that risk-weighted capital buffers were not good predictors in 
practice, which is verified in our case (Estrella, Park and Peristiani, 2000). Northern 
Rock for example was fully compliant with risk-weighted measures shortly before its 
failure (Mayes  and  Wood, 2009). 
 
Figure 9: The estimated regressions of key capital adequacy ratios with the corresponding 
the breakpoints, the U.S., 1992Q4 to 2011Q4 
Equity capital to asset ratio% 
Core capital (leverage) ratio% 
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3.4.2 Key Ratios for Examining Asset Quality 
Grier (2007) argued that poor asset quality is the main reason of major bank failures. Therefore, 
the risk of loan losses derived from delinquent loans is the primary risk faced by the banks, 
because the loan is one of most important asset category; and thus the asset quality assessment in 
order to manage credit risk is necessary, though may be difficult. Based on the study conducted 
by Frost (2004), the Loan Loss Reserves
25
 to Total Loans ratio as well as Coverage ratio were 
employed as the primary measurement for judging the quality of a loan portfolio. Appendix 1 
lists the formulae as well as the minimum requirement of those two key ratios to be considered as 
“well capitalized” the U. S. banks. Figure 10 illustrated fitted regressions of loss allowance to 
loans ratio and coverage ratio during the period of 4
th
 quarter of 1992 to 4
th
 quarter of 2011 (more 






















Figure 10: The estimated regressions of key ratios for examining asset quality with their 
corresponding the breakpoints, the U.S., 1992Q4 to 2011Q4 
                                                 
 
25 It is also called Loss allowance to loans ratio. 
Loan loss allowance to 
noncurrent loans% 





From the upper figure 10, loss allowance to loans ratio shows an obvious “U” shape pattern, 
reaching a bottom at 1.15% (but still over the minimum level of 1%) by 2007. The structural 
break test verifies the significance of change in trend at 4
th
 quarter of 2007 (see Appendix 3 for 
further details). Non-performing loans are considered carefully in coverage ratio as contained in 
three lowest categories of loans: substandard, doubtful and loss. Comparing to the minimum 
criteria of 1.5x set by FDIC, banks were in generally safe from 1993 to 2007; but it started to fail 
in meeting the requirement by the 4
th
 quarter of 2007. The coverage ratio bottomed itself by the 
end of 2007 at less than 0.8x, which is far away from the peak record of 2.3x around year 2005. 
After the break point, the coverage ratio constantly decreased again; but the percentage of loan 
loss allowance to total loans was acting in completely different way. One possible explanation of 
those is that banks start to increase loss allowance and decrease the short-term lending in order to 
protect them from illiquidity. Loan loss reserves have a forward-looking component that reflects 
banks’ efforts to increase their loan provisioning in anticipation of expected losses, and therefore, 
provide another motivation to hoard cash in anticipation of such losses. Loan Loss allowance to 
total loans ratio will be well examined as an on-balance proxy of liquidity risk in our chapter 5. 
 
All in all, both ratios verified the structure break date of 2007Q4 during the financial crisis and 
the changes were consistent with the assumption. Similar to the previous research -for example, 
Keeton and Morris (1988), Fisher et al. (2000), and Dinger and Hagen (2009)- the coverage ratio 
worked well as it gave a good warning sign just before the financial crisis began. Loan Loss 
allowance to loans ratio gave the sign of banks’ precaution actions, such as liquidity hoarding and 
lending cut.  However, a more rigorous supervisory system or a higher minimum requirement 
level for loss allowance to loans ratio may be proposed.  
 
More ratios are discussed below to describe the loan concentration profile (see figure 11) as well 
as the recovery situation in figure 12. All in all, lending fell across all types of loans during the 
crisis. In chart 11, the total noncurrent loans and leases, loans and leases 90 days or more past 
due plus loans in nonaccrual status, weighted less than 5% of total gross loans and leases in the 
past 20 years. It fluctuated all the time before end of 2006 while it has had a rapid increase since 
then, peaking once around 3.3% by the 2nd quarter of year 2009. The figures dropped again after 
2009. These changes were again highly statistically significant (see Appendix 5). In more detail, 
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for 16% of total loans at end of 1992, while the weights dropped to 3% by a constant decrease. 































Figure 11: The estimated regressions of key ratios for testing loan concentration profile with their 
corresponding the breakpoints, the U.S., 1992Q4 to 2011Q4 
From the loan recovery profile in figure 12, a seasonal fluctuation can be observed. After 
2008Q2, the amount of net loans charged-off rocketed, peaking at 9 times of the previous average 
level 0.05%. The change in 2008Q2 during the recent crisis is highly statistically significant (see 
Noncurrent loans to total loans and leases /TL% 
Time 
Loans to individuals/total loans and leases/ TL% 
Loans to depository institutions and 
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Appendix 5). However, no similar strong sudden change was found in any subcomponents such 
as Net Loans Charged-off to Commercial and industrial, Net Loans charged-off to individuals 
and Net Loans Charged-off to Credit card loans (see Appendix for full definitions and tests). As 
the large amount of bad debts written off, there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew 
down their credit lines, leading to a reverse spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on 
































Figure 12: The estimated regressions of key ratios for loan recovery profile with their corresponding 
the breakpoints, the U.S., 1992Q4 to 2011Q4 
 
%Net loans charged-off: commercial and industrial 
%Net loans charged-off: loans to individual 
 






3.4.3 Key Ratios for Examining Interbank Lending 
Now let’s go back to the interbank loan topic. One core business provided by banks is a liquidity 
service (Heffernan, 2005). Banks bridge savers and borrowers with their different liquidity 
preferences.  For example, a bank lends funds to a firm which is commonly financed by deposits; 
while, the maturity of those deposits might be shorter compared to loans. In this case, the 
liquidity preferences of borrowers and savers are simultaneously satisfied through bank services. 
Moreover, interbank market works as the most immediate liquidity source within banks; and the 
overnight interest rate can be a core indicator of market risk. In a downturn, insufficient bank 
liquidity could lead to inadequate allocation of capital, which could increase a higher interbank 
rate as well as a higher market risk level. Figure 4 in chapter one documents 3-Month Interbank 
Rates for the United States from 1992 to 2014. It plunged twice over the time: one happened in 
2001 (‘The early 2000s recession’, which affected the United States in 2002 and 2003) and 
another one was around 2007 (financial crisis 2007/08). The later one as an example here: a 
decline of the interbank rate can be observed in late 2006 (even during the financial crisis period 
from 2007 to 2008) in order to support the refinance of problematic banks through the interbank 
market; while it slightly increase around middle of 2009 after the period of the ‘panic of 2008’, 
following the scenario in the financial market that banks demanded a higher interest rate due to a 
high level of uncertainty about the future availability of liquidity and fearing insolvency of their 
counterparts. It did decrease again in mid-2010 due to the U.S. government interventions.  
 
As mentioned early, after the failure of Lehman Brothers, there was a run by short-term bank 
creditors, particularly in the interbank market. Banks act in lending less even if they had better 
access to deposit, which were observed in constantly decreasing of ratio of loans to depository 
institutions and acceptances of other banks in the top panel of figure 13. The interbank loan 
breakdown by the nature of borrowers, of which over 60% in average are the loans lent to 
commercial banks in U.S., peaked at 70% during the year 2005 to early 2010; and less than 5% in 
loans to foreign branches of U.S. banks during whole time period. All the numbers verified the 
structure break date of 2009Q2 and structure break tests were again highly statistically significant 
(see Appendix 5). The evidence shows the interbank market was not fully frozen and still quite 
active, at least in issuing new interbank loans in the early stage of financial crisis. This gives me 
an initial idea of combine interbank loans movements into our chapter 4 and 5. It is worth 
mentioning that the figure of loans to banks in foreign countries shot up by the end of year 2004 





Figure 13: The estimated regressions of key ratios for interbank loan given profile with their 
corresponding the breakpoint, the U.S., 1992Q4 to 2011Q4 
Again, from Figure 11 and Figure 13 above, the interbank market was large and active in the 
U.S.: outstanding loans, typically overnight lending, to other banks averaged close to $440 billion 
in early 2008; while, the financial crisis started from 2007, triggered an unprecedented, sustained 
strains in interbank lending. The crisis prompted a surge in demand for liquid assets in the entire 
U.S. financial system, in turn, rather than lend surplus liquid assets out, most banking preferred to 
hold, in case their own need might increase. With the increasing level of uncertainty and 
counterpart risks, banks became increasing unwilling to lend and thus the size of interbank loans 
in average plummeted by the end of 2008; the big fall happened after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers in September. The situation was constantly becoming worse when interbank loans 
created a vicious circle of increased caution, greater demand for liquidity, reduced willingness to 
lend and higher loan rates, the waves of financial crisis may be seen in the graph. The evidence 
demonstrates that funding fragility and the changes of interbank loans both in level and trend at 
third quarter of year 2008Q3 were highly statistically significant (Appendix5).  
 
In contrast to the interbank loan given, the key ratios of cash and balances due from depository 
institutions showed a skyrocket around second quarter of 2009; and went up with moderate 
growth rate (see figure 14). After several rounds of contagion, some banks in U.S. are in default 
while others have enough capital to absorb the losses. These banks will consider themselves in 
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distress if their new level of capital does not satisfy supervisory requirements anymore, especially 
the failed in belief of “to big to fail” after Lehman Brothers went bankruptcy.  
 
One possible reason of uprush observed in the Figure 14 (Page 71) is preemptive defensive 
actions from banks, such as liquidity hoarding. The changes happened around 2
nd
 quarter of 2009 
are also statistically significant. This is another important dynamic we will consider in our model. 
At the same time, banks may also experience a liquidity shortage from private investors in the 
money market, because they may face high quality collateral, high interest rates or simply reject 
the transaction. It can be observed according to the trend of the ratio of cash due from depository 
institutions to total deposit in Figure 14. If a bank fails to satisfy its short-term commitments, it 
defaults due to illiquidity. The Federal Reserve injected substantial liquidity and cut the funds 
rate by 300 basis points in interbank lending market in August 2007. But it worsened in March 
2008. On 13th October, the U.S. treasury followed suit with a plan to inject $250 billion into the 
U.S. banks. Eventually, unprecedented actions by Federal to add liquidity and guarantee bank 
debts were able to counter the record strains in 2009, but did not prevent extensive damage to the 
whole financial system. The lower panel shown in Figure 14 (Page 71) indicate a larger scale of 
Federal funds had been injected into banks during the crisis; and a clear minimum can be found 
in 2009Q1 and another slump in second quarter of 2010. And the time has told these plans, which 
were similar to earlier, mainly successful, rescue solutions like the RFC in U.S. in the 1930s, may 
not solve the crisis. 
 
The recent banking crisis made painfully clear to alive banks that they cannot always count on 
being able to borrow at low cost when needed. Take the Lehman Brothers as an example: it 
seemed to be safe experienced creditor runs and significant cash outflows, which ultimately led 
to its defaults. Here, heavy reliance of financial institutions on wholesale funding was 
overlooked, whereas capital levels were closely monitored. The result is consistent with analysis 
in capital part. Again, the liquidity hoarding behavior of banks were observed, which may arise 
from failure of a specific asset and consequently fire sales, or a more general loss of confidence 
of confidence trust. Initial overpricing of assets by complex, untransparent assets credit rating 
agencies can make for severe liquidity shocks. However, one may argue new interbank loans 
might be granted as the interbank market was not fully frozen and still quite active, at least in 
issuing new interbank loans in the early stage of financial crisis. The findings of this section will 
be considered in our studies in chapter 4 and 5.  
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%cash items  / total deposits MED
 
 
%cash items in process of collection / total deposits MED
% collection in domestic offices/ total deposits MED
%currency and coin in domestic offices / total deposits MED
%balances due from depository institutions in U.S. / total deposits MED
%balances due from FRB/ total deposits MED
 
Figure 14: The estimated regressions of key ratios for interbank loan taken profile with their 
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 Figure 14 continues in page 71, which presents the estimated regressions of key ratios of cash balances due from 
depository institution profile with their corresponding breakpoint 
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3.4.4 Key Ratios for Examining Liquidity 
According to Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (1997), a financial institution is 
required to maintain a certain level of liquidity to meet its potential financial obligations in a 
timely manner as well as liquidate assets with minimal loss. It is emphasized by Rudolf (2009) 
again: there may be a maturity or interest rate mismatch as banks make money by mobilizing 
short term deposits at lower interest rate while investing funds in long-term at higher rates. 
 
Figure 15: Deposit Growth (Quarterly growth rates, 4-period moving average)27 
Figure 15 above depicts deposit flows of U.S. commercial banks between 2002 and 2011, and 
reveals a distinctive behavior of core and non-core deposits during the financial crisis. Previous 
work has raised concerns on the extent to which banks facing heightened liquidity risk are able to 
meet the increased borrowing demand from corporations shut out of commercial paper markets. 
 
As argued by Diamond and Rajan (2001) and empirically documented by Gatev and Strahan 
(2006) and Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan (2009), commercial banks can cope with higher loan 
demand in the form of drawdowns of unused corporate credit lines as long as they are perceived 
as less risky and receive deposit inflows from institutional investors pulling their funds from 
securities markets (e.g. the commercial paper market). Core deposits include transaction deposits, 
savings deposits, and small time deposits (less than $100,000). Non-core deposits include large 
time deposits ($100,000 or more) and foreign deposits.  
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 Please see full definitions of liquidity hoarder and non-hoarder in section 5.3. We class all banks into two groups: 
Liquidity hoarders and non-Liquidity hoarders. Liquidity hoarders in this study are defined as banks for which the 
average ratio of total liquid assets to total assets increased by more than 3.5-percentage-point from a period before 
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The growth rate of core deposits increased during the crisis, whereas the growth of non-core 
deposits contracted by almost fifty percent.  Such behavior suggests a flight-to-quality effect in 
deposit flows. The figure shows that deposit growth, mainly non-core deposits, decreased 
remarkably over the second half of 2007. The sharp contraction in non-core deposits began 
immediately after the interbank markets—especially, the ABCP market-dried up. Furthermore, 
this sharp contraction continued through the 3rd Quarter of 2008, despite the significant decline 
in short-term interest rates that followed the reduction of the target Federal funds rate about 2 
percent by the spring of 2008. Deposit growth recovered months later, more notably by the end 
2008. Intensifying turbulence in financial markets in particular after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers and AIG-caused significant outflows from money market mutual funds and contributed 
to the strong expansion of bank deposits. Favoured by the increase in the deposit insurance limit 
from $100,000 to $250,000 and the implementation of the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee 
Program (TLGP)  in October 2008, transaction deposits grew considerably (about one-fifth) in 
2008. 
 
In this section, two key ratios are used for examining liquidity as a supplement of last part. They 
are Net Loans and Leases to Deposits Ratio and Net Loans and Leases to Core Deposits Ratio. 
More details with a certain criteria are listed in Table 2: 
Ratios Formula Criteria 
Net loans and leases to deposits ratio Net loans and leases / Total Deposits ≤ 75% 
Net loans and leases to core deposits ratio  Net loans and leases / Core deposits ≤ 80 − 90% 













Figure 16b: The estimated regressions of two key ratios for examining liquidity with their 
corresponding breakpoint, the U.S., 1992Q4 to 2011Q4 






In figure 16b, from 1992Q4 to 2009Q2, two ratios rose drastically, peaking at 87% and 107% in 
2009Q2 respectively. The changes in both level and trend are statistically significant (see 
Appendix 5). Then the trends of both turned strongly downwards, bring the figures down to 73% 
and 77% respectively in the fourth quarter of 2011. It is noticeable that the robust lending growth 
during an inflationary and house booming environment before the financial crisis raised the 
concern on banks’ liquidity. The net loans and leases to core deposits ratio was higher than the 
maximum level of 80% to 90% in most time after year 2003; which indicated that the bank didn’t 
have capacity to write new loans, but, they just simply ignored the problems. The deposits 
mismatched to investments and banks ignored the facts that they may not be converted quickly to 
cover redemptions. The results of liquidity ratio analysis support the observed liquidity hoarding 
behavior of banks and less active moments in interbank loan market. The crisis prompted a surge 
in demand for liquid assets in the entire U.S. financial system, in turn, rather than lend surplus 
liquid assets out, most banking preferred to hold, in case their own need might increase. With the 
increasing level of uncertainty and counterpart risks, banks became increasing unwilling to lend 
and thus the size of interbank loans in average plummeted by the end of 2008; For example, the 
big fall happened after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September, particularly in the interbank 
market. The situation only got to be controlled by the end of 2009 after a large scale of 
government injection and banks’ liquidity hoarding. 
 
The results from the empirical investigations in previous section, which can be assumed to be 
valid in principle for most banking systems, provides us with some guidance on the banks’ 
dynamic actions in the interbank loan market that we are able to use in our research design 
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian, 2011; Gorton and Metrick ,2012). 
In this section, we found that whereas capital levels were closely monitored, heavy reliance of 
financial institutions on whole-sale funding was overlooked: banks that seemed to be safe 
experienced bank runs, which ultimately led to their defaults. The sudden decrease in interbank 
market activity and increase in the banks’ liquidity hoarding behavior were observed as well. 
However, one may argue new interbank loans might be granted, extended and withdrawal as the 
interbank market was not fully frozen and still quite active, at least in issuing new interbank loans 




3.4.5 Key Ratios for Examining Profitability 
There are three ratios we present as a measurement of profitability: net interest margin, yield on 
earning assets and noninterest income to earning assets. 
 
Overall, yield on earning assets and noninterest income for all banks increased significantly 
before 2006; however, both net interest margin decreases. Our result suggests that both net 
interest margin and yield on earning assets serves as indicator for the timing of a crisis. A break 
was found at 2008Q1 in post crisis period. And net interest margin is appropriate indicator for the 
detection of banking system vulnerabilities. It provides a signal for systemic banking problems. 
The net income for commercial banks did plunge in 2007, which is a significant response to the 
financial crisis.  
 
Recall chapter one, Figure 2 shows the non-interest income to total income for United States 
banks from 1998 to 2013. Compare to net interest margin, it does not suggest any significant 
changes before 2006 but some increase between 2003 and 2006 (See Figure 18). It experienced a 
sharp decline in bank returns and non-interest income in early 2003 due to monetary policy. 
Figure 3 in chapter one displays net income for commercial banks in United States, which shows 
a significant increase despite a gradual increase in non-interest income before 2007 (see Figure 
2).  
 
Here, according to the definition of Heffernan (2005), we define the net interest margin as the 
difference between the loan rate and deposit rate; and it also cover additional costs including 
operation costs, intermediation fees and risk premiums. In Figure 17, it is clearly shown that 
overall interest margin declines through the period and it touches the bottom at 2008Q1. 
 
A bank acts as an intermediary role by taking deposits and granting loans and it plays a core role 
in reallocating capital because of the economies of scale: Banks can access more privileged 
information on borrowers; therefore the information economies of scale would enable banks to 
lending at lower cost compare to other financial institutions.  
 
The drops of net interest margin may due to the volatility of interest rate, as it could make costs 
of short-term funding higher than interest incomes from long-term loans.  In this case, a higher 
interest margins will be required to cover additional costs including operation costs, 
intermediation fees and risk premiums, and thus a lower net interest margin. And, in order to 
maximise returns at lower costs, bank may increase non-traditional activities to offset the losses 
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traditional bank actives, which bring more diversification as well as high risk (Valverde and 
Fernandez, 2007).  
 
In the past three decades, the banking industry has showed a trend in the diversification of 
financial services and consolidation of financial institutions, especially prior to the financial crisis 
in 2007/08. This trend can be found at Figure 19. Thus, it that there’s an evidence showing U.S. 
banks moved away from traditional activate to non-traditional services to achieve higher non-
interest income because of the greater competitions in traditional financial market. Non-interest 
income increases dramatically since 2002 and then the speed of increase slows around 2003Q3. 
The break is statistically significant under 5% significant level.  
 
The reason for this might be the serious regulation that restricted the establishment of branches 
(Canals, 2006; Cole and White, 2012; Fahlenbrach et al., 2011; Mishkin, 2002). In the United 
States, although a large number of financial institutions had existed since the 1980s, the number 
decreased due to a national consolidation through which banks could increase their size in order 
to benefit from the economies of scale (Mishkin, 2002). It experienced a sharp decline in bank 
returns and non-interest income in early 2003 due to monetary policy. It also maybe some banks 
considered the switching costs from traditional bank activities to new activates, therefore they 
still focus on traditional services but make an effort to improve the efficiency of financial 
operations. Modern economists believed that a large number of new lines of non-traditional 
financial services cause higher risk-taking, thus further tiger bank failure and financial instability 
(Stiroh, 2006; Saunders and Walter, 1994; Welfens, 2008). Thus, in these cases, banks have more 
incentive to become large through consolidation in order to benefit from the economies of scale 
(Canals, 2006). In contrast, Fahlenbrach et al., 2011and  Cole and White, 2012 concluded that the 
causes and nature of banks’ financial weaknesses during the recent financial crisis were similar to 
those observed at banks that failed or performed poorly during previous banking recessions. 
Banks that engaged in risky non-traditional activities also tended to take risk in their traditional 
lines of business, suggesting that deregulation was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 













Figure 17: Net Interest Margin for all Banks in United States from 1992 to 2014 
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Figure 18: Non-Interest Income to Earning Assets for U.S. banks from 1992 to 2014 


















































































Figure 19: Yield on Earning Assets for U.S. banks from 1992 to 2014 
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3.5 The Bank Size Effect and Episode Analysis 
Beltratti and Stulz (2009) argued that many large banks have seen most of their equity destroyed 
by the recent financial crisis in 2007/08. Was the poor performance of the banks the outcome of a 
financial Tsunami that hit them unexpectedly, or were large banks more predisposed to 
experience large losses? Many observers have argued that ineffective regulation contributed or 
even caused the collapse. If that is the case, we would expect difference in the regulation of 
financial institutions regarding to bank sizes to be helpful in maintain the stable of financial 
system. Other observers have criticized the governance of small banks and suggested that better 
governance would have led to better performance during crisis. It is need to be pointed out that 
banks were affected differentially simply because they had different balance sheet and thus 
different financial ratios. In this section, we discuss the consequence of ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) 
and show differences in the applicability of banking accounting ratios for the identification of 
banking problem between large, median and small banks. 
 
Section 3.5 address similar issues to those discussed in section 3.4, and same data and methods 
are employed. Therefore, only results and discussions will be presented in this section. Please 
refer to methodology in section 3.3 for further reference. In order to consider the effect of bank 
size in identifying significant structural shifts of selective early warning ratios in response to the 
crisis, we divide whole sample into three groups (big bank, median bank and small banks) by 
bank sizes. A bank is classified as a small firm if its bank asset size is below the 60
th
 percentile, 




 percentile, and as a large 
bank if its bank assets is above 10
th
 percentile. Three sets of proportions of bank sizes are 
considered to divide sample in our work: 25%-50%-25%; 10%-20%-70%; and 10%-30%-60%; 
and the 3
rd
 asymmetric way is most suitable way for  current U.S. bank system. Please see 
Appendix 9 for full results. 
 
3.5.1 The Bank Size Effect 
All in all, we’ve found bank size does matter in context of applicability of banking accounting 
ratios serve as early warning signals. Our results suggest that certain indicators such as 
nonperforming loans ratio (NPLs), loan deposit ratio, loan provision ratio and interbank lending 
ratio are appropriate indicators for the detection of banking system vulnerabilities for both big 
and small banks. And nonperforming loans ratio (NPLs) additionally serves as an indicator for 
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the timing of a crisis. However, again capital ratios failed to provide signals for systemic banking 
problem.  
 
While the changes in the financial system affected all banks, they had a particularly large impact 
on the largest banks. The business model of large banks became clearly distinct from that of 
small or medium-sized banks. The evolutions of regulatory capital ratio, nonperforming loans 
ratio (NPLs), loan deposit ratio, loan provision ratio and interbank lending ratio are carefully 
examined in each sub group. The business model of large banks became clearly distinct from that 
of small or medium-sized banks. First, large banks today engage disproportionately more in 
market-based activities (Figure 20 and 21). Second, large banks hold less capital than small banks, 
as measured either by a tier 1 capital ratio or a leverage ratio (Figure 22 and 23). Third, large 
banks have less stable funding than small banks, as measured by the ratio of deposits to total 
assets (Figure 24). Fourth, large banks engage more interbank activities, as measured by 
interbank loan (Figure 25). From Figure 26 below, while the financial crisis started from 2007, 
triggered an unprecedented, sustained strains in interbank lending; we found that the interbank 
market was large and active, for large banks, in the U.S. in early 2008. With the increasing level 
of uncertainty and counterpart risks, all banks became increasing unwilling to lend and thus the 
size of interbank loans in average plummeted by the end of 2008; the big fall happened after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers in September. The crisis prompted a surge in demand for liquid assets 
in the entire U.S. financial system, in turn, rather than lend surplus liquid assets out, most banks 
preferred to hold, in case their own need might increase. The situation was constantly becoming 
worse when interbank loans created a vicious circle of increased caution, greater demand for 
liquidity, reduced willingness to lend and higher loan rates, the waves of financial crisis can be 
seen in the graph. For small banks, the evidence demonstrates that funding fragility and the 
changes of interbank loans both in level and trend at third quarter of year 2008Q4 were highly 
statistically significant (Figure 27). Finally, large banks have poorer asset quality than small 









Figure 20: Large Banks Engage More in                          Figure 21: Large Banks Generate More Income  
                      Nonlending Activities                                                             from Noninterest Income  
 
Figure 22: Large Banks Hold Less Tier 1Capital            Figure 23: Large Banks Have Higher Leverage 
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% loans to commercial in U.S.
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Figure 26: The interbank lending profile for large banks 
 
Figure 27: The estimated regressions of key ratios for interbank loan for small bank 
Figure 28: NPLs to total gross loans ratio for both large(Left) and small banks(Right)28 
                                                 
 
28
 NPLs to total gross loans ratio increase in run up to a crisis, indicating that financial systems recognize poor asset 
quality; it bottomed itself by the end of 2007 for large banks, which is quicker than small banks. This follows the 
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There are a number of possible explanations for why large banks act differently: 
One explanation is that large banks benefit from economies of scale, and this affects their 
business model. Large banks benefit from too-big-to-fail subsidies, although their value is also 
uncertain and varies across countries and over time. See Chapter 3 of the IMF’s April 2014 
Global Financial Stability Report for a review of the current thinking on the too-big-to-fail 
subsidies (IMF, 2014). First, size allows better diversification, which reduces risks and allows 
banks to operate with lower capital and less-stable funding. It may also facilitate market-based 
bank activities. And, large banks also may operate in a different market segment than small 
banks. Large banks may have a comparative advantage in market-based activities, which require 
significant fixed costs and enjoy economies of scale. Market-based activities may invite more 
leverage and unstable funding, because securities can be used as collateral in repos. Small banks 
may stick to their comparative advantage in traditional, relationship-based lending. 
 
The literature on the economies of scale in banks is inconclusive; therefore it is difficult to 
determine optimal bank size. Early studies have found economies of scale to be limited to 
relatively small banks, with no evidence of economies of scale in banks beyond US$10 billion to 
US$50 billion in assets (Benston, Hanweck, and Humphrey, 1982; Berger and Mester, 1997; 
Peristiani, 1997). More recent studies question these results and find economies of scale for large 
banks. There are valid economic reasons for why the evidence may have changed: with the 
advance of information technologies and the proliferation of scalable market-based operations, 
optimal bank size may have increased. Most studies on economies of scale focus on cost 
economies-the ability of banks to efficiently use overhead. Kovner, Vickery, and Zhou (2013) 
estimate the total value of such economies in the U.S. banking system for banks over US$50 
billion in assets to range between US$16 billion and US$45 billion a year, corresponding to 0.1 
to 0.25 percent of GDP.  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
result of Cihakand and Schaeck (2000). One possible explanation of those is that banks start to increase loss 
allowance and decrease the long-term loan lending in order to protect them from illiquidity. All in all, NPLs verified 
the structure break date of 2006Q3 for large banks and 2008Q2 for small banks during the financial crisis. We only 
found a statistically significant break date of 2007Q4 for loan loss allowance to noncurrent loans ratio for both group 
of banks. It seems to also indicate that provisioning lags behind the recognition of NPLs before crisis, which may 
affect linter alia perceptions of vulnerability and changes were consistent with the assumption. The NPLs worked 




Another view is that large banks respond to (inefficient) too-big-to-fail subsidies. Due to a 
perception that the creditors of large banks will be bailed out in case of bank distress, the cost of 
debt for large banks is lower. This makes banks more willing to use leverage and unstable 
funding, and to engage in risky market-based activities. Some researchers take into account the 
diversification abilities of large banks. Studies that allow for possible changes in the input and 
product mix of banks find significant economies of scale (Hughes and Mester, 2013; Wheelock 
and Wilson, 2012). Large banks diversify by moving from traditional deposit-taking and lending 
to more cost-effective but riskier wholesale funding and market-based activities. However, the 
negative returns to scope for banks that engage in market-based activities is evident in lower 
market valuations (Laeven and Levine, 2007; Schmid and Walter, 2009), higher risk 
(Brunnermeier, Dong and Palia, 2012; De, 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; DeYoung 
and Torna, 2013), and lower risk-adjusted returns (Baele, De Jonghe, and Vander Vennet, 2007; 
Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). This evidence points not only to the destruction of 
shareholder value but also to potential costs for other stakeholders in the bank, including 
taxpayers, from the risk of failure. Yet it may be that banks’ involvement in market-based 
activities creates surplus to bank customers. In this case, from a social welfare perspective, the 
returns to scope in banking may still be positive. Interestingly, the source of these negative 
returns is not technological. Indeed, a large literature points to the benefits of the efficient use of 
information from lending in the market-based activities of banks (Drucker and Puri, 2005; 
Kroszner and Rajan, 1994; Puri, 1996). Rather, the source of the negative returns to scope is the 
agency costs in banks that engage in market-based activities (Boot and Ratnovski, 2016). 
 
The third view is that excess bank size is a consequence of managerial empire-building, and that 
large banks suffer from bad corporate governance. Managers may reach for size to receive larger 
compensation (Murphy, 1985; Gabaix and Landier, 2008) or because they enjoy private benefits 
from the prestige of running a large firm (Jensen, 1986). Managers can boost bank size by 
attracting additional funding and increasing bank leverage, or through mergers and acquisitions 
of other banks. While the consolidation process has improved access to finance for U.S. firms 
and households, it has destroyed corporate value for many banking firms in the process, 
especially those that combined traditional banking with investment banking activities (Levine, 




The corporate governance challenges in large banks are especially significant given that large 
banks tend to be more highly leveraged, have more complex organizations, and engage in trading 
activities to a greater extent. First, there are limits on the concentration of ownership and 
takeovers (Caprio and Levine, 2002; Laeven, 2013). For example, U.S. regulation effectively 
limits nonbank ownership of banks to no more than 10 percent of the voting stock. Limits on 
ownership also limit takeovers. Uncoordinated shareholders and an absence of the takeover threat 
reduce the influence that bank shareholders wield over bank managers. Second, banks are highly 
leveraged institutions. This means that their shareholders may have aggressive risk preferences, 
which are not in the interest of other stakeholders - depositors, creditors, and the government. 
Indeed, there is evidence that banks where shareholders exercise more control tend to take more 
risk (Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 1990; Laeven and Levine, 2009).Third, the risks associated 
with the trading activities of banks may be genuinely difficult to control, either by shareholders 
or management (Mehran, Morrison, and Shapiro, 2011; Glode, Green, and Lowery, 2012; Ellul 
and Yerramilli, 2013). Banks have much scope to manufacture “tail risks” that are hard to 
quantify in normal times (Acharya et al., 2013), and, given the difficulty in assessing the 
riskiness of such positions, it is almost impossible to establish any neglect of management’s 
fiduciary duty to shareholders. Given the distorted incentives of bank shareholders, a natural 
proposition might have been to expand the control over banks to other stakeholders, such as 
creditors or government representatives (Macey and O’Hara, 2003). However, the literature 
points out that this is not a panacea, as creditor or government control may lead to directed or 
affiliated lending, compromising credit quality (Sapienza, 2004). 
 
All of the explanations above have some validity. The explanation that large banks are so large 
and operate in the way in which they do because of economies of scale is benign: It suggests that 
bank size is economically beneficial. Explanations based on too-big-to-fail subsidies and bad 
corporate governances imply that distortions may be present. Banks may be too large compared 
to what is socially optimal, and have no incentives to shrink because of private interests of 
shareholders or managers. Taken together, this implies that there may be a trade-off with large 






3.5.2 Episode analysis 
The 2007/08 financial crisis was characterized by non-bank FIs acting as one of the main triggers 
of the distress, the so-called “the non-bank clue” (FCIC, 2010), which is a novel property of the 
financial crash and is presented as a three-stage process (3 episode) in Appendix 10. In this 
section, those statistically significant changes of slope and/or trends of financial indicators are 
summarised and mapped by 3 sub-periods including the run-up to the recent financial crisis 2007-
2008, the 3 episode of the crisis, and post stage of the crisis: 
 
Episode1 The Liquidity Crisis of 2007 
        1. Failure of mortgage lenders (early 2007) 
        2. Hedge fund losses (end of July) 
        3. Run on commercial paper (summer of 2007) 
        4. The government response 
Episode2 The run on Bear Stearns (early 2008) 
        1. Financial guarantors  
        2. Run on auction-rate securities  
        3. Bear Stearns and the run on repo and other collateral 
        4. The government response 
Episode3 The panic of 2008  
        1.The failure of Lehman Brothers (September 2008) 
        2.The government response 





































Y 2008Q1 2001Q1 2007Q1 C 2006Q1 C 2006Q1 
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Figure 29: The breaks identified by capital adequacy ratios in aggregate level 
 
 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 32: The breaks identified by liquidity ratios in aggregate level 
 
 
Figure 33: The breaks identified by profitability ratios in aggregate level 
 
 






NO. of ratios 
 
NO. of beaks 
 
NO. of ratios 
 
NO. of beaks 
 
NO. of ratios 
 




24 42 24 30 
Asset quality 26 32 26 26 26 34 
Profitablity 30 40 30 35 30 41 





91 50 95 50 80 








































































































































































































































































































Figure 35:  The summary of timing of breaks in aggregate level 
 
 
Figure 36:  The summary of timing of breaks in aggregate level for large banks 
 
 










































































































































































































































































From Figures above, we find that the failure of mortgage lenders started in early 2007, which is 
Episode 1; in what follow, government responses are observed through all three stages.  
 
For capital adequacy ratios, there are 38 structural breaks found in aggregate level, 42 for large 
banks and 30 for small banks. And, those breaks happened mainly from 2nd quarter 2006 to last 
quarter of 2007, and in late 2008 for all banks, which are in the first and third stage of crisis. 
There is barely a ripple in the series in the period 2004 to 2006 when the vulnerability to the 
financial crisis was building up. What is remarkable is how tranquil the Capital adequacy ratios 
are before the crisis; they failed in playing a key role of being a first waring sign of financial 
crisis. There is clear empirical evidence from the global financial crisis (GFC) and earlier that 
risk-weighted capital buffers were not good predictors in practice, which is verified in our case 
(Estrella, Park, and Peristiani, 2000). Northern Rock for example was fully compliant with risk-
weighted measures shortly before its failure (Mayes and Wood, 2009). Concentration just on 
capital adequacy, for example, while capturing most occurrences, would miss many of the 
problems cases. This does not imply that there should be any reduction in the use of risk –
weighted measures in deciding how much capital a bank should hold in normal times but that 
when things start to go wring, a simple leverage ratio, which is transparent and more difficult to 
manipulate, would be the better indicators of problems. 
 
Even though ratios for asset quality and profitability, have obvious structure breaks and slumps 
across whole crisis, but they didn’t help in identify the timing of the financial crisis. 
 
The structural shifts of key ratios for examining liquidity reveals a distinctive behaviour of all 
banks just before the crisis, and after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. For 
ratios of interbank loans, structural breaks are found after the end of 2008 for large banks, but 
changes comes earlier for small banks. Those groups of ratios identify the main changes in 
liquidity and interbank lending during the crisis. And liquidity ratios successfully gave the waring 
before the crisis. The evidence shows the interbank market was not fully frozen and still quite 
active, at least in issuing new interbank loans in the early stage of financial crisis. The results of 
liquidity ratios and interbank loans support the observed liquidity hoarding behavior of banks and 
less active moments in interbank loan market. The crisis prompted a surge in demand for liquid 
assets in the entire U.S. financial system, in turn, rather than lend surplus liquid assets out, most 
banking preferred to hold, in case their own need might increase. With the increasing level of 
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uncertainty and counterpart risks, banks became increasing unwilling to lend and thus the size of 
interbank loans in average plummeted by the end of 2008; For example, the big fall happened 
after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September, particularly in the interbank market. The 
situation only got to be controlled by the end of 2009 after a large scale of government injection 
and banks’ liquidity hoarding. Moreover, we find that the market’s perception of the risk of a 
bank can depend on the size of the bank. ‘Size matters’ is also provided by Black, Collins and 
Robinson (1997) and Schweitzer (2003). It is interesting to see how bank size plays a significant 
role for liquidity hoarding, which will be present in our chapter 5. 
 
The results from the empirical investigations, which can be assumed to be valid in principle for 
most banking systems, provides us with some guidance on the banks’ dynamic actions in the 
interbank loan market that we should be able to use in our research design in chapter 4 and 5 

































This chapter has investigated bank behaviors around the 2007/08 global financial crisis by 
examining the structural changes of a number of aggregate level bank accounting ratios in three 
sub-periods: pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis. 
 
First of all, it is also the first paper, as far as we know that uses structural shifts to assess the 
relative likelihood of success of selective financial ratios as early warning indicators. We also 
identify real banks’ preemptive actions from a wide range of balance sheet ratios that experienced 
a significant structural change in response to the crisis at aggregate level.  
 
In aggregate level, the bulk of our results suggest that certain indicators such as leverage and 
coverage ratio are appropriate indicators for the detection of banking system vulnerabilities. And 
coverage ratio additionally serves as an indicator for the timing of a crisis. However, capital 
ratios failed to provide signals for systemic banking problem. Concentration just on capital 
adequacy, for example, while capturing most occurrences, would miss many of the problems 
cases. This does not imply that there should be any reduction in the use of risk - weighted 
measures in deciding how much capital a bank should hold in normal times but that when things 
start to go wring, a simple leverage ratio, which is transparent and more difficult to manipulate, 
would be the better indicators of problems. 
 
What’s more, the findings in our financial ratios analysis clearly suggest that the aspects of the 
actual dynamic behavior of banks might be a determinant for the likelihood of a banking crisis. 
We found that whereas capital levels were closely monitored, heavy reliance of banks on whole-
sale funding was overlooked. Banks that seemed to be safe experience bank run that ultimately 
led to their defaults. The sudden decrease in interbank market activity and increase in the banks’ 
liquidity hoarding behavior were observed as well. However, new interbank loans might be 
granted, extended and withdrawal as the interbank market was not fully frozen and still quite 
active, at least in issuing new interbank loans in the early stage of financial crisis.  
 
In addition to this, we’ve also discussed the consequence of ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) and show 
differences in the applicability of banking accounting ratios for the identification of banking 
problem between large, median and small banks. We’ve found Bank size does matter in context 
of applicability of banking accounting ratios serve as early warning signals. Our results suggest 
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that certain indicators such as nonperforming loans ratio (NPLs), loan deposit ratio, loan 
provision ratio and interbank lending ratios are appropriate indicators for the detection of banking 
system vulnerabilities for both big and small banks. And nonperforming loans ratio (NPLs) 
additionally serves as an indicator for the timing of a crisis. However, again capital ratios failed 
to provide signals for systemic banking problem. 
 
The results from the empirical investigations in this chapter, which can be assumed to be valid in 
principle for most banking systems, provides us with some guidance on the banks’ dynamic 
actions in the interbank loan market that we should be able to use in our research design. It 
proposes a framework that allows us to take into account the banks’ preemptive actions on the 
interbank loan market after an initial common shock hitting the system. To capture more aspects 
of real banking systems, we are proposing a new way of simulating and interpreting interbank 
market contagion by combining banks’ preemptive actions during the crisis in the chapter 5. 
Finally, we could investigate real banking systems by using actual banking system in the future, 
which could extend our framework to determine an optimal regulation. 
 
However, there are limitations to our research and future works. First, one may argue that the U.S. 
interbank market is only considered rather than other countries in our study. What’s more, while 
we acknowledge that the regulatory and institutional settings as well as macroeconomic variables 
are considered to be one determinant of financial system sounder, we do not account for this in 
our study since it is beyond the scope of this research to investigate the interaction between bank 
















Interbank lending makes a great contribution to the efficiency of financial markets. It helps meet 
large volume funding liquidity requirements, and allows banks with a temporary surplus of cash 
to invest it reliably for period maturities from overnight to one year.  In particular, as one of the 
most important but vulnerable systems in the whole economy, over the last 20 or so years, there 
has been a significant growth of interest in the question whether the U.S. interbank market 
amplifies shocks to the whole banking sector or individual banks.  
 
Even for many banks that are mostly funded by deposits, interbank loans may be a critical 
marginal source of additional funds. How those interbank transactions resolve short-term 
imbalance of supply and demand? In any normal day, some banks receive more deposits than 
expected, while others receive less than expected. Similarly, some banks experience an 
unexpected demand for loans from either homeowners or investors in equities while other banks 
face the opposite situation. If banks could not reliably lend and borrow on any particular day to 
offset those unanticipated ebbs and flows, a large volume of cash would be needed to insure itself 
against the possibility of unexpected payment inflows or outflows. However, extra-large amount 
of cash holding is a big waste and those resources could be invested profitably elsewhere. The 
interbank market helps banks to solve this problem by satisfying temporary, localized excess 
demand for funding liquidity that is necessary for the smooth function of other financial 
organizations.  
 
However, the interbank market plays a role in risk sharing between banks with credit linkages 
(Allen and Gale, 2000). Contagion from one bank to the next could be propagated via the 
interbank market (Rochet and Tirole, 1996; Stiglitz, 2010; Allen and Gale, 2001). Figure 38 
below displays a simple framework of interbank markets with relation to contagion risk. On the 
one hand, contagion could occur in the event of a shortage of aggregate liquidity asset, which has 
been manifested in the settlements systems (Freixas and Parigi, 1998). The interbank market 
reapportions excess liquidity towards other banks that may have shortages only in case of no 
overall excess demand for liquidity, as interbank deposits cannot increases the aggregate 
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liquidity. The lender of last resort (LLR) will be the only solution if the interbank market fully 
freezes. If this lender is apathetic, those banks that would be the first to experience difficulties 
with a large numbers of withdraw depositors. Thus fragility and panic will be propagated and 
spread through the interbank market, especially when there exists a chain of bilateral 
relationships in the market where the gross outstanding positions (rather than the net ones) are 
exposed to liquidity risk. On the other hand, for those banks who survive from the initial shock, 
they perceive the situation of the entire system as being in distress and may start hoarding 
liquidity, thus generating cash outflows for their counter-banks and exacerbating their funding 
issues. However, banks can also issue new loans from interbank market with high quality 
collaterals or high interest rates. Eventually, the banks will suffer from a liquidity shortage and 







Figure 38 : The Framework of Interbank Markets 
 
The interbank markets also have significant influence on the modern economy through monetary 
policy (Matsuoka, 2012). In the U.S., the Fed funds rate, also known as overnight interbank rate, 
works as a main channel in monetary policy. Usually, the rate of interbank loans is lower than the 
rate for other trading partners as banks are seen as low-risk confidence borrowers and investors 
require a smaller risk premium and even without collateral. However, events occasionally strain 
the interbank lending: such as physical disruption on 11
th
 September 2001 as well as financial 
crisis of 2007-09. Uncertainty about banks’ own needs combined with concerns about potential 
shortfalls prompted banks to be more unwilling to lend for more than a few days, and even then 
only at every high interest rates. The higher rate and reduced availability of interbank lending 
would create a vicious circle of over caution, extraordinary increase in demand for liquidity, 
reduced willingness to lend and higher cost. The contagion effect is more significant in a 







increased from 1.05% in 2004 to 5.31% in 2007
29
 (4.72% in 2006), as involvement in the 
interbank market may trigger a higher level of risk-taking for lending banks. For the neither 
collateralized nor insured against interbank loans, one financial institution’s failure may trigger a 
chain of subsequent failures and eventually force the central bank to intervene to stop the 
contagion process in the bud. Interbank lending also could reduce the transparency of banks’ 
balance and off-balance sheet and complicate the measurement of actual banking liquidity as well 
as solvency ratios for prudential purposes.  
 
It was predicted according to some recent economic theoretical models that the interbank lending 
market would freeze at the beginning of summer of 2007 just following the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers as it did during the Asian banking crisis of the late 1990s (Allen and Gale, 
2001; Freixas and Parigi, 1998). This may impose adverse implications in the whole financial 
system as it could be contagious and spills over from one to the others. Therefore, Central bank 
as a LLR must conduct large-scale interventions to prevent a large scale of economic 
deterioration under this circumstance (Bagehot, 1873). However, the observed evidence in the 
Fed funds market in the immediate aftermath the collapse of Lehman Brothers, did not support 
the hypotheses above. In addition, the run on Northern Rock very likely reflected not the failure 
of the Bank’s lender of last resort policy but inadequacies in the UK’s provision of deposit 
insurance, the ill thought out separation of financial supervision and regulation from the central 
bank and political pressure (Milne and Wood, 2008).  On the other hand, a moral hazard problem 
is generated from LLR intervention: it encourages all banks to make an effort to be large by 
increasing the capacity of bank activities in order to benefit from TBTF (too-big-to-fail) while the 
expansion of bank activities, especially non-traditional actives, may increase risk (Gandhi and 
Lustig, 2015; Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong, 2014). Simaan (2017) proposed a unique 
diversification index to capture the risk-taking behaviors of banks; and he found robust evidence 
that large banks are more likely to take excessive risk than their smaller peers.  
 
Figure 39 below displays the structure of the U.S. interbank market pointed out by Freixa et al. 
(2000). It is characterised as an interconnected multiple money centre banks market, the same as 
Germany and Austria, where the money centre banks connected between each other. Lending 
banks are money centre banks that have a significant impact on the rest of the economy, as the 
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 Data source: OECD, see figure 4 in chapter 1 
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contagion can be spread to other money centre banks through the credit linkages. Therefore, the 
central bank is willing to provide potential protection for big banks, which might enable them to 
be involved in risky activities. In other words, to some extent, the implication of the multiple 
money centre banks market structure is consistent with the policy of  ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF), 
where they are protected by central bank and moral hazard problem could be observed. The size 
















Figure 39: Interconnected Multiple Money centre Bank Market Structure (Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 
2000) 
 
The recent subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-08 leads us to question the advantage of relying on 
interbank markets to provide liquidity, considering the systemic risk. In this chapter, we focus on 
the issue on whether involvement in interbank lending increases the risk level of banks while the 
size effect will particularly be considered. Exiting empirical research on the relationship between 
interbank lending and bank size is very limited and has found only marginal effects (Furfine, 
2001; Aschcraft and Bleakley, 2006). One possible explanation is that interbank exposures in the 
countries which have been the focus of previous studies are with very short-term maturity 
(Overnight). In addition the interbank borrowing banks is U.S. are the largest banks so that too-
big-too fail considerations reduce the lenders’ incentives to control for borrower’s risk. In this 
research, a micro-level datasets from FDIC has been used. The sample includes 13973 banks and 
the time span has been restricted from the fourth quarter of 1992 to the last quarter of 2011
30
. The 
analysis places special emphasis on the influence of bank size, activities, and complexity on bank 
risk, given the debate on the optimal size of banks, but also considers whether bank size interacts 
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 It characterized by long-term interbank exposures 
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with interbank lending to influence bank risk. We also detect differences in U.S. bank activities 
and risk taking in three sub-periods: pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. 
 
A nonlinear (U-shaped) relationship is found in our study of the impact of bank size and 
interbank lending on bank risk-taking during the normal times. The empirical analysis documents 
that large banks, on average, create more individual risk than smaller banks, especially when they 
have insufficient capital or unstable funding - both common features of large banks. Additionally, 
large banks are riskier than small banks when they engage more in interbank market activities in 
non-crisis period; but interbank lending reduces the large banks’ risk-taking during financial 
crisis. 
 
These findings have an important bearing on the current policy debate on financial structure. 
They generally support the path taken by the Basel III regulatory framework, which focuses on 
strengthening bank capital and liquidity requirements. There are two additional novel 
implications. First, policy needs to take into account the disproportional role of large banks. This 
argument goes beyond the literature’s traditional focus on whether large financial systems are 
optimal from an allocative efficiency point of view (Arcand, Berkes and Panizza, 2015; 
Philippon, 2010). Accordingly, second, measures targeting bank interbank activities and 
complexity may need to be undertaken in the context of a wider macro-prudential framework. 
 
The rest of this section is organised as follows: Section 4.2 summaries the literature on bank size 
and interbank activities; research methodologies as well as the model specification are discussed 
















4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Basic Facts about Large Banks 
Since the 1970s, the U.S. global financial system has been transformed by a wave of financial 
innovation and deregulation. The origin of both can be traced to the information technology 
revolution, which increased the availability of information, made a variety of assets more 
tradable, and led to a proliferation of financial markets. Financial innovation and deregulation 
have expanded access to finance, bringing substantial welfare benefits. For example, interest rate 
deregulation for U.S. banks (Regulation Q) was in part motivated by competition from financial 
markets (mutual funds) that could offer financial products with more attractive interest rates.  
 
At the same time, financial innovation and deregulation have affected the structure of the banking 
system; such as, the removal of prohibitions on mergers between commercial banks, investment 
banks, securities firms, and insurance companies in 1999 (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). First, 
U.S. banks, especially the largest of them, have grown in size. The consolidation process in U.S. 
banking following deregulation in the 1970s has led to an increase in bank concentration, with 
large banks growing in size and geographical spread. Figure 40 shows how the balance sheet size 
of three largest U.S. banks at least doubled, and in some cases quadrupled, over the 10 years prior 
to the financial crisis. The crisis was followed by some deleveraging, also in large banks, so their 
size has been relatively stable since the crisis.  
 
Figure 40: Increase in the Asset Size of Selected Largest Banks 
Sources: Bankscope; IMF 
 
Second, large banks have expanded the range of their activities. They added a wide range of 
market-based operations to the traditional business of making loans. These include investment 
banking, proprietary trading, market-marking, venture capital, security brokerage and asset 
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securitization; and, more generally, a provision of various financial market services, from 
advisory to hedging, to customers. Figures 41 and 42 illustrate the shift of four largest banks 
toward market-based activities using two alternative measures: a reduction of loans as a share of 
assets, and an increase in noninterest income as a share of income.  
      
Figure 41: Decrease in Loans to Assets Ratio             Figure 42: Increase in Share of Noninterest Income  
Sources: Bankscope; IMF 
Recall section 3.5, while the changes in the financial system affected all banks, they had a 
particularly large impact on the largest banks (compare Figure 41 and 42 to Figure 1, 2 and 3 in 
section 1.1). The business model of large banks became clearly distinct from that of small or 
medium-sized banks (see Section 3.5.1, Figure 20 to Figure 28). First, large banks today engage 
disproportionately more in market-based activities. Second, large banks hold less capital than 
small banks, as measured either by a tier 1 capital ratio or a leverage ratio. Third, large banks 
have less stable funding than small banks, as measured by the ratio of deposits to total assets. 
Finally, large banks engage more interbank activities, as measured by interbank loan. Although 
the 2007/08 financial crisis triggered unprecedented strains in interbank lending, we found that 
the interbank market was large and active for large banks in early 2008. With the increasing level 
of uncertainty and counterpart risks, all banks became increasing unwilling to lend and thus the 
size of interbank loans in average plummeted by the end of 2008; the big fall happened after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers in September. The situation was constantly becoming worse when 
interbank loans created a vicious circle of increased caution, greater demand for liquidity, 
reduced willingness to lend and higher loan rates, the waves of precautionary behaviors, such as 




4.2.2 Interbank Market Structure and TBTF 
There are two different structures of interbank markets: one is the incomplete market with credit 
chains, in which a bank has a connection only with its neighbor; and the other is the complete 
interbank market with diversified lending where a bank has symmetric links with all others 
(Allen and Gale, 2000; Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987). Lower risk-taking was found in the 
complete market as the risk of interbank lending can be shared by more than one lending bank.   
 
The existing empirical models have studied the effect of the interbank market structure on risk-
taking using matrix analyses. In these studies, balance sheet data or large interbank exposures 
data are used as a proxy to determine the structure of interbank markets. 25 matrices of bilateral 
exposures in terms of maturity and bank categories are applied in a study of Upper and Worms 
(2002) to examine the Germany interbank market. They find that the German interbank market is 
two-tier: in the upper tier, the structure of interbank exposures is close to a complete interbank 
market structure, while in the lower tier, the interbank market is associated with an incomplete 
structure.  They also point out that the contagion risk is lower in a complete market structure than 
in an incomplete market structure.  
 
Considering the role of the central bank in the context of the interbank market, Freixas et al. 
(2000) extended the original model of Freixas et al. (1998). They present a disconnected multiple 
money centre market structure (Figure 43), where borrowing banks have a connection with the 
money centre banks (A and B). As shown in Figure 39, the money centre bank is connected 
with other small banks, large non-financial firms and even the government. Therefore, the 
failure of the money centre bank could lead to serious consequences for the financial system. 
Here, as the lender of last resort (LLR), role of the Central Bank (CB) is highlighted. It indicates 
that the optimal strategy of the CB is to provide additional protection for money centre banks in 
order to minimize the costs of intervention under TBTF. Figure 39 in mentioned introduction 
above displays the structure of the U.S. interbank market pointed out by Freixa et al. (2000). It is 
characterised as an interconnected multiple money centre banks market, the same as Germany 
and Austria, where the money centre banks connected between each other. Lending banks are 
money centre banks that have a significant impact on the rest of the economy, as the contagion 
can be spread to other money centre banks through the credit linkages. Therefore, the central 
bank is willing to provide potential protection for big banks, which might enable them to become 

















Figure 43: Disconnected Multiple Money centre Bank Market Structure (Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 
2000) 
The results from a UK study conducted by Well (2004) are consistent with the implications of 
the multiple money centre bank structure as suggested by Freixas et al. (2000). Also, Degryse 
and Nguyen (2004) analyze the contagion risk by using data from Belgian banks between 1993 
and 2002. They emphasize the importance of interbank market structure in determining the level 
of contagion risk. A change in market structure from a complete market to a multiple money 
centres market allows contagion risk to be reduced. The failure of borrowing banks (small banks) 
linked to a money centre bank cannot lead to the failure of the money centre bank protected by 
CB, which is consistent with the implications of the framework suggested by Freixas et al. 
(2000). However, a different structure exists in the Portuguese interbank market (Cocco et al., 
2009). In this market, large banks tend to be net borrowers as they have more opportunities to 
invest while small banks specialize in deposit taking but have few investments, so they have 
sufficient liquidity to lend to large banks.  
 
To some extent, the implication of the multiple money centre banks market structure is consistent 
with the policy of ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF), where they are protected by central bank and moral 
hazard problem could be observed. The size effect, therefore, is significant in determining bank 
risk level. The U.S. interbank market used in our study is an example of interconnected multiple 
money centre bank market. 
 
Central Bank 
















4.2.3 Interbank Lending and Bank Size 
The importance of effective monitoring of the interbank assets of lending banks has been 
highlighted in a theoretical model introduced by Rochet and Tirole (1996). Good monitoring can 
reduce the risk of interbank lending and maintain a stable financial system. Dinger and Hagen 
(2005) introduce a theoretical model to examine the impact of bank size on bank risk level. They 
suggest that large banks have more advantages, such as efficient management and economies of 
scale, in monitoring borrowing banks, and hence can reduce the risk level of interbank 
lending. There are several assumptions made in this model. First, they assume two firms: one 
with good projects and the other with bad projects. The rate of return on a good project is 𝑅𝑔 
with probability of 𝜋𝑔, 0 otherwise; the rate of return on a bad project is 𝑅𝑏 with probability of 
𝜋𝑏 , 0 otherwise; and  𝑅𝑔𝜋𝑔 − 1 > 0 > 𝑅𝑏𝜋𝑏 − 1, 𝑅𝑔 < 𝑅𝑏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋𝑔 > 𝜋𝑏 . Second, under the 
money centre bank market structure, there is only one large bank acting as a lending bank with n 
small banks as borrowing banks. Due to the policy of ‘too big to fail’, the large banks receive 
government protection on its deposits.  
 
For the large bank, the interest rate of deposit (𝑖𝑙𝑏  ) which is lower than that of the small 
banks (𝑖𝑠𝑏  ). The payment for depositors in the large bank is 𝐷𝑙𝑏 = 1  due to  its  risklessness  
and  for small  banks,  the nominal  repayment  is  D=1+ i
sb 
. Moreover, the large bank also 
provides interbank loans at the interbank 𝑖𝑖𝑏 , which varies according to the risk level of 
borrowing banks and would be required to pay a t  a higher rate if a borrowing bank usually 
finances bad projects. The repayment for one unit of interbank asset is d=1+ iib . Here, they 
also assume that small banks can refinance through either the interbank market or deposit-
taking. Thus, the amount of credits from the interbank market for small banks is 1-E-p: E is the 
equity, and a higher level of equity reduces the amount of credit financed by either deposit-
taking or the interbank market, and provides additional protection for banks. p is the deposit for 
small banks and thus the marginal cost of gathering deposits is c(p). Considering the moral 
hazard problem, small banks are willing to finance the bad project due to its higher return rate; 
the small banks prefer to finance a good project only if the net return of the good project is not 
lower than that of the bad project: 
𝜋𝑔(𝑅𝑔 − 𝑅𝑖) − (1 − 𝜋𝑔)(1 − 𝐸) ≥ 𝜋𝑏(𝑅𝑏 − 𝑅𝑖) − (1 − 𝜋𝑏)(1 − 𝐸) 
 
In their paper, the net expected return (NER) of the large bank is discussed in four cases:  
1. both good and bad project success; 
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2. bad project failure and good project success;  
3. good project failure and bad project success; 
4. both good project and bad project failure.  
In sum, the large bank prefers to monitor borrowing banks and assure them to finance good 
projects in order to maximize the net expected return, which reduces the default risk level of 
interbank lending. However, the monitoring only occurs if the benefit of screening is not lower 
than the fixed costs C: 
(1 − 𝐸 − 𝑝)𝑑(𝜋𝑔 − 𝜋𝑏) ≥ 𝐶                                                                           (4-1) 
 





Where the repayment of interbank assets for the large bank is 𝑑𝑔when small banks finance a good 
project, and 𝑑𝑏when financing a bad project: 𝑑𝑔 < 𝑑𝑏and 𝑑𝑔𝜋𝑔 > 𝑑𝑏𝜋𝑏. The large bank start to 





In 2009, Dinger and Hagen applied this theoretical model into an empirical study in estimating 
the effect of interbank borrowing on bank risk using data on Central and Eastern European banks 
from 1995 to 2004. They suggest that the borrowing banks are associated with lower risk-taking, 
as the lending bank is willing to monitor the borrowing banks’ activities to maximize its 
expected return. Banks with good capitalization are indicative of lower risk-taking. The reduced-
form empirical model is shown as: 
 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 = (𝐼𝑁𝐵, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸2, 𝐸𝑄𝑈,𝑀𝑉)                                                             (4-2) 
Where, 
RISK is risk-taking measured by loan loss provision, loan loss reverse and net charge-off to 
equity, respectively. 
INB is measured by interbank borrowing to total assets. 
SIZE is log bank assets. 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸2  is size squared. 
EQU is the equity ratio used to measure capitalization. 
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MV is macro-variables, including GDP and inflation. 
 
In addition, the probability of bank failure is higher for small banks than large banks, which is  
found by Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) under a given interbank market 
structure, implying that large banks participate in a potential bail-out provided by Central Bank. 
Dinger and Hagen’s (2005) also documented a nonlinear (U-shaped) relationship between bank 
size and risk-taking. In other word, the level of risk varies accordingly to whether the bank size 
is under or above a certain critical value. However, this study does not take TBTF into account in 
investigating bank behaviors; therefore, in this chapter, we would like to modify this model by 
considering the difference between large and small banks (size effect), following the argument of 
Freixas et al. (2000), to investigate the impact of interbank market activities on bank risk-taking. 
 
 
4.2.4 Interbank Lending and Macroeconomic Shocks  
Elsinger et al. (2006) employed a set of data on Austrian banks to investigate two types of bank 
failure: one is due to fundamental risk-taking, e.g. the exposure to market, and another one is due 
to contagion risk resulting from other bank failures. The result shows that the majority of bank 
defaults (97%) are driven by fundamental shocks of banking system, while only 2.7% of bank 
defaults result from a chain reaction of other bank failures in the financial system. They suggest 
that fundamental risk factors are the source of bank default, systemic crises and financial 
instability. The result is consistent with their earlier work in 2002 (Elsinger et al., 2002). A set of 
macroeconomic shocks, such as interest rate risk, was examined in the context of interbank 
markets. They found that the default risk of the interbank market mainly results from 
macroeconomic shocks. Therefore, in order to the explicit credit linkage, macroeconomic 











4.3 Introduction of Methodology and Sample 
 
4.3.1 Hypotheses 
According to our previous empirical studies and literature review, there are three hypotheses we 
attempt to test in this research: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The bank size is positively associated with risk-taking when the bank size goes 
beyond a certain level under TBTF.  
 
Recalling what we discussed in literature review: First, due to the economies of scale, the larger 
the bank size is, the lower long-run average costs of bank activities (Kovner, Vickery and 
Zhou, 2013). In addition, with respect to the theoretical work of Dinger and Hagen (2005), they 
suggest that large banks prefer to monitor borrowing banks in order to maximize the profit and 
reduce the default risk level of bank assets. However, those are not consistent with the findings 
in the empirical study of Freixas et al. in 2000 as well as ours findings in chapter 3. Therefore, 
we may question the conclusion from Dinger and Hagen (2005).  
 
Hypothesis 2: The interbank activities are negatively associated with risk-taking for large banks 
during the financial crisis. 
 
It was widely believed that CB as a LLR must conduct large-scale interventions to prevent a large 
scale of economic deterioration under this circumstance (Bagehot, 1873). A moral hazard 
problem could be generated from LLR intervention: it encourages all banks to make an effort to 
be large by increasing the capacity of bank activities in order to benefit from TBTF (too-big-to-
fail) while the expansion of bank activities, especially non-traditional actives, may increase risk 
(Gandhi and Lustig, 2015; Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong, 2014). Therefore, large banks in U.S. 
interbank market may have less incentive to monitor interbank lending under TBTF. However, 
Dinger and Hagen (2007) argue that interbank lending might be also associated with substantially 
lower risk taking by borrowing banks, which are consistent with monitoring by lending banks. 
The observed evidence, in the Fed funds market in the immediate aftermath the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, indicated the Fed rarely acted as the LLR it was designed to be. Therefore, the 
banks’ precautionary behaviours may be observed, which arises from a more general loss of 
confidence of confidence trust; and it maybe change the positive relationship between interbank 
lending and banks’ risk taking. Following the work of Freixas et al. in 2000, here we may 
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question the effect of policy of TBTF in the context of interbank market during the financial 
crisis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Higher equities and/or less nonperforming loans can protect all banks against 
the liquidity problem, particularly for small banks that lack protection from Central Bank. 
 
It is widely believed that all banks with higher capital holding, especially above the minimum 
capital requirement are involved in less risky activities (Dinger and Hagen, 009;  Milne and 
Wood, 2008); which is contrary to the findings of Calem and Rob in 1999 as well as our 
empirical results in chapter three. We’ve found that large banks are risker: they tend to have 
lower capital and more active in interbank market than small bank.  
  
4.3.2 Non-linear Empirical Model 
Our empirical work in this chapter is based on the theoretical model introduced by Dinger and 
Hagen (2005) and our empirical results in previous chapter 3, which also take consideration of 
the effect of policy of TBTF suggested by Freixas et al. (2000) in the context of U.S. interbank 
markets. Consistent with our hypotheses, bank size and interbank lending are our main concerns 
in the estimation. Higher equities and less nonperformance loans would provide additional 
protections for banks, which are also considered.  
 
A few assumptions are required in order to make our models of banks feasible for analysis. First, 
for bank risk taking, we primarily measure bank risk using the Z-score of each back as suggested 
by Laeven and Levine (2009). It can be calculated for listed and unlisted banks. Nonperforming 
loans to total gross loans ratio is utilized as a proxy of deteriorating asset quality. What’s more, 
from our previous empirical studies, visual inspection of the behaviour of banking accounting 
ratios around the crisis date captures NPLs as a good precursor for deteriorating banking system 
soundness. This follows the study carried out by Cihakand and Schaeck (2007). Therefore, NPLL 
(Nonperforming loans to total gross loans) will be included in our independent variables as an 
appropriate indicator for asset quality in our study. In addition, Elsinger et al. (2002, 2006a, 
2006b) theoretically and empirically show the effect of fundamental systemic risk on bank 
performance, so the macro-variables should be used. Therefore, the explanatory variables in this 
work consist of interbank loans (IL), size effect (SIZE), deposit ratio (LD), NPLL 
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(Nonperforming loans to total gross loans), equity (EA) and macro-variables (MV) - interbank 
rate (I) as a measure of the risk level of interbank markets.  
 
Firstly, following Dinger and Hagen (2009), we estimate a non-linear regression to identify the 
significant difference in risk-taking between large and small banks, further suggesting whether 
we can split the whole sample in terms of bank size. If we find significant results with 
different signs of bank size and bank size squared, then we can make estimation based on the 
large and small banks sub-samples respectively. Thus, the non-linear empirical model includes 6 
independent variables, IL, SIZE, LD, EA, NPLL and I. The estimated function is shown below: 
 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 + Nonperformingloansratio 𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 +
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑐 + 𝜀                                                                                                                                         (4-3) 
 
The preliminary results in terms of this function are shown as below: 

𝑍score𝑖𝑡 = 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝑐 + 𝜀                                             (4-4) 
 
Where, 




  SIZE, Lasset is bank size and is the log-transformation of bank total assets. 
IL, Interbank asset ratio is defined as the ratio of interbank assets to total bank assets.  
 
LD, Deposit ratio is defined as bank loans to total deposits. 
 
NPLL, Nonperforming loans ratio is defined as the ratio of nonperforming loans to total gross 
loans. 
 
EA, Equity ratio is defined as total equity to total bank assets.  
 
I, Interbank rate is 3-month interbank rate. 
 
C is a constant. 
 
Z-score measures bank risk suggested by Laeven and Levine (2009), which equals the return on 
assets (ROA) plus the capital to asset ratio (CAR) divided by the standard deviation of asset 
returns (σ(ROA)). Roy (1952) introduces Z-score as a measure of the distance from insolvency. 
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Insolvency is defined as a state in which losses surmount equity (Equity, E< -π, Profits). The 
probability of insolvency, therefore, can be expressed as prob(-ROA< CAR). If profits are 
normally distributed, then the inverse of the probability of insolvency equals (ROA+CAR)/ 
σ(ROA)). Following the literature, we define the inverse of the probability of insolvency as the 
Z-score. A lower Z-score indicates that the bank is less stable. Because the Z-score is highly 
skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the Z-score, which is normally distributed. For brevity, 
we use the label ‘Z-score’ in referring to the natural logarithms of the Z-score in the remainder of 
this thesis.    
 
SIZE is the bank size and it is defined as the log-transformation of total bank assets. SIZE is a 
threshold through which we can estimate the differences in bank behaviors and risk-taking 
between large and small banks based on the framework of Dinger and Hagen (2005). We expect 
a negative coefficient for large banks under the policy of “too big to fail”. 
 
LD is a ratio defined as total bank loans to total deposits and is also presented as a percentage to 
reflect liquidity risk. It is an endogenous variable, since banks can change their portfolios 
according to the risk level. As suggested by Lepetit et al. (2008), the increase in the loan-deposit 
ratio indicates higher level of liquidity risk, which might force banks to be active in interbank 
markets. In addition, a large loan base might require higher loan loss provision as a buffer against 
potential risk-taking due to adverse selection. Thus, the sign is expected to be negative.  
 
NPLL (Nonperforming loans to total gross loans) will also be included in our independent 
variables as an appropriate indicator for asset quality in our study. Deteriorating asset quality 
Deteriorating asset quality can be proxied by two ratios (Nonperforming loans net of provisions 
to capital and Nonperforming loans to total gross loans). From our previous empirical studies, 
visual inspection of the behaviour of banking accounting ratios around the crisis date captures 
NPLs as a good precursor for deteriorating banking system soundness. This follows the result of 
Cihakand and Schaeck (2007). The sign is expected to be negative.  
 
EA is the ratio of the total equity to total bank assets and is presented as a percentage. It is 
included to capture the effect of capital regulation on bank risk. A higher equity ratio indicates 
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that shareholders have more incentive to monitor bank behaviors, which in turn reduces the level 
of risk-taking (Dinger and Hagen, 2005). Thus, the expected sign is to be positive.  
 
IL is defined as the ratio of interbank loans to depository institutions to total bank assets and is 
presented as a percentage. Regarding the theoretical work of Dinger and Hagen (2005, 2007), 
they suggest that large banks prefer to monitor borrowing banks in order to maximize the 
expected return and reduce the default risk level of interbank assets. However, this prediction is 
against the findings in their further work in 2009, which documented that large banks in U.S. 
interbank market have less incentive to monitor interbank lending considering TBTF, though 
they do not present an investigation into this issue. We may question this conclusion. Thus, the 
sign is expected to be negative for large banks. 
 
I is the 3- month U.S. interbank rate and reflects the scenario of the money market. It is a proxy 
of the effect of the macro-economy on bank risk-taking in the context of interbank markets based 
on Elsinger et al. (2002, 2006a). A higher interbank rate indicates a higher level of potential risk-
taking in interbank markets, which in turn increases the marginal costs of lending (Panetta et al., 
2004). Thus, the expected sign is to be negative. 
 
4.3.3 Threshold Model and Bank Size 
A threshold model is employed in our empirical work to find this critical value of bank size to 
divide the whole sample. Based on our hypotheses, we are interested in the results of bank 
size. A negative and significant coefficient of bank size and a positive and significant coefficient 
of bank size squared indicate that there is a U-shaped relationship between risk-taking and bank 
size, following the result of Dinger and Hagen (2009), which suggests that there might be 
difference in the risk level of bank activities between large and small banks. Thus, we could 
endogenously find this critical value of bank size to divide the whole sample by using a 
threshold model. Hansen (1996, 2000) develops an econometric method to estimate the 
threshold model. The applications of a threshold model include sample splitting and separating, 
and multiple equilibriums.  The basic estimated threshold model is shown as: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃1
′𝑥𝑖𝑡𝐼(𝐾𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝜏) + 𝜃2





i is the number of individual sections, and i=1,2....N 
 
t is time period, t=1,2...N 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a dependent variable. 
𝛼𝑖  is an individual effect. 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a m-vector of independant variables. 
𝜃1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃2 are the coefficients for different regimes divided by the threshold parameter 𝜏. 
𝐾𝑖𝑡 is a threshold variable. 
𝜏    is a threshold variable.  
I     is an indicator function. 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  is an error term and follows a zero-mean process, 𝜀𝑖𝑡~(0, 𝜎
2). 
 
Two categories are classified by the threshold value 𝜏, and using the ordinary least squares 
method, the slope coefficients 𝜃1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃2can be estimated. 
 
 
Khan and Senhadji (2001) extend the threshold model and apply it to an unbalanced panel. By 
using conditional least squares, the threshold value is determined by minimizing the sum of 
square residuals. In our research, with an unbalanced data set, bank loans to total deposits 
ratio, and total equity to assets ratio are identified as two endogenous variables, because in 
some circumstances banks having a higher risk level are concerned about risky assets, so they 
tend to change their portfolios by reducing the amount of loans or increasing equities. The 
relevant test of the endogeneity of these two variables will be shown in the next section. This 
allows us to use the method developed by Hansen (2000) and Caner and Hansen (2004), who 
show a threshold model considering instrumental variables. Based on their work, the estimated 
model is given as: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃1
′𝑧𝑖𝑡𝐼(𝐾𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝜏) + 𝜃2
′𝑧𝑖𝑡𝐼(𝐾𝑖𝑡 > 𝜏) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                             (4-6)   
Where, 
 
i is the number of individual sections, and i=1,2....N 
t is time period, t=1,2...N  
 
 113 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a dependent variable. 
𝑧𝑖𝑡 is a m-vector and is correlated with the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡, which are endogenous. 
𝜃1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃2 are the coefficients for different regimes divided by the threshold parameter 𝜏. 
𝐾𝑖𝑡 is a threshold variable. 
𝜏    is a threshold variable.  
I     is an indicator function. 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  is an error term and follows a zero-mean process, 𝜀𝑖𝑡~(0, 𝜎
2). 
If we set a k-vector (𝐾 ≥ 𝑚) as instrumental variables for 𝑧𝑖𝑡, then the reduced form model 
from above on the conditional expectation of 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is: 
 
𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝜓(𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝛽) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                               (4-7) 
Where, 
𝑧𝑖𝑡 is a m-vector of endogenous variables. 
𝑥𝑖𝑡  is a k-vector (𝐾 ≥ 𝑚) of exogenous variables, which is correlated with the endogenous 
variables but is uncorrelated with the error term. 
𝛽   is coefficient vector. 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 is a m*1 vector of the error term, here we assume that 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 0. 
Now if we substitute Eq. 4-7 into Eq. 4-6, the expression will be transformed as shown below: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃1
′𝜓𝑖𝑡𝐼(𝐾𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝜏) + 𝜃2




′𝑢𝑖𝑡𝐼(𝐾𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝜏) + 𝜃2




In next step, we will follow the three-step method suggested by Caner and Hansen (2004). The 
coefficient 𝛽of the reduced-form function will be estimated firstly by using the least squared 
method. The second step is to identify the threshold parameter 𝜏 by using the predicted values of 
endogenous variables in the first step.  Finally, given exogenous threshold value, the coefficients 𝜃 
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are estimated by using 2SLS method.  In our case, the bank size is the threshold variable as we 
attempt to estimate the difference in risk-taking between large and small banks, and deposit ratio 
and capital ratio are identified as endogenous variables. According to this three-step method 
suggested by Caner and Hansen (2004), in the first step, we predict the endogenous variables 
(deposit ratio and equity ratio) by using the one-year lagged variables of deposit ratio and total 
equity to total bank assets ratio as instruments; the relevant test of the validity of the 
instruments will be given in the next section. The second step is to estimate the threshold 
variable (bank size) by using the predicted values of the endogenous variables. The third step is 
to estimate the slope coefficients by using 2SLS on two regimes identified by an estimated 
threshold parameter. Therefore, the basic nonlinear model Eq.4-4 can be changed in terms of the 
threshold model, which aims to estimate the differences in the bank risk level and bank 
activities between large and small bank groups. This is shown below: 
 
𝑍score𝑖𝑡 = {
𝛼1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑡 + 𝑐(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 ≥ 𝜏)
𝜆1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆2𝐼𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆2𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆4𝑁𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆5𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆6𝐼𝑡 + 𝑐(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 < 𝜏)




Recall the Eq.4-8 𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝜓(𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝛽) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , and thus the predicted value of are ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝜓(𝑥𝑖𝑡, ?̂?). As 
there are two endogenous variables ?̂?1  and ?̂?2 , given any threshold values, we can run the 
regression of on  ?̂?1  and ?̂?2  by using the least squares method. The estimator of the critical 
threshold value 𝜏 can be generated by minimizing the sum of squared residuals𝑆(𝜏) :  ?̂? = 
min(𝑆(𝜏)).  
 
The result of the threshold model is obtained using the code of Matlab provided by Hansen 
(2000) and Caner and Hansen (2004)
32
. In Figure 44, the critical threshold value (5.299027) is 
the point where the Likelihood ratio (LR) strikes 0. The asymptotic confidence interval for the 
threshold value is robust to heteroskedasticity as illustrated by Caner and Hansen (2004). An 
asymptotically valid 90% confidence region is set, and the likelihood ratio of the threshold 
value approaches 𝜂2𝐶 (𝐿𝑅(𝜏) → 𝜂2𝐶 )33, where C is the 90% of the distribution function of a 
                                                 
 
32 The code can obtained in this address: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~bhansen/papers/ 
33






























random variable 𝜉 . The 𝜉  follows function 𝑝(𝜉 ≤ 𝑥) = (1 − exp (
−𝑥
2
))2 , and the 
Criticalvalue = −2log (1 − √1 − 𝛼)  (Hansen, 2000). The points are those points where 
Likelihood ratio (τ) ≤ 𝜂2̂𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  in the confidence region in figure 44. Also, we have to 














 90% Critical 
 Hetero Corrected-1 















1               2                 3   4 5   6          
Threshold Variable 
 
Figure 44: Confidence Interval Construction for Threshold 
 
As  𝜂2 ≠ 1, we then attempt to detect whether heteroskedasticity exists or not in Stata. We use 
a modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in a fixed effect model. Based on 
Greene (2000, p598), the null hypothesis for this test is no heteroskedasticity. The results of 
this test are indicated in Table 8 below; and it is significant at the 1% significant level, given 
that p-value is 0, which suggests that errors in the fixed effect model are heteroskedastic. In 
order to maintain the consistency of estimators, we need to correct standard errors in the 
estimations. Normally, the solution is to make standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. We 
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use a programme 
34
introduced by Schaffer (2010) in Stata to construct “robust” standard errors 




We found that there is correlation between explanatory variables and unobservable error terms. 
Therefore, we need to estimate the slope coefficients by using two stage least squares method on 
two regimes identified by an estimated threshold parameter (Caner and Hansen, 2004; 
Wooldridge, 2002). An instrumental variable vector should be included in the estimations to 
eliminate endogeneity. Here we recall the Eq. 4-6. 
 
In our case, we set 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is a m-vector and 𝑧𝑖 = (𝑧1𝑖 , 𝑧2𝑖 ). We assume that the 𝑧1𝑖is endogenous
35
, 
which is correlated with the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡; the explanatory 𝑧2𝑖 is exogenous. Set ?̂?1and ?̂?2 as the 
matrices of verctors 𝑥𝑖
′𝐼(𝐾𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝜏) , and 𝑥𝑖
′𝐼(𝐾𝑖𝑡 > 𝜏) ; and ?̂?1  and ?̂?2  are the matrices of 
vectors 𝑧1𝑖
′ 𝐼(𝐾𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝜏), and 𝑧1𝑖
′ 𝐼(𝐾𝑖𝑡 > 𝜏). The vectors of the expectation value of  𝜃1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃2 thus 



























The Hausman specification test in Stata has the null hypothesis of that the tested variables are 
exogenous and not correlated with the error term. Hence, the 2SLS and OLS estimators should 
differ only by sampling error, and in other words, OLS is preferred. The alterative hypothesis 
is that the difference between the 2SLS and OLS estimators is statistically significant, then, 
2SLS can be employed. The Hausman test result is shown in Table 4. 
 
From Table 4 below, the value of the Chi-square test statistic is large (65.19) enough to reject 
                                                 
 
34 http://idears. repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456501.html 
35
 In order to identify the endogeneity of variables, the Hausman specification test (Wooldridge, 2002) has to be 
employed. The original form of this test can be found in Wooldridge (2002). 
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the null hypothesis at the 1% significant level. We found the difference between the OLS 
estimators and 2SLS estimators is systemically significant, thus, 2SLS is preferred here. 
Therefore, the reduced-form equation in the first stage of 2SLS (Eq.4-7) should be used. β is 
coefficient vector in Eq.(4-7) z_it=ψ(x_it,β)+u_it. Here we need to use correlation test to 








SQRT (diag (V_b-V_B)) 
SIZE -1.0764 -2.0421 0.9657 0.9827 
EA 0.2808 0.1685 0.1123 0.3351 
LD 0.6552 0.0468 0.6084 0.7800 
IL -2.2291 -3.6971 1.4680 1.2116 
NPLL 3.5345 5.4114 -1.8769 . 
I -1.0764 -0.4212 -0.6552 . 
Test: H0: difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2(6)=(b-B)’[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)=65.19 
  Prob>Chi2=0.000   
                      Table 4 : Results of the Hausman Specific Test 
 
In our study, we consider banks would rebalance their assets and liabilities using previous 
performance. Therefore, the one-year lagged values of the ratio of equity to total asset 
and the ratio of loan to deposit  are  predetermined at t-1. Then, they can be employed as      
instrument variable to estimate the endogenous variables as they are not correlated with the 
current error term. The correlation test is used to test the validity of instruments variables (IVs), 
and the result is shown in Table below. The null hypothesis of the test is 𝐻0: ?̂? = 0  (the 





IVs t-statistics P>|t| 
EA ratio(-1) 143.76 0.000 
  LD ratio (-1)  136.69 0.000   
 
                                 Table 5 : Results of the Correlation Test 
As suggested by t-statistics, all coefficients of IVs are significantly different from 0 at the 1% 
significant level in the reduced form equations. The P-value shows that we can reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus, one-year lagged values of the equity to asset ratio and loan to deposit ratio as 
IVs are valid in the 2SLS estimations. 
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4.3.4 Sample and Ratios 
In this research, we use the dataset described in section 3.3. The sample includes 13973 banks 
36
and the time span has been restricted from the fourth quarter of 1992 to the last quarter of 2011. 
Data for some of the banks are only available for certain research time periods, which results 
from the restructuring or failures of banks. We give NIL under this circumstance. The sample we 
use here is the same as the sample we used in Chapter 3, but in individual level. All data are 
measured in million US dollar
37 
and ratios are presented as percentages. The summary statistics 
of each variables employed in this chapter are listed in table 6 and 7.   
 
 
The U.S. Minimum Median Mean Maximum 
ZSCORE 2.321 3.118 3.203 4.056 
IL 0.000 2.401 35.072 66.100 
SIZE 2.890 4.213 4.366 6.996 
EA 1.681 8.083 9.672 57.240 
LD 0.010 84.170 93.200 139.200 
NPLL 0.001 0.121 5.100 9.011 
I 1.000 4.286 3.783 6.301 
 
Table 6: The statistics for the main regression variables 
 
 
  ZSCORE IL SIZE EA NPLL LD 
ZSCORE 1      
IL 0.206** 1     
SIZE -0.389** 0.415** 1    
EA 0.012 0.127** -0.16 1   
NPLL -0.236** -0.045 0.004 0.007 1  
LD -0.191** -0.274** 0.054 -0.253** 0.387** 1 
 
Table 7: The correlation matrix of the main regression variables 
Note: **indicate significance at 5% level 
                                                 
 
36
 In total 16520 banks, some of them have been a failure, or merged by other banks. To deal with mergers and 








4.4 Results and Analyses of Empirical Work 
 
4.4.1 Non-linear Empirical Model 
The basic model is shown as Eq.(4-9) and the results of the regression are presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Results of Basic Model 
Notes: whole sample is split into in two groups according to a threshold value of log 
bank total assets (5.299027). t-statistic values are denoted in []. ***, **, * indicates 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: ZSCORE Size ≥ 5.299027 Size < 5.299027 
SIZE -0.401***    0.227**    
  [3.96] 
 
[1.71]   
IL -1.689**  
 
0.482   
  [4.16] 
 
[0.72]   
LD -0.012 ** 
 
-0.009**    
  [1.74] 
 
[1.77]   
NPLL -1.802**  
 
-1.905 ***   
  [1.79] 
 
[2.79]   
EA 0.154 
 
0.227**    
  [0.06] 
 
[1.51]   
I -0.657 
 
-0.758   
  [0.76] 
 
[0.51]   
No. of banks 3783 
 
10190   
Hausman test Chi2 (6) 56.97***  
 
67.21***    
Heteroskedasticity Chi2 1.6e+32*** 
 
3.6e+32***   
R-square 0.49   0.37   
 
 
First, regarding to the effect of bank size, a nonlinear (U-shaped) relationship between bank size 
and risk-taking is found: strong negative coefficient of bank size is found in large banks where 
bank size is over the threshold (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 ≥5.299027); whereas a significant positive coefficient is 
found in the small banks where bank size is smaller than the threshold estimate. Both 
coefficients are statistically significant at 5% significant level. It is consistent with our first 
hypothesis, which is given an interconnected multiple money centre bank market, under 
TBTF, large banks are positively associated with risk-taking. On possible reason is, large banks 
benefit from economies of scale; and large banks diversify by moving from traditional deposit-
taking and lending to more cost-effective but riskier wholesale funding and market-based 
activities (Boot and Ratnovski, 2016; Brunnermeier, Dong and Palia, 2012; De, 2010; 
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Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Wheelock and Wilson, 
2012). 
 
Second, the coefficient of the interbank loan ratio in large banks is negative and statistically 
significant; whereas an insignificant positive coefficient is found in the small banks. Thus, 
interbank lending, which implies positive interbank assets, is associated with a higher level of 
risk taking for large banks. It indicates that large banks in U.S. interbank market have less 
incentive to monitor interbank lending due to a perception of TBTF. This is consistent with the 
empirical findings of Freixas et al. (2000), but not with Ding and Hagen (2005). One possible 
explanation to this might be that, if the monitoring costs are higher than the difference in the 
repayment between “good” and “bad” borrowers, lending banks are not willing to monitor 
borrowers, which may increase the risk level of interbank assets. A moral hazard problem can be 
generated from LLR intervention. It encouraged large banks to make an effort to be larger by 
increasing the capacity of bank activities in order to benefit from TBTF (too-big-to-fail). In 
addition, the insignificant positive coefficient in small banks may suggest interbank positions do 
not add to individual bank risk. And, it shows that large banks play more important roles in 
interbank market, which is consistent with our findings in Chapter three as well as in Chapter 
one. However, concerning the macroeconomic variable, interbank rate seems not have 
significant impact on risk. 
 
Third, a positive relationship between equity holding and risk level is only found in the small 
bank group, but it is statistically insignificant in large banks. It supports our third hypothesis that 
small banks with more equities are less likely to be associated with lower risk-taking. This is 
also consistent with the empirical findings of Dinger and Hagen (2005, 2009) and Clarke et al. 
(2003). One possible explanation to this might be that shareholders of small banks have more 
incentive to monitor bank activities on behalf of their interests because of a lack of protection 
from CB. Thus, this highlights the importance of monitoring from shareholders to reduce the 
risk-taking of small banks owing to the lack of protection from CB.  
 
An insignificant result in terms of large banks suggests that shareholders have less incentive to 
monitor bank activities due to a potential bail-out provided by CB; thus, we may argue that 
TBTF generates a moral hazard problem that is not only related to bank managers pursuing 
higher interests, but also related to shareholders or even depositors having less incentive to 
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screen banks. This might be a possible reason for the recent crisis, in that neither regulators nor 
shareholders paid much attention to the risk-taking of large banks and allowed them to get 
involved in risky activities. The corporate governance challenges in large banks are especially 
significant given that large banks tend to be more highly leveraged (Caprio and Levine, 2002; 
Laeven, 2013). Banks are highly leveraged institutions. This means that their shareholders may 
have aggressive risk preferences, which are not in the interest of other stakeholders - depositors, 
creditors, and the government. Indeed, there is evidence that banks where shareholders exercise 
more control tend to take more risk (Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 1990; Laeven and Levine, 
2009).  
 
Forth, the coefficients of the loan-deposit ratio are negative and highly statistically significant in 
both groups of banks, which support the assumption that banks, which have more deposits, are 
assumed to be more stable and less risky, as suggested by Dinger and Hagen (2005). Moreover, 
as suggested by Lepetit et al., (2008), the increase in the loan-deposit ratio suggests higher 
level of liquidity risk, which might force banks to be active in interbank markets. This result is 
confirmed by the empirical findings of Fisher et al. (2000) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1998). A large loan base increases risk level and deteriorates loan quality, as banks may lend to 
borrowers with bad credit by charging higher interest rates due to adverse selection. Thus, an 
increase in the amount of loans triggers a higher level of loan loss provision as a buffer against 
potential risk. Core deposits represent an important funding source to increase the holdings of 
government securities and MBS of small banks (Berger and Bouwman, 2009), given that small 
banks generally have more restricted access to interbank markets and the central bank’s discount 
window.  
 
The last but not least, from our previous empirical studies, visual inspection of the behaviour of 
banking accounting ratios around the crisis date captures NPLs as a good precursor for 
deteriorating banking system soundness. Thus, NPLL (Nonperforming loans to total gross loans) 
is included in our independent variables as an appropriate indicator for asset quality. The 
coefficients of nonperformance loan ratio are negative and highly statistically significant in both 
groups of banks, which support the assumption that banks which have more deposits and fewer 
nonperformance assets are assumed to be more stable and less risky, as suggested by Hughes 
and Mester (2013). This follows the result of Cihakand and Schaeck (2007). A nagative and 
highly statistically sign indicats that financial systems recognize poor asset quality. It seems also 
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indicate that level of risk-taking increases in responding to the recognition of increase in 
nonperforming loans. Grier (2007) argued that poor asset quality was the main reason of major 
bank failures. Therefore, the risk of loan losses derived from delinquent loans is the primary risk 
faced by the banks, because the loan is one of most important asset category and thus the asset 
quality assessment in order to manage credit risk is necessary, though may be difficult (Frost, 
2004).  
 
4.4.2 Non-linear Empirical Model with Interaction Variables 
Continuing the studies we conduct in Chapter three, we are interested at the time specific effect 
on bank risk-taking, which leads us to divide the sample period into three sub-periods since 
we are interested in the differences in the effect of bank activities in the run-up to the financial 
crisis, the financial crisis period itself and post financial crisis period. Therefore, we present 
extended empirical models with the threshold in terms of sub-periods for large and small banks. 
In order to define three sub-periods, we use Quant-Andres unknown break point test (1960) and 
Chow test (1960) to verify the breakpoints obtained by Break point Maximum LR/wald F-
STATISTIC (same econometric tools used in section 3.3;  see all details in Appendix 2).   
 
Recall Figure 36 and 37 in section 3.5.2. They present summaries of timing of breaks in 
aggregate level for big and small banks respectively. We collect majority of structural breaks 
during the period of 2007Q4 to 2009Q3; which is consistent with the financial crisis three-stage 
process assumption made by FCIC (2010)
37
. Therefore, we can split the whole sample period into 
sub-periods: 1992Q4 -2007Q3, 2007Q4 -2009Q3, and 2009Q4-2011Q4. We date the subprime 
mortgage crisis starting from 2007Q4 and ending at 2009Q; which is also consistent with 
findings in Stijn and Kose (2013)
38
.   
  
Also GDP growth is used as additional macro-economic level indictor since the interbank rate is 
insignificant for both large banks and small banks in our basic model. Wells (2004), Elsinger et 
al. (2006a, b), Upper (2007) and Dinger and Hagen (2009), suggest a positive sign in GDP 
growth in the estimated model. It indicates the cyclical impact of macro-economic growth on 
bank risk-taking. The risk level of interbank assets is highlighted particularly in a recession, 
                                                 
 
37
Refer to section 3.5.2 
38 It is useful to keep in mind that this identification is impact. A large body of work has been devoted to 
identification and dating crises, but ambiguities remain.  
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which indicates banks increase provision as a buffer against shocks from the macro-economy. 


























𝜇 =1,…7, which is the number of independent 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝜇 takes value of one for the period from the 4
th
 quarter of 2007 up to 3
rd
 
quarter of 2009 (Subprime mortgage crisis period), and zero otherwise. 
 
In this section, those three hypotheses we proposed in section 4.3.1 will be examined again by 
splitting whole sample into two banks groups with three sub-periods. Results are presented in 
table 9 below. Overall, the R-square is higher for interaction model than the R-square for our 
basic model.   
 
A negative relationship has been found again between interbank lending and banks’ risk taking 
for large banks, but only during the normal times. It is also interesting to see that the significant 
positive coefficient is found in small banks in normal times. It may suggest small banks are more 
willing to monitor borrowing banks in order to maximize the expected return and reduce the 
default risk level of interbank assets. But this relationship becomes insignificant during the 
financial crisis, which suggests that interbank lending market freezes, at least to small banks, at 
the beginning of summer of 2007 as it did during the Asian banking crisis of the late 1990s. It 
was consistent with a recent study in interbank market by Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar in 2011.  
 
According to the significant positive coefficient of the interbank loan ratio in large banks during 
the financial crisis, someone may argue that the interbank market was large and active in the U.S. 
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as outstanding loans, typically overnight lending, to other banks averaged close to $440 billion in 
2008. With the increasing level of uncertainty and counterpart risks, banks, especially small 
banks who were not fit in policy of TBTF, became increasing unwilling to lend and thus the size 
of interbank loans on average plummeted by the end of 2008, the big fall happened after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers in September. Thus only large banks were active in interbank market 
during the crisis, but they became more willing to monitor borrowing banks in order to reduce the 
default risk level of bank assets (the sign is negative in normal time, but positive in financial 
crisis). The situation was constantly becoming worse when interbank loans created a vicious 
circle of increased caution, greater demand for liquidity, reduced willingness to lend and higher 
loan rates, the waves of precautionary behaviors were observed. The empirical analysis in our 
Chapter 3 also demonstrates that the funding fragility and the changes of interbank loans both in 
level and trend at third quarter of year 2008 were highly statistically significant.  
 
Interbank market works as the most immediate liquidity source within banks; therefore it can be a 
core indicator of the functioning of the banking market. However, the financial crisis started from 
2007, triggered unprecedented, sustained strains in interbank lending. The crisis prompted a 
surge in demand for liquid assets in the entire U.S. financial system, in turn, rather than lend 
surplus liquid assets out, most banking preferred to hold, in case their own need might increase. 
Insufficient bank liquidity could lead to inadequate allocation of capital if any problems happen 
in this market. This may impose adverse implications in the whole financial system as it could be 
contagious and spills over from one to the others. Our results highlight that interbank lending is 
associated with substantially lower risk taking by borrowing banks in financial crisis, which are 
consistent with monitoring by lending banks. However, this good relationship was broken up 
during the normal times for large banks.  
 
Although a positive relationship between equity holding and risk level is only found in the small 
bank group with our previous basic model, but it is statistically significant in both large banks 
and small banks during the financial crisis with extent model. In the crunch, banks with high 
capital are less likely to be associated with higher risk-taking. My results indicate that bank 
capital and deposits are important for both large and small banks when they face finance stress, 
but they seem to be more relevant for small banks. It is consistent with Estrella, Park and 
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Peristiani (2000) and Mayes and Wood (2009). It also suggests that risk-weighted capital buffers 
were not good predictors in practice.  
 
Interbank rate reflects the scenarios of the money market for both large and small banks during 
the financial crisis, but only have a significant impact on risk for small banks in normal times. In 
a downturn, insufficient bank liquidity could lead to inadequate allocation of capital, which 
increases a higher interbank rate as well as higher marginal costs of lending; and thus a higher 
market risk level (Iori et al., 2008; Matsuoka, 2012). Recall Figure 4 in section 1.1, 3-Month 
Interbank Rates plunged around 2007 (Subprime Crisis 2007-2008). It emphasizes the important 
of an effective monetary policy. GDP growth as additional macro-economic level indictor has 
significantly positive impacts on banks’ stable level for both large banks and small banks. It 
indicates the cyclical impact of macro-economic growth on bank risk-taking. The risk level of 
interbank assets is highlighted particularly in a recession, which indicates banks increase 
provision as a buffer against shocks from the macro-economy. It is consistent with the findings of 



























Notes: whole sample is split into in two groups according to a threshold value of 
log bank total assets (5.299027). T-statistic values are denoted in []. ***, **, * 
indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: 
ZSCORE Size ≥ 5.299027 Size < 5.299027 
SIZE -0.492***    0.326**    
 [3.07] 
 
[1.73]   
IL -1.024*** 
 
0.128**   
 [2.76] 
 
[1.59]   
LD -0.010 ** 
 
-0.006**    
 [1.69] 
 
[1.68]   
NPLL -1.702  
 
-1.107 *   
 [1.01] 
 
[1.39]   
EA 0.221 
 
0.281**    
 [0.76] 
 
[1.79]   
I -0.256 
 
-0.358**   
 [0.96] 
 
[1.81]   
GDP 0.401**   0.426**    
 [1.92] 
 
[1.68]   
Inter_SIZE -0.689***  
 
0.474***   
 [2.16] 
 
[2.72]   
Inter_IL 0.752 * 0.679    
 [1.34]  [0.27]   
Inter_LD -0.020 ***   -0.015 ***   
 [2.69]  [2.38]   
Inter_NPLL -1.954*  -1.227*    
 [1.36]  [1.51]   
Inter_EA 0.552***  0.667***   
 [4.76]  [4.51]   
Inter_I -0.314**  -0.474**   
 [1.96]  [1.81]   
Inter_GDP 0.534***    0.632**    
 [3.96]  [1.71]   
No. of banks 3783  10190   
Hausman test Chi2 (14) 43.76***   75.82***    
Heteroskedasticity Chi2 2.1e+32***  3.9e+32***  





In this chapter, the interbank lending and the bank size effect have been particularly considered in 
bank risk-taking. We have found that the bank size plays a core role in determining overall bank 
risk level: the hypothesis of the significant effect of TBTF on large banks holds. We also propose 
an interaction model as a robustness check to detect differences in U.S. bank activities and risk 
taking in three sub-periods.  
 
First, a nonlinear (U-shaped) relationship between bank size and risk-taking has been found, 
which suggests the risk level increase when the bank size goes beyond a certain level.  A non-
linear threshold model has been employed in our empirical work to find this critical value. A 
strong negative coefficient of bank size has been found in large banks when bank size is larger 
than the threshold point while a significant positive coefficient has been found in the small banks 
where bank size is smaller than the threshold estimate. Due to a perception that the creditors of 
large banks will be bailed out in case of bank distress, the cost of debt for large banks is lower. 
This makes banks more willing to use leverage and unstable funding, and to engage in risky 
market-based activities. 
 
Our findings indicate that bank capital and deposits are important for both large and small banks 
during the financial crisis, though they seem to be more relevant for small banks in normal times. 
For one side, it suggests that shareholders of large banks have less incentive to monitor bank 
activities due to a potential bail-out provided by CB; thus, we may argue that TBTF generates a 
moral hazard problem that is not only related to bank managers pursuing higher interests, but also 
related to shareholders or even depositors having less incentive to screen banks. This might be a 
possible reason for the recent crisis, in that neither regulators nor shareholders paid much 
attention to the risk-taking of large banks and allowed them to get involved in risky activities. 
Concertation just on capital adequacy, for example, while capturing most occurrences, would 
miss many of the problem cases. It also may conclude that Basel III is correct in including the 
leverage ratio in its requirements for improved supervisors and those supervisors would be wise 
to adopt it. From another side, this result is consistent with the view that core deposits are a more 
important source of funding for smaller banks, given that small banks generally have more 
restricted access to interbank markets and the central bank’s discount window. Moreover, in 
liquidity management, banks take into account the stability of their funding sources such as 
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equity capital and deposits. Empirical study by Berger and Bouwman (2009) shows that bank 
capital is a key determinant for liquidity creation. They also present evidence that liquidity 
creation varies by bank size. In our next empirical chapter 5, we will further test whether that 
capital plays a significant role in the increased holdings of liquid assets during the financial crisis. 
 
It is interesting to see that the interbank lending is negatively associated with Z-score for large 
banks in the normal times, but positively links to the stable level of banks during the financial 
crisis. One possible explanation for this negative sign is a moral hazard problem generated from 
LLR intervention, which encourages large banks to make an effort to be larger by increasing the 
capacity of bank activities in order to benefit from TBTF (too-big-to-fail) while the expansion of 
bank activities, especially non-traditional actives, may increase risk. In an interconnected 
multiple money centre banks market (U.S.), where the money centre banks are connected 
between each other, lending banks are money centre banks that have a significant impact on the 
rest of the economy, as the contagion can be spread to other money centre banks through the 
credit linkages. Therefore, it was also widely believed that Central bank as a lender of last resort 
(LLR) must conduct large-scale interventions to prevent a large scale of economic deterioration.  
 
However, the financial crisis started from 2007, triggered an unprecedented, sustained strains in 
interbank lending. During the financial crisis, although banks can also issue new loans from 
interbank market, but with high quality collaterals or high interest rates, all banks suffer from a 
liquidity shortage in this case. What’s more, the observed evidence aftermath the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers did not support the TBTF statement above: a more general loss of confidence 
of confidence trust arose. Therefore, during the financial crisis, preemptive behaviors, such as 
liquidity hoarding, have been observed in large banks and they became more willing to monitor 
borrowing banks in order to reduce the default risk level of bank assets. 
 
The coefficient of the interbank loan ratio in small banks is positive and only statistically 
significant in normal times; whereas an insignificant positive coefficient is found during financial 
crisis. It may indicate that the large banks dominate the interbank market, especially during the 
financial crisis in the U.S.. During financial crisis, fragility and panic will be propagated and 
spread through the interbank market. For those banks who survive from the initial shock, they 
perceive the situation of the entire system as being in distress and may start hoarding liquidity, 
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thus generating cash outflows for their counter-banks and exacerbating their funding issues. In 
this case, the situation is constantly becoming worse to small banks when interbank loans create a 
vicious circle of increased caution, greater demand for liquidity, reduced willingness to lend and 
higher loan rates. Thus we suggest policymakers re-consider the bank size effect in determining 
bank risk level.   
  
Significantly positive signs in GDP indicate the cyclical impact of macro-economic growth on 
bank risk-taking. The risk level of interbank assets is highlighted particularly in a recession, 
which indicates banks increase provision as a buffer against shocks from the macro-economy.  
 
Many observers have argued that ineffective regulation contributed or even caused the collapse. 
If that is the case, we would expect difference in the regulation of financial institutions regarding 
to bank size to be helpful in maintain the stable of financial system. Other observers have 
criticized the governance of banks and suggested that better governance would have led to better 
performance during crisis. It needs to be pointed out that banks are affected differentially simply 
because they have different balance sheet and thus the probable gains and losses to individual 
















Chapter Five: Liquidity Hoarding and the Interbank Lending Reluctance: 




Through the interbank market, banks can coinsure against idiosyncratic liquidity risk by 
reallocating funds from those with an excess to others with a deficit (Allen, Carletti, and Gale, 
2009; Castiglionesi, Feriozzi, Lóránth, and Pelizzon, 2014). However, in the absence of a well-
functioning interbank market, idiosyncratic liquidity risk may be hard to coinsure against 
(Castiglionesi et al., 2014), leading to credit rationing, liquidity hoarding for self-insurance, and 
higher funding costs. Whereas capital levels were closely monitored, heavy reliance of banks on 
whole-sale funding was overlooked. Banks that seemed to be safe experienced bank run that 
ultimately led to their defaults. 
 
Recall our previous empirical chapters in this thesis, we’ve found that new interbank loans might 
be granted, extended and withdrawn as the interbank market was not fully frozen and still quite 
active, at least in issuing new interbank loans in the early stage of 2007/08 financial crisis. 
However, the sudden decrease in interbank market activity and increase in the banks’ liquidity 
hoarding behavior were observed at the onset of the financial crisis in the late 2007. Short-term 
funding markets experienced a severe disruption: securitization markets - in particular the market 
for asset-backed commercial paper - collapsed and interbank markets froze (Strahan, 2008; 
Brunnermeier, 2009). Although conditions improved in early 2008 relative to late 2007 due to an 
aggressive policy response and a massive liquidity injection into the banking sector, funding 
markets experienced significant distress again during the fall of 2008 after Lehman Brothers and 
AIG failed, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed under conservatorship.  
 
As Gorton (2009) argues, the financial crisis resembled a banking panic that took the form of a 
run of financial firms on other financial firms. The panic centered on the repurchase agreement 
market, which suffered a run when lenders withdrew their funds by declining to roll over their 
loan agreements, and by raising their repo haircuts. This created an indiscriminate distrust of 
counterparties to any financial transactions. Concerned about the size and location of the 
exposure to subprime-related assets, banks stopped lending to other banks, and decided to hoard 
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liquid buffers in response to several factors: widespread concerns about the solvency of their 
counterparties in interbank operations, increased risks in their asset portfolios, and potential 
liquidity risk arising from draw-downs of committed lines of credit. As a result, a large number 
of financial institutions found it increasingly difficult to access interbank funding and manage 
their liquidity risk. Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar (2011) show that the number of lenders in the 
Federal funds market fell from approximately 300 in the summer of 2008 to 225 after Lehman 
Brothers’default, and the Fed funds rate experienced a one-day jump by more than 60 basis 
points on September 15, 2008, the date on which Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. 
 
Systemic risks command much attention as the preoccupation of the banking industry, and the 
current research is manifold; whereas scarce previous research has considered the possibility that 
banks can protect themselves during a financial crisis and therefore affect the propagation of 
losses through financial linkages, such as the interbank market. In chapter 3, we have 
investigated bank behaviors in three sub-periods: pre-crisis, 2007/08 financial crisis and post 
crisis; and we’ve found the aspects of the actual dynamic behavior of banks might be a 
determinant for the likelihood of a banking crisis. In addition to this, the sudden decrease in 
interbank market activities and increase in banks’ preemptive actions, such as liquidity hoarding, 
have been also found in chapter 4. However, previous studies on the liquidity hoarding and 
funding ability in the interbank market offer mixed results (Acharya and Skeie, 2011; 
Castiglionesi et al., 2014; Cornett et al.; 2011; McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang, 2008; Taylor and 
Williams, 2009), motivating us to conduct a further study in this area; which would allow further 
proposal of more reliable policy implications. 
 
Using a large quarterly dataset of all U.S. banks from year 1992 to 2011, the main determinants 
of bank liquidity hording and the precautionary motive hypothesis of liquidity are carefully tested 
in this chapter. We also study the financial impact of disruptions of the interbank market on 
banks’ liquidity creation during the interbank lending crunch.  
 
Our research contributes to the recent literature in several ways. First of all, we find that, the 
same factors leading to precautionary liquidity hoarding also contributed a sharp decline in bank 
lending. When the interbank market was reluctant to offer liquidity coinsurance, banks with net 
interbank borrowing positions sought self-insurance by hoarding liquidity and rationed lending, 
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while banks with net interbank lending positions also hoarded liquidity due to heightened 
counterparty risk. Net interbank borrowing banks raised rates to draw external funding. Second, 
we find that banks held more liquid assets in anticipation of future losses from securities write-
downs and loans charge-off. Unrealized security loss and exposure to expected loan losses 
represent key measures of banks’ on-balance sheet liquidity risks, in addition to off-balance sheet 
liquidity risk stemming from unused loan commitments. Therefore, we propose two on-balance 
sheet proxies for banks’ liquidity risk: unrealized security loss ratio (unrealized losses on 
available-for-sale securities to available for sale securities) and loan loss allowance ratio 
(allowance for loan losses to total loans
39
). Moreover, consistent with the view that deposits 
represent a stable source of funds for bank operations, we find evidence of inflows of core 
deposits during the financial crisis to banks that chose to hoard liquidity (flight-to-quality effect 
in deposit flows). On the policy frontier, besides credit and securities lending programs targeted 
at the interbank market, we suggest interbank lending subsidization as well. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 briefly describes balance sheet 
data of liquidity hoarders. Section 5.3 discusses my hypotheses compared with the related 
literature and the research methodology. The empirical results for the determinants of bank 









                                                 
 
39 See Appendix 1 for full definition. 
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5.2 Liquidity Hoarding and Liquidity Hoarders 
Recall our previous empirical studies in chapter 3 and 4. Using a large quarterly dataset of all U.S. 
banks from year 1992 to 2011, disruptions of the interbank market on banks’ liquidity creation 
during the interbank lending crunch are observed. In this section, we will look into more details 
of the balance data about banks’ liquidity hoarding behaviors before we further conduct our 
empirical study.  
 
First, we begin with the definition of total liquidity assets. According to Cornett et al. (2011), 
‘total liquid assets’ are calculated as the sum of cash (including balances at other banks and 
reserves at the central bank), Fed funds (including reverse repos), and investment securities 
(government securities). In this chapter, our definition of liquid assets includes mortgage-backed 
securities. Cornett et al. (2011), considered that all MBS and ABS became illiquid during the 
crisis, and therefore dropped them from their definition of liquid assets. Their rationale was that 
these securities would be held due to their inability to be sold or used as collateral in rolling over 
short-term funding after the collapse of the market for securitized assets.  However, most of these 
securitized assets are comprised of agency MBS. With implicit government guarantee, it is not 
entirely clear that  the majority of these securities should be excluded and considered illiquid as 
their market values were not really impaired during the collapse of the funding and securitization 
markets. In fact, most of the security losses in banks’ balance sheets result from the write downs 
of ABS and non-agency MBS. 
 
Figure 45 below depicts the changes in the composition of U.S. banks’ assets in 2008 and 2009. 
By far the most striking change in aggregate bank balance sheet conditions occurred in the 
holdings of safe and liquid assets. Holdings of cash and securities (both treasuries and agency) 
increased $869 billion from 2008 to 2009 ($375 billion and $494 billion, respectively). Since 
most of the Federal Reserve’s liquidity programs, such as the TAF, CPFF and AMLF (refer 
section 2.3.4 for further details), were specifically designed to foster the normal functioning of 
particular financial markets, it is not entirely surprising that securities holdings by commercial 
banks increased as a result of the liquidity provision of these specific programs. Indeed, the 
observed expansion of securities holdings may reflect the successful propping up of liquidity in 





Figure 45: Changes in all U.S. Banks’ Assets in 2008 and 2009 ($ Billion, mean) 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
 
The sharp increase in the holdings of liquid assets contrasts with the evolution of bank loans 
during these years, especially Commercial and Industrial loan (C&I) loans which declined $211 
billion. In other words, the aggregate bank balance-sheet information (see more details in section 
3.4.2) and monetary aggregate figures (see further information in section 1.1 and section 2.3.4) 
seem to suggest that the majority of the funds that have been injected into banking organizations 
did not result directly in additional lending. Instead, banks chose to hoard these liquidity and 
capital provisions to build up a cushion to protect against further capital losses and expected 
write-downs. Another manifestation of the liquidity pressures banks faced during the crisis are 
the large reductions in trading assets and Fed funds sold to non-bank institutions (decline in other 
assets of $449 billion). 
 
Recall section 3.4.4, regarding the liability side of their balance sheets, most of the counterpart 
changes in liquid assets over 2008 and 2009 were also explained by a significant increase in bank 
deposits. Despite the slowdown in deposit growth in 2007, banks experienced significant deposit 
inflows from investors received. In contrast, most of the liquidity programs set up by the Federal 
Reserve were not directly aimed at reviving bank lending, although they did by improving the 
functioning of specific markets and they aim to ultimately contribute to greater credit availability 
for businesses and households. Thus, one might still expect these liquidity programs to reinforce 































































































































For further investigation, we class all banks into two groups: Liquidity hoarders and non-
Liquidity hoarders. Liquidity hoarders in this study are defined as banks for which the average 
ratio of total liquid assets to total assets increased by more than 3.5-percentage-point from a 
period before the crisis period (1992:Q4 to 2008:Q2) to the interbank lending crunch (2008:Q3 
to 2011:Q4). Recall section 3.5.2, for interbank loans and liquidity ratios, majority of structural 
breaks were found after the end of 2008 for large banks, but changes comes earlier for small 
banks after fall of 2007.  Overall, for all banks, we identify the main changes in liquidity and 
interbank lending happened after 2008:Q3 when Lehman Brothers bankrupted and the interbank 
market started shrinking. Although arbitrary, the 3% cut off identifies about 19% of the banks in 
the sample as liquidity hoarders. We also utilize 2.5, 3, 3.5 and 4 percentage point cut-offs and 
obtain similar result.  
                        Total Liquid Assets / Assets                                    Cash and Fed Funds/ Assets 
 
 
  02:Q4         05:04         08:Q4          11:Q4          02:Q4           05:04           08:Q4         11:Q4   
             
                                    Agency MBS/ Assets                                        Gov. Securities/ Assets                                      
 
     02:Q4        05:04        08:Q4        11:Q4              02:Q4           05:04          08:Q4         11:Q4   
 
Figure 46: Liquid Assets with Liquidity Hoarding in U.S. Banks 
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Figure 46 above further presents the evolution of the ratio of total liquid assets to total assets for 
the U.S. banks (aggregate level) between 2002Q4 and 2011Q4, as well as the share of some of its 
components: cash and Fed funds, government securities (including Treasuries), and agency MBS 
(MBS issued or guaranteed by GSEs, which investors perceive as having an implicit government 
guarantee). As shown in Figure 46, agency MBS represents a large fraction of the liquid assets 
that banks were hoarding. The striking insight from it is the remarkable gap in the behavior of 
liquid assets across asset categories between liquidity-hoarding banks and their non-hoarding 
counterparts. Such disparity confirms that the disposition to hold liquid assets is not uniform 
across banks or across asset categories, and highlights the advantage of exploiting bank-level 
variation to study the nature of liquidity hoarding. The difference in the liquid assets ratio across 
the two groups of banks widens considerably (from 5 to 12 percentage points) between 2008:Q3 
and 2010:Q4, precisely the period when the interbank market froze. 
 
Among the liquid asset categories on the balance sheet, banks started hoarding cash (including 
Fed funds) and agency MBS during the interbank market crunch. The holding of government 
securities, however, declined after the third quarter of 2008, especially for non-hoarding banks. 
This decline suggests that banks were selling treasuries and other government securities to cope 
with increased funding pressures. Since asset categories are moving in opposite directions, each 
must be examined in tandem to understand the nature of liquidity hoarding.  
 
In addition to this, the flight-to-quality effect during the financial crisis is documented in Figure 
47, which was also found in study of Gatev and Strahan in 2006. Figure 47 shows the quarterly 
growth rate of core and non-core deposits by liquidity-hoarding banks and their non-hoarding 
counterparts (also recall Figure 15 in section 3.4.4). Before the crisis, the growth rates of both 
core and non-core deposits were lower for liquidity hoarders (red dash line). This situation 
reverses during the first year of the financial crisis for core deposits. Deposits increased 
significantly as liquidity fled other markets and is mainly explained by flows to liquidity-
hoarding banks. Non-hoarder seemed to attract core deposits at a lower pace. However, as the 
crisis deepened during the fall of 2008, liquidity hoarders saw a sharp contraction in their core 
deposits, whereas non-hoarder continued to receive such deposits. One interpretation for such 
different behavior between liquidity hoarders and non-hoarders is that banks highly exposed to 
credit and security losses managed to attract deposits at the beginning of the crisis (during the 
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first year 2007) by raising their deposit rates. This interpretation is consistent with Acharya and 
Mora (2012), who find that banks hit by a funding squeeze attempted to attract deposits by 
raising their deposit rates. At the height of the crisis (during interbank lending crunch), however, 
depositors lost confidence and these banks were perceived as more risky institutions as some of 
their losses started to materialize. Less exposed banks (Non-hoarding banks) faced lower risks 
and managed to continue receiving core deposits. In contrast to the surge in core deposits, non-
core deposits decreased sharply for both hoarders and non-hoarders at about the same pace. 
Taken together, these findings suggest a flight-to-quality effect from non-core to core deposits. 
Non-core deposits flew out of both types of banks at similar rates, and returned in the form of 
core deposits to liquidity hoarders at first, and to non-hoarders at the peak of the crisis. 
 
 











5.3 Hypotheses and Methodology  
5.3.1 Hypotheses with Literature Review 
The actual dynamic behavior of banks in interbank market might be a determinant for the 
likelihood of a banking crisis (Chapter 3 and 4), and there are remarkable gaps in the behaviors 
between liquidity-hoarding banks and their non-hoarding counterparts (Section 5.2). In addition 
to this, recall our previous literature review (section 2.3.4), previous studies on the liquidity 
hoarding and funding ability in the interbank market offer mixed results, motivating us to 
conduct a further study in this area. In this section, testable hypotheses with key relevant 
literature will be pointed out. 
 
First, our first prediction is that banks curbed lending during the interbank lending crunch, when 
the interbank borrowing channel was broken.  
 
Second, we also study the heterogeneity across different categories of liquid assets. Since asset 
categories are moving in opposite directions, each must be examined in tandem to understand the 
nature of liquidity hoarding (See Figure 46 in section 5.2). Liquidity management decisions are 
not uniform across banks, as they depend on the nature of the risks being faced. Depending on 
the type of funding pressures they faced, we predict that banks sold assets worth selling, such as 
treasuries and government securities, because the return on those assets was almost zero. Banks 
accumulated cash and excess reserves at the central bank because of the interest earned on 
reserve balances. Banks also accumulated securities such as mortgage backed securities (MBS) 
issued or guaranteed by Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)
40
. These securities had a 
positive return due to an implicit government guarantee and provided valuation gains that partly 
compensated for the losses generated by subprime mortgage-related securities. In this chapter, we 
will document how liquidity hoarding became manifest during interbank lending crunch by 
examining the behavior of various assets commonly included in the definition of liquid assets. 
 
Refer to section 2.3.4 in literature review; the main motivations for banks to hoard liquid assets 
are examined empirically. Banks may decide to hoard liquidity for precautionary reasons if they 
believe they will be unable to obtain interbank loans when they are affected by temporary 
liquidity shortages (Allen and Gale, 2004). In the model of Gale and Yorulmazer, banks hoard 
                                                 
 
40
 Such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
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liquidity to take advantage of potential sales (strategic motive). Acharya and Skeie (2011) 
develop a model in which banks hoard liquidity in anticipation of insolvency of their 
counterparties in interbank markets (rollover risk). Another strand of the literature derives 
liquidity hoarding as a result of Knightian uncertainty 
41
where due to increased uncertainty banks 
make decisions based on worst-case scenarios (for example, in Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 
2008) and contagion in financial networks. 
 
Unused commitments and Market-to-book value of security holdings as traditional measures 
proxies for self-insurance motives are widely used (Cornett et al., 2011; Kashyap, Rajan, and 
Stein, 2002; Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan, 2009). Loan 
commitments are off-balance sheet bilateral contracts, and are issued by banks for fees. When the 
funding market toughens, the holders of loan commitments can borrow up to a certain limit at a 
certain rate as specified in the bilateral contracts. The work of Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and 
Tehranian (2011) finds that a measure of off-balance sheet liquidity risk for commercial banks, 
such as the fraction of unused loan commitments to their lending capacity, is a key determinant 
of bank liquidity management. They emphasize that large undrawn loan commitments expose 
banks to sudden liquidity demand from corporations. That risk materialized during the financial 
crisis, as firms in need of liquidity rushed to draw down funds from their committed credit lines 
and forced banks to build up liquidity buffers to meet such increased demand. These drawdowns 
displaced banks’ lending capacity and constrained their new credit origination. What’s more, 
Acharya and Mora (2015) find in the context of the recent financial crisis that more exposed 
banks received less deposit inflows and they consequently scrambled to attract deposits by 
offering higher rates. Security holdings are used as collateral for secured funding. Defining the 
percentage deviation  of  the  market  value  of  security  holdings  from  the  book  value  as  
haircuts  (or margins), Brunnermeier  (2009) argues that haircuts capture funding risk. In analogy 
to traditional banking, Gorton and Metrick (2012) show that rising haircuts in the secured 
funding market are tantamount to deposit withdrawals, forcing sales of securities on a large scale, 
which in turn further increases haircuts and exacerbates funding problems.  
 
                                                 
 
41
 Knightian uncertainty is risk that is immeasurable and not possible to calculate, and it named after University of 
Chicago economist Frank Knight. 
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Despite the significance of these results, we argue that an important part of the story during the 
subprime mortgage financial crisis is still missing. In our work, we anticipate banks increased 
their holdings of liquid assets also in anticipation of future losses from unrealized security losses 
and expected loan losses measured by allowance for loan losses. Some evidence can be found in 
in-balance sheet data both in Figures in section 3.4.2 and Figure 48.  
 
 
        2004:Q4          2005:Q4           2006:Q4             2007:Q4           2008:Q4             2009:Q4           2010:Q4 
 
     Figure 48: Bank Security Losses ($Billion) 
 
For one side, unlike traditional measures of credit quality, such as net charge-offs and delinquent 
loans, allowance for loan losses have a forward-looking component that reflects banks’ efforts to 
increase their loan provisioning in anticipation of expected losses, and therefore, provide another 
motivation to hoard cash in anticipation of such losses. From the Figure 10 in section 3.4.2, loss 
allowance to loans ratio shows an obvious “U” shaped pattern, reaching a bottom at 1.15% by the 
end of 2007, and then increased remarkably. The structural break test verifies the significance of 
change in trend at 4th quarter of 2007 (see Appendix 3 for further details). It indicates banks 
increased their loan reserves in anticipation of expected losses.   
 
For another side, unrealized losses in securities holdings represent the write-downs of securities, 
and they reflect the exposure to future capital losses for banks if they had to sell those assets at 
fire sale prices. This source of liquidity risk has not been explored at length in the previous 
literature, due perhaps to the few balance sheet items related to credit exposure covered by 
collateral in those transactions. Figure 48 below shows the aggregate amount of unrealized 
security losses for the banking sector between 2004:Q4 and 2010:Q4. After falling from about 
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$40 billion in early-2006 to less than $10 billion over the second mid-2007, unrealized losses 
increased again during 2008. As financial strains intensified in the fall of 2008, security losses 
reached a peak of $52 billion at the height of the financial crisis, in 2009:Q2. Large banks were 
more severely hit by security losses. From Federal Reserve Bulletin (2009), the largest 10 banks 
held about 45 percent of the available-for-sale securities in investment accounts and accounted 
for two-thirds of the security losses during 2008-2009. Although security losses had a bigger 
impact on large banking institutions, they were a widespread problem for all banks including 
medium and small banks as well. 
 
Third, therefore, we hypothesize that the precautionary motive to hoard liquidity is better 
approximated by a liquidity risk measure that captures a bank’s exposure to expected losses in 
their balance sheet portfolio in anticipation of future liquidation of assets, as in Diamond and 
Rajan (2009). My proposed risk measures are therefore: the ratio of security losses (unrealized 
losses on available- for-sale securities) to available for sale securities and the ratio of loan loss 
allowance to total loans. 
 
As our focus is more on interbank market, we further class our whole sample into two subgroups: 
Banks with net lending position (Net Lenders/ liquidity-rich banks) and Banks with borrowing 
lending position (Net Borrowers/liquidity-poor banks) as our main focus is interbank market. 
Here, net interbank loan ratio
42
 is the sum of loans to depository institutions, Federal funds sold 
and securities purchased under agreements to resell, less the sum of Federal funds purchased and 
securities sold under agreements to repurchase, scaled by total assets. Net Borrowers (Net 
Lenders) are those with net interbank loan ratio less (greater) than its 30th (70th) percentile value 
in the previous quarter. Net Lenders takes the value of one when net interbank ratio exceeds the 
70th percentile value in the previous quarter and zero otherwise; Net Borrowers takes the value 
of one when net interbank loan ratio is less than the 30th percentile value in the previous quarter 
and zero otherwise. Since no bank can be a net borrower and a net lender at the same time for any 
one quarter, (Net Borrowers - Net Lenders) takes the value of minus one for net borrowers, one 
for net lenders, and zero for all other cases. 
 
                                                 
 
42
 They are from Schedule RC and RC-A of Call Reports. 
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Fourth, we hypothesise that, faced with a strained interbank market, liquidity-poor banks will 
ration lending and hoard liquidity for precautionary motive. Both Unused commitments and our 
proposed proxies for self-insurance motive will be used. This prediction resonates with Iyer et al. 
(2013). Using loan level data and controlling for loan demand effects, they find that the freeze of 
the interbank market caused banks with heavier reliance on interbank borrowing to cut lending 
and hoard liquidity 
 
Fifth, highly liquid  banks  will  ration  lending  and  hoard  liquidity  as  well  due  to increased  
counterparty  risk. Freixas and Jorge (2008) show counterparty risk can lead liquidity-rich banks 
to ration lending to liquidity-poor banks, which in turn cut back on their lending. Heider, 
Hoerova, and Holthausen (2010) show counterparty risk causes liquidity hoarding by liquidity-
rich banks and can lead to a breakdown of the interbank market. Afonso,  Kovner,  and  Schoar  
(2011) find  that  counterparty  risk  played  a  major  role  in interbank lending disruptions 
during the banking crisis of 2008. Similarly, Paolo, Nobili, and Picillo (2011) point out that 
during the crisis, interbank rates became more sensitive to borrowers’ credit worthiness.  
 
Finally, less liquidity banks will try to attract external funding by offering higher rates. A similar 
manifestation of high costs of self-insurance in funding rates can be found in Acharya and Mora 
(2015). In recent 2007/08 financial crisis, interbank markets froze and the market for asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP) collapsed in late 2008. In the face of fear and uncertainty in 
financial markets, large institutional investors withdrew their funds from the collective pool of 
cash by declining to roll over their loan agreements. If the interbank market was fully functional 
as a channel for efficient allocation of funds, banks in need of liquidity would not have to seek 
costly funding outside the interbank market. In normal times, this can even be done without 
causing significant effects on interest rates. However, with deepening concerns about the credit 
quality of counterparties and the fact that the magnitude of the exposure to subprime-related 
assets was unknown, investors withdrew their funds together. This withdrawal created a huge 
shortage of collateral, which forced institutions to sell securities to meet the increased demand for 
liquidity. As the repo and interbank markets shrunk, the increased sale of securities drove their 
prices further down. Such deterioration in the value of securities was a natural source of liquidity 





5.3.2 Data and Methodology  
In this research, the sample we use here is the same as the sample we used in Chapter 4, and they 
are in individual level. All data are measured in million US dollar
 
and ratios are presented as 
percentages.  
 
In our study, total liquid assets are calculated as the sum of cash (including balances at other 
banks and reserves at the central bank), Fed funds (including reverse repos), and investment 
securities (including MBS, ABS, and government securities).
43
 Since asset categories are moving 
in opposite directions, each must be examined in tandem to understand the nature of liquidity 
hoarding. All models and the full definitions of each variables employed in chapter Five will be 
listed this section. 
 
Appendix 13 first presents descriptive statistics for both liquidity hoarders and non-hoarders 
before and during the interbank market meltdown. Liquidity hoarders reduce their lending much 
more than non-hoarders during the crisis (loan growth is considerably smaller for liquidity 
hoarders). On average, the growth rate of loans for liquidity hoarders dropped 1.255 percentage 
points (from 1.18 percent before the crisis to negative 0.075 percent during the crisis); over three 
times the decline in annual growth of their non-hoarding counterparts (0.38 percentage points). 
Furthermore, liquidity hoarders seem to be slightly larger and better capitalized than their non-
hoarding counterparts, both before and when interbank market was in dire straits. Differences in 
almost all variables across groups before the crisis and during the crisis are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
Appendix 14 further presents the mean and median difference in bank-level variables between 
net lenders and net borrowers. Upper Panel shows, as expected, net lenders have substantially 
higher Liquid asset growth and Loan growth than net borrowers. Total interest expense rate is 
higher for net borrowers. These results provide preliminary support for our prediction that net 
borrowers were subject to lending rationing and strived to attract funds by offering higher rates. 
Lower Panel shows Deposit growth is higher for net borrowers than net lenders, indicating that 
net borrowers raised rates to draw additional funding. Such different behavior was also found 
                                                 
 
43
 See section 5.2 for full details. 
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between liquidity hoarders and non-hoarders at the beginning of the crisis. At the height of the 
crisis (during interbank lending crunch), however, depositors lost confidence and a flight-to-
quality effect from non-core to core deposits was found. Non-core deposits flew out of both types 
of banks at similar rates, and returned in the form of core deposits to liquidity hoarders at first, 
and to non-hoarders at the peak of the crisis.Net borrowers are substantially larger in size, 
implying that larger banks are more dependent on interbank borrowings perhaps because they 
have higher liquidity risk. Consistent with our characterization that net borrowers are liquidity 
poor and financially weak, net borrowers generally have higher unused commitments and more 
exposures to expected loss in anticipation of future liquidation of assets. Again, Differences in 
almost all variables across both groups are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
To investigate the how banks curbed lending during the interbank lending crunch occurred during 
the financial crash of 2007-2008, as well as how the preemptive behaviors of banks contribute to 
or mitigate the onset of a financial crisis; we use regression frameworks similar to that in Cornett 






= 𝛼1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼5𝑈𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6Unrealized Security Loss ratio 𝑖𝑡




𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝜇 +∑𝜃𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖 + 𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 







= 𝜆1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆2𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜆3𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆4Illiquid Assets/Assets𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜆5𝑈𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆6Unrealized Security loss ratio 𝑖𝑡




𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝜇 +∑𝜃𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖 + 𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                       (5-2) 
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We specify the 1
st
 model for loan growth, which is defined as the changes of bank loans to 




 regression analysis considers the share of liquid assets in 
total assets as the dependent variable
45
, expressed as changes normalized by total assets. Our 1st, 
2nd, and 3rd predictions will be tested by using formula 5-1 and 5-2. 
 
The full definitions of explanatory variables employed in those models are listed below: 
 
SIZE is the logarithmic total assets of the banks. Afonso, Santos, and Traina (2014) as well as our 
empirical studies in chapter 3 and 4 show large banks engage in riskier lending activities and 
produce a larger volume of impaired loans due to implicit government guarantees (i.e., too big to 
fail subsidy). 
 
Tier1 capital ratio is defined as a percentage of risk-weighted assets as defined by the appropriate 
Federal regulator for prompt corrective action during that time period (Dinger and Hagen, 2005). 
 
Core deposit to asset ratio is the share of core deposits (the sum of transaction deposits and other 
insured deposits) in total assets. It is a proxy of stable sources of funding. 
 
Illiquid assets to assets is the ratio of total illiquid assets to total assets. 
 
Unused commitment ratio is measured by the percentage of unused commitments to lending 
capacity (unused commitments plus assets). Recall section 5.3.1, it is a proxy of off-balance sheet 
funding liquidity stemming from loans. 
 
 Loan Loss Allowance ratio
46
 is defined as a ratio of allowance for loan losses to total loans. 
Loan loss allowance is the sum of all estimated (unrealized) credit losses, which is a contra-asset 
account that reduces the book value of non-performance loans to the amount deemed collectible. 
                                                 
 
44
 Ratios in this chapter are all scaled by the beginning of quarter value.  
45
 Here, we assume a bank with liquid assets and loans on the debit side of the balance sheet, financed by equity and 
deposits only. Therefore, growth in liquid assets should be equal the sum of changed in deposits and loans. If the 
changes in deposits are larger than the changes in loans, the deposit inflow will transform into liquidity assets. 
46
 Recall section 5.3.1, we hypothesize that the precautionary motive to hoard liquidity is better approximated by a 
liquidity risk measure that captures a bank’s exposure to expected losses in anticipation of future liquidation of 
assets. My proposed risk measures are therefore: the ratio of security losses and the ratio of loan loss allowance. 
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Loan loss allowance increases with loan loss provision and recoveries, and decreases with 
charge-offs. Therefore, failing to control for loan loss allowance and charge-offs could lead to 
wrong conclusions. 
 
Unrealized security loss ratio is the percentage of unrealized losses on available - for - sale 
securities to available for sale securities
47
.  For the ease of interpretation, I switch the sign and 
take a positive sign as indicative of a loss. 
 
Fed rate (Federal Funds Rate) is the proxy of aggregate loan demand. It is the rate at which 
depository institutions trade Federal funds 
48
on an overnight and uncollateralized basis. Bernanke 
and Gertler (1995) consider direct and indirect effects of the central bank’s interest rate policy. 
The central bank controls the short-term interest rate to directly influence the cost of borrowing 
and spending by households and corporations. Indirectly, interest rate changes affect loan 
demand. For example, a rise in the interest rate increases the cost of external financing more for 
borrowers with weak financial standings and thus restricts their demand for credit relative to 
those with strong financial conditions. 
 
TED Spread is the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and 3-month Treasury rate, and serves as 




                                                 
 
47 We use both gross and net (of taxes) measures of unrealized gains (losses) in available-for-sale securities. Net 
unrealized gains (losses) are obtained directly from Call Reports (RC-R, RCFD-8434), whereas gross unrealized 
gains (losses) are computed as the difference between the amortized cost and the fair value of available-for-sale 
securities as reported in the securities schedule (RC-B) of Call Reports. The amortized cost of securities is their book 
value (acquisition cost) adjusted for the discount or premium paid at purchase. The difference between amortized 
cost and fair value is the change in market value (write-up or write-down) of the securities still being held on banks’ 
investment portfolios. Unrealized security losses are reported with a negative sign (a positive sign then indicates a 
security gain). 
48
 It is balances held with the Fed, also known as reserves 
49
 In October 2008, after the failure of Lehman Brothers, the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and 
the AIG bailout, a measure of counterparty risk in interbank markets such as the TED spread (difference in yield 
between LIBOR  and a Treasury Bill of similar maturity) moved up to a record level of 430 basis points. As Acharya 
and Merrouche (2013) argue, the drying up of short-term liquidity markets caused a significant increase in borrowing 
rates for all banks, regardless of counterparty risk. The spike in funding costs suggests an interest rate contagion 
channel through the interbank markets, which is well described by rate spreads such as the TED spread (3-month 
LIBOR rate minus 3-month Treasury rate) or the LIBOR-OIS spread (LIBOR rate over the corresponding overnight 
index swap rate). As in Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2011), we include interaction terms of the TED 




Interbank Lending Crunch (ILC) takes the value of one for the period from the 3rd quarter of 
2008 when Lehman Brothers bankrupted and the interbank market started shrinking, and zero 
otherwise (for more details please refer to section 5.2). Interbank Lending Crunch is an 
interaction variable to get interaction variables in terms of 9 independent variables by considering 
two sub-periods (1992Q4 -2008Q2 and 2008Q3 -2011Q4). It is equal to the original values of 
independent variables multiplied by 1 in the later sub-period, and 0 otherwise. μ is the number of 
independent banking variables from 1 to 9.  
 
Tt (t = 1,…,T) is a set of quarter dummies which control for unobserved time-specific effects at 
the macro level. 
 
Bi (i = 1,…,N) is a set of bank fixed effects which control for time-invariant unobserved banks-
specific heterogeneity. 
 
In the rest of models, we also class our whole sample into two subgroups: Net Lenders 
(Liquidity-rich banks) and Net Borrowers (Liquidity-poor banks); (Net Borrowers - Net Lenders) 
takes the value of minus one for net borrowers, one for net lenders, and zero for all other cases 
(see full details in section 5.3.1).  
 
For brevity, we also introduce a set of control variables 𝑋𝑗 (j = 1, …, J, J=9) to account for bank-
specific characteristics we examines from Eq 5-1 and 5-2. They are bank size, Tier1 Capital ratio, 
core deposit to asset ratio and illiquid assets to assets as proxies for banks’ financial conditions; 
and Federal Funds Rate as proxies for aggregate loan demand; unused commitment ratio, 
unrealized security loss ratio and loan loss allowance ratio as proxies for self-insurance motives; 
and TED Spread as our proxy for counterparty risk. Then Model 5-1 and 5-2 with Net Lenders 





= 𝜆1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ + 𝜆2(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑖𝑡












𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 =
Δ𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝜆1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ + 𝜆2(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑖𝑡







𝑇𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖 + 𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
                       (5-3) 
Our 4th prediction poses that net borrowers amassed liquidity to insure against potential liquidity 
shortfalls. To capture such self-insurance motives of liquidity hoarding, we match Liquid Asset 
Growth with Deposit Growth
50






= 𝛽1𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ
+ 𝛽2𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6Deposit Growth ∗ Liquidity Shortage 𝑖𝑡







𝑇𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖 + 𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
                      (5-4) 
Where, Deposit Growth is quarterly change in Deposits, scaled by the beginning of the quarter 
value of total assets. Liquidity Shortage is our liquidity shortage indicator, for which we employ 
UC90 and URSL90. UC90 takes the value of one for observations where Unused Commitments 
is greater than its 90th percentile value in the previous quarter and zero otherwise. URSL90 takes 
the value of one for observations where Unrealized Security Loss ratio is greater than its 90th 
percentile value in the previous quarter and zero otherwise (Sign is positive for loss). In 
estimating equation (5-4), when UC90 is used as a liquidity shortage proxy, we leave the unused 
commitment ratio out of the set of controls; similarly, when URSL90 is used, we leave out the 
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 Here, we assume there are two-group banks with identical characteristics, banks As (have precautionary needs) 
and banks Bs (do not). In order to cover liquidity shortages, As borrow from the interbank market, but if interbank 




Unrealized Security Loss ratio. The remaining variables are as specified above. We estimate 
equation (5-4) separately for net lenders and net borrowers. 
 
To test our fifth prediction that net lenders piled up liquidity due to counterparty risk, we estimate 





= 𝜌1𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ
+ 𝜌2(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜌3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ ∗ (𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜌4𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌5𝑇𝐸𝐷 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜌6𝑇𝐸𝐷 ∗ (𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠) 𝑖𝑡







𝑇𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖 + 𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                      (5-5) 
Where, all variables are as specified above. TED is a proxy for counterparty risk. 
 
Lastly, we examine our final predication that lending rates were higher for net borrowers. We 
estimate the following regression model for Total interest expense rate: 
Total Interest Expense Rate𝑖𝑡
= 𝜂1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ + 𝜂2(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑖𝑡







𝑇𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖 + 𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(5-6) 
Where, total interest expense rate is the ratio of total interest expenses to the quarterly average 
balance of interest-bearing liabilities. Interest-bearing liabilities are the sum of interest-bearing 
deposits, Federal funds purchased and securities sold under repurchase agreements, trading 
liabilities, other borrowed money, subordinate notes and debentures. The remaining variables are 




5.4 Results and Analyses of Empirical Work 
5.4.1 Liquidity Hoarding with Different Asset Categories 
In contrast to Cornett et al. (2011), we first investigate the main determinants of liquidity 
hoarding for different asset categories as suggested by Figure 46. Our definition of liquid assets 
includes mortgage-backed securities. Refer to section 5.2 for full details. In fact, most of the 
security losses in banks’ balance sheets result from the write-downs of ABS and non-agency 
MBS; and agency MBS represents a large fraction of the liquid assets that banks were hoarding. 
Table 10: Results of Fixed Effect Regressions of Various Liquid Assets 
 Reference Model Model based on Eq5-2 





























































































































































































Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quart. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.220  0.221 0.216 0.106 0.173 
Observations 1075921 1075921 1075921 1075921 1075921 
ILC stands for 'interbank lending crunch'. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels. 
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Our regression estimates based on equation 5-2 are shown in table 10 above. The first column in 
table 10 is included as a reference, as they replicate the findings of Cornett et al. (2011). As can 
be seen, unused commitments ratio appear to be a significant determinant of increased liquidity 
buffers measured by the liquid asset ratio. Cornett et al. (2011) suggest a positive expected sign 
for loan commitments, but acknowledge the difficulty in establishing ex-ante sign of this 
variable. As they argue, banks with greater unused commitments may be exposed to liquidity 
risk, but also experience greater increase in loan demand during the crisis. 
 
Columns 3 through 6 show our estimates by type of liquid assets. Our main findings are:  
 
As documented in prior work, stable sources of funding such as deposits and capital are key 
determinants of the holdings of liquid assets: holdings of liquid assets also decrease with bank 
capital and deposits. Consistent with Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and Tehranian (2011), this thesis 
finds that core deposits substitute for cash and Fed funds as banks use these stable funding 
sources to fund loans and commitments.  
 
Our proposed measures of on-balance sheet risk, unrealized security loss ratio and loan loss 
allowance ratio, play a significant role during the interbank lending crunch, and seem to 
complement off-balance sheet liquidity risk stemming from the possibility of increased 
drawdown demand for committed loans.  
 
When looking at each individual component of the overall liquid asset ratio, our results suggest 
that this complementarity between on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet risks is particularly 
important to explain the hoarding of cash and Fed funds during times of interbank lending 
crunch. However, that is not the case for the holdings of government securities and agency MBS. 
Columns 5 and 6 indicate that, in general, large unused commitments seem to reduce the holdings 
of government securities and to increase the holdings of agency MBS in normal times. However, 
they seem to act in the opposite direction during times of interbank crisis. These results seem 
counterfactual if one takes the interpretation that large unused commitments are a source of off-
balance sheet liquidity risk. As Figure 46 indicates, rather than hoarding government securities 
during the financial crisis, most banks were selling them; Tehranian (2011), who examined an 
overall holdings of agency MBS, found that most banks decided to continue holding them. In 
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contrast, the unrealized security loss ratio and more importantly, its interaction with the interbank 
lending crunch, consistently explains the behavior of each category of liquid assets. It 
significantly explains the increase in cash plus Fed funds and the holdings of agency MBS during 
financial distress. Security losses and loss allowance also appear to be significant explanatory 
variables for the decline in government securities, in agreement with the behavior in Figure 46; 
but not for the holding of agency MBS. 
 
Our results also suggests that core deposits added liquidity to banks that wanted to hoard their 
liquid funds, which is consistent with Gatev and Strahan (2006). ‘The flight-to-quality effect’ is 
found. During the recent financial crisis, many banks had enormous difficulties accessing 
interbank markets. In those circumstances, it is also likely that within banks where institutions are 
more harshly competing for liquid funds; banks perceived as a safe haven for deposits (with large 
holdings of liquid assets) benefited more than less liquid banks and were able to attract inflows in 
the form of core deposits by raising their rates. Investors regard banks as a “safe haven” only 
when they can be confident that their deposits are insured or backed by a government guarantee 
(Gatev and Strahan, 2006; Pennacchi, 2006). 
 
5.4.2 Liquidity Hoarding and Bank Size 
As we found in chapter 4, the market’s perception of the risk of a bank can depend on the size of 
the bank. Evidence of ‘Size matters’ is also provided by Black, Collins and Robinson (1997). 
Schweitzer (2003) observes a flight to quality as evidenced by changes in institutional ownership 
of TBTF for bank equity shares. It is interesting to see whether bank size plays a significant role 
for liquidity hoarding, especially in financial crisis.  
 
To further investigate the role of size, we conducted a regression analysis on liquid asset growth 
(Eq5-2) and loan growth (Eq5-1) for large banks and small banks, using the bank-size split in our 
chapter 4. Whole sample is split into two groups according to a threshold value of log bank total 
assets (5.299027). Results are shown in Appendix 15. As before, the interactions between the 
interbank lending crunch and the variables that explain liquid risks are of particular interest. Our 




Core deposits and capital are more relevant for small banks than for large banks. The negative 
and significant coefficient on the interaction term of the interbank lending crunch and both core 
deposits and capital suggests that, during times of financial distress, core deposits and capital 
substitute liquidity assets for small banks. Although Appendix 13 suggests that liquidity hoarders 
appear to be slightly larger than non-hoarders, the regression results do not support the 
hypothesis that larger banks hoard more liquid assets. On the contrary the results indicate that the 
holdings of liquid assets decrease with bank size; this is in line with Ashcraft, McAndrews, and 
Skeie (2011), who find that small banks hold larger amounts of cash and excess reserves with the 
Federal Reserve than larger banks. 
 
Our regression results reveal that the complementarity among unused loan commitments, 
unrealized losses and loan loss allowance, is significantly important in explaining the cash 
hoarding of small banks during the interbank lending crunch. However, this evidence seems 
weaker for large banks. To further examine the relationship between unused commitments and 
unrealized security losses, Figure in Appendix 16 plots the behavior of these two measures of 
liquidity risk for small and large banks. Unused commitments drop significantly for large banks, 
starting in September 2007, that is, immediately after the collapse of the interbank and the 
securitization markets. The unused commitment ratio falls from 18 percent in the 3rd Quarter of 
2008 to 12 percent in 2009 summer. This finding is consistent with Berrospide, Meisenzahl and 
Sullivan (2011), who report evidence of increased drawdowns of corporate credit lines starting in 
the fall of 2007, that is, earlier than previously documented. The decline in unused commitments 
continues during 2008, precisely the time when banks were hit by significant losses in their 
securities holdings. Security losses for large banks rose to almost 2 percent after the collapse of 
Lehman and AIG in October 2008.  Small banks faced a similar situation. Their unused 
commitments decreased from 9 percent to 7 percent during the financial crisis. Their security 
losses increased from -1% (gain) to 1.6% between the first and third quarters of 2008. 
 
5.4.3 Liquidity Hoarding with Net Borrowers and Net lenders  
We further class our whole sample into two subgroups: Net Lenders (liquidity-rich banks) and 
Net Borrowers (liquidity-poor banks). For brevity, in this section, we do not show the 
coefficients for the control variables. Both bank and quarterly time dummies are included in all 
regressions with the residuals clustered at the bank level. 
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Table 11 presents the results from estimating Eq(5-3) for Loan Growth and Liquid Asset Growth 
respectively.  
Table 11: Lending rationing by net borrowers 













Control variables included Yes Yes 
Bank Dummies included Yes Yes 
Quarterly Time Dummies included Yes Yes 
R² 0.411 0.248 
Number of observations 1075921 1075921 
Number of banks 13973 13973 
Note: This table reports the regression results for Loan Growth and Liquid Asset Growth. 
T‐statistics are in parentheses, and *** , **and * indicate the 1% , 5% and 10% significance levels 
respectively. 
 
First of all, we find evidence of lending rationing by liquidity-poor banks, which is in the line 
with the theory of lending rationing by Arnold and Riley (2009). From column (1), we discover 
that the difference in Loan Growth rate between net borrowers and net lenders is insignificant 
before the interbank lending crunch. However, during the financial crisis, when the interbank 
market was unable to perform efficient allocation of funds, Loan Growth was 1.53 percentage 
points lower for liquidity-poor banks than liquidity-rich banks. Moreover, this result holds after 
controlling for loan demand effects. In column (2), unlike Loan Growth, we find no significant 
difference in Liquid Asset Growth rate between net borrowers and net lenders between the 
periods before and during the interbank lending reluctance.  
 
In the absence of the well-functional interbank market as a coinsurance channel, Castiglionesi et 
al. (2014) show liquidity-poor banks hoard liquidity for self-insurance against liquidity shortfalls. 
By model (5-4), we test our prediction on self-insurance motives by liquidity-poor banks. And we 
present our results in Table 12. We fit equation (5-4) to net borrowers and net lenders 
respectively.  
 
Column (1) shows net lenders transform 21.91 cents of every dollar of deposit inflows into liquid 
assets unconditionally. During the interbank lending crunch, they kept 12.19 cents more. Before 
the crunch, net lenders with unused commitments did not need high levels of liquidity, perhaps 
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because funds were readily available in the interbank market, and managed to keep 7.61 cents 
less. This is consistent with Gatev and Strahan (2006) and Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan 
(2009) who find that banks with more unused commitments enjoy greater deposit inflows and 
lower funding costs especially in financial distress. However, in the interbank lending crunch, 
unused commitments posed a great deal of pressure even on net lenders; net lenders with unused 
commitments kept 9.45 cents more. Overall, during the interbank lending crunch, net lenders 
with unused commitments retained 35.94 cents in the form of liquid assets for every dollar of 
deposit. This result is consistent with Acharya and Mora (2015). 
 
Table 12: Liquidity hoarding by net borrowers for self-insurance   
△Liq.Asset/ 
Assetst−1 
 Liquidity Shortages = UC90 Liquidity Shortages = URSL90 








































Control variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly Time Dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.1098 0.1644 0.1274 0.2324 
Number of observations 553630 522291 553630 522291 
Number of banks 7190 6783 7190 6783 
Note: This table reports the regression results for Liquid Asset Growth using Unused Commitments greater 
than 90th percentile (UC90) as an anticipated liquidity shortfall proxy for Net Lenders in column (1) and for 
Net Borrowers in column (2). 
T‐statistics are in parentheses, and *** , **and * indicate the 1% , 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
 
In column (2), a similar pattern is found for net borrowers, except that net borrowers with unused 
commitments transformed 16.53 cents more into liquid assets during the interbank lending 
crunch (7.08 cents more than net lenders with unused commitments). For every dollar of deposit, 
they hoarded 54.96 cents in liquid assets, 19.02 cents more than net lenders with unused 
commitments. Our results verify our 4th predication that net borrowers could hoard liquidity for 
self-insurance, especially during the crunch. Robustness test is done by use unrealized security 
loss ratio as our proxy for liquidity shortage. We’ve found similar results and net borrowers 
hoard more liquidity with lower quality security holdings. 
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Empirical results of Eq5-5 for our fifth prediction that counterparty risk prompted net lenders to 
hoard liquidity are in Table 13. The same set of controls as for the Liquid Asset Growth 
regressions are included, and (Net Lenders-Net Borrowers) is used instead of (Net Borrowers-Net 
Lenders) so that we can draw direct inference about net lenders. 
 
Table 13: Liquidity hoarding by net lenders due to counterparty risk 
  △Liq.Asset/ 
Assetst−1 
TED 0.0113 *** 
(19.874) 
TED × ILC ‐0.0063 *** 
(‐9.2321) 
TED × (Net Lender ‐ Net Borrowers ) 0.0009 
(1.5326) 
TED × ILC× (Net Lender ‐ Net Borrowers ) 0.0023 *** 
(2.9865) 
Control variables included Yes 
Bank Dummies included Yes 
Quarterly Time Dummies included Yes 
R² 0.0957 
Number of observations 1075921 
Number of banks 13973 
Note: This table reports the regression results for Liquid Asset Growth.  
The main test variable is TED as a proxy for counterparty risk.  
T‐statistics are in parentheses, and ***, **and * indicate the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
Table 13 describes that a 1% increase in TED unconditionally leads to a 1.13% increase in Liquid 
Asset Growth. TED Spread is in percentage and liquid asset growth is in fraction
51
. During the 
interbank lending reluctance, a 1% rise in TED brought about a 0.63% drop in Liquid Asset 
Growth for all banks, regardless whether they are net lenders or net borrowers. Before the crisis, 
TED Spread had no differential impact on liquid asset growth between liquidity-rich banks and 
liquidity-poor banks. However, during the interbank crunch, we find that a 1% rise in TED 
prompted net lenders to hoard 0.23% more liquid assets than net borrowers. Therefore, we’ve 
find evidence of precautionary liquidity hoarding by liquidity‐rich banks due to counterparty risk; 
which is in the line with the theory of lending rationing by Afonso,  Kovner & Schoar, 2011; 
Ashcraft; McAndrews & Skeie, 2011; and Paolo, Nobili & Picillo, 2011. 
 
                                                 
 
51
 Therefore, we adjust the scale inconsistency by multiplying the coefficient estimates by 100. 
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Table 14 describes the results for our final proposition that net borrowers offered higher rates to 
attract deposits. As net borrowers scrambled for self‐insurance when the interbank market was 
disrupted, they could have faced higher funding costs. Subsequent to the failure of Lehman 
Brothers, the Fed started injecting unprecedentedly large amounts of liquidity into the banking 
sector. In theory, unless every bank holds the injected liquidity with the Fed, the injected liquidity 
should create deposits as it changes hands (Ennis and Wolman, 2012; Keister and McAndrew, 
2009). Our results also indicated the Fed’s liquidity injections created considerable amounts of 
deposit flows.  
Table 14: Funding costs for net borrowers 
  Total Interest 
Expense Rate 
(Net Borrowers − Net Lenders ) ‐0.0012 
(‐0.9166) 
(Net Borrowers − Net Lenders ) × Interbank Lending Crunch 0.0066 *** 
(4.765) 
Control variables included Yes 
Bank Dummies included Yes 
Quarterly Time Dummies included Yes 
R² 0.6512 
Number of observations 1075921 
Number of banks 13973 
Note: This table reports the regression results for Total Interest Expense Rate 















In this Chapter, we examine the impact of the disruption of the interbank market on banks’ 
liquidity creation and funding ability. As the recent financial crisis demonstrates, liquidity 
hoarding affects the normal functioning of short-term funding markets. Our results are consistent 
with previous work documenting the substantial effects of disruptions in interbank markets.  
 
Due to increased uncertainty and the fear of prolonged restrictions to access interbank loans, 
banks that choose to hoard liquidity may cause a rise in borrowing costs that have an adverse 
impact on less liquid banks. Consistent with theoretical explanations for the precautionary motive 
of liquidity hoarding, the empirical results show that banks choose to build up liquidity in 
anticipation of future expected losses from holding assets during interbank lending crunch. 
Specifically, we find evidence of self-insurance motives and lending rationing by net borrowers. 
We also find net borrowers offered higher rates to attract external funding, and net lenders 
hoarded liquidity due to heightened counterparty risk. 
 
Compared with previously suggested proxies for banks’ liquidity risk, such as the proportion of 
unused loan commitments to their lending capacity-exposure, security losses in their investment 
portfolio represents a more accurate measure of liquidity risk associated with the run in repo 
markets during the financial crisis. This measure of liquidity risk is consistent with the theory of 
liquidity hoarding and provides supporting evidence for the precautionary motive. We also find 
evidence that allowance for loan losses are another key factor contributing to the increased 
holdings of liquid assets, especially for small banks. Although not a substitute for cash, and thus 
less related to liquidity risk, the forward-looking component of loan loss allowance seems to 
reflect banks’ asset reallocation from loans (which have become riskier due to the reduced 
creditworthiness of their borrowers) to safe and liquid securities. 
 
We also document an important flight-to-quality effect in deposit flows. Consistent with the view 
that deposits represent a stable source of funds for bank operations, we find evidence of inflows 
of core deposits during the financial crisis to banks that chose to hoard liquidity. Non-core 
deposits flew from both liquidity-hoarding and non-hoarding banks, moving into hoarding banks 
in the form of core deposits.  
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On the policy frontier, we argue that the central bank has to ensure the interbank market function 
well for its expansionary monetary policy to be effective. Besides credit and securities lending 
programs targeted at the interbank market, such as TAF, TSLF, and PDCF, we suggest interbank 
lending subsidization as well. The central bank should consider paying a spread over the rate at 
which banks lend to each other whenever the interbank market is not performing efficiently to 
incentivize interbank lending. In implementing this policy, the central bank has to constantly and 
closely monitor the interbank market so that, as full efficiency is reached, it can narrow the 
spread. In our belief, unlike the interest-on-reserve policy, interbank lending subsidization will 

































Chapter Six: Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
The current research arising from recent subprime mortgage crisis 2007/08 is manifold. For one 
side, while there are many benefits in knowing whether and if so when a crisis may occur, it has 
been a challenge to predict crisis. For another side, the view that the structure of the financial 
network plays a central role in shaping ‘Systemic risk’ has become conventional wisdoms. 
However, the banking systems have developed in those network models are free of any actual 
dynamics: there is a paucity of research in network models has considered the possibility that the 
banks could make preemptive actions to protect themselves from a common market shock and 
therefore affect the propagation of losses through the financial linkages, such as interbank market. 
As a result, further related studies will be required in future; to fine-tune public policy and the 
policy-making process. 
 
The author started the analysis by identifying banks’ behaviours vis-à-vis the 2007/08 global 
financial crisis from a wide range of balance sheet ratios according to CAMELS model. 
Methodologically, chapter 3 provided a new and innovative analysis: it analysed structural shifts 
of those accounting ratios, in response to three chronological periods: pre-crisis, crisis and post 
crisis, to assess the relative likelihood of success of selective financial ratios as early warning 
indicators. Following this analysis, we’ve found that an aspect of the actual dynamic behaviour of 
banks is a key variable for the onset of a banking crisis. More specifically, the results show that 
certain indicators such as nonperforming loans ratio, leverage ratio and coverage ratio are 
appropriate indicators for the detection of banking system vulnerabilities for all banks. And 
nonperforming loans ratio additionally serves as an indicator for the timing of a crisis. While 
capital levels were closely monitored, banks’ heavy reliance on wholesale funding was 
overlooked. Banks that seemed to be safe experienced a ‘bank run’ that ultimately led to their 
defaults. Finally, although the interbank market was not fully frozen in the early stage of 
financial crisis for large banks, the sudden decrease in interbank market activities and increase in 
banks’ liquidity ‘hoarding’ behaviour was observed. 
 
We’ve also verified differences in the applicability of banking accounting ratios for the 
identification of banking problem between large, median and small banks: Bank size does matter. 
While the changes in the financial system affected all banks, they had a particularly large impact 
on the large banks. The business model of large banks became clearly distinct from that of small 
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or medium-sized banks. First, large banks today engage disproportionately more in market-based 
activities. Second, large banks hold less capital than small banks, as measured either by a tier 1 
capital ratio or a leverage ratio. Third, large banks have less stable funding than small banks, as 
measured by the ratio of deposits to total assets. Fourth, large banks engage more interbank 
activities, as measured by interbank loan. Finally, large banks have poorer asset quality than 
small banks, as measured by NPLs to total gross loans ratio. The results from this empirical 
investigation, which can be generalised to the banking system as a whole, provide valuable 
insights into the operation of the interbank market that we’ve focused in our chapter 4 and 5. 
 
In Chapter 4, the author further focused on whether involvements in interbank lending increased 
the risk level of banks; and particular attention was paid to the effect of size. All in all, the 
empirical evidence supports the ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) thesis: there is a close nonlinear (U-
shaped) relationship between a bank’ size and its risk-taking behavior. In other words, the risk 
level is increased when the bank size goes beyond a certain level. A non-linear threshold model is 
employed in my empirical work to find this critical value: a strong positive coefficient of bank 
size is found in large banks where bank size is over the threshold; whereas a significant negative 
coefficient is found in the small banks where bank size is less than the threshold. This result 
indicates that given an interconnected multiple money centre bank market, large banks are 
associated with higher risk-taking. In addition to this, Chapter 4 also tests an interaction model to 
detect differences in U.S. interbank bank activities and risk-taking in three sub-periods: pre-crisis, 
crisis and post-crisis.  
 
For specifically, a negative relationship between equity holding and risk level was found in the 
small banks, but not in large banks. This suggests that small banks with fewer equities are more 
likely to be associated with higher risk-taking. This, in turn, highlights the importance of 
monitoring from shareholders to reduce the risk-taking of small banks owing to the lack of 
protection from CB. An insignificant result in terms of large banks might suggest that 
shareholders have less incentive to monitor bank activities due to a potential bail-out provided by 
CB; thus, it might be argued that TBTF generates a moral hazard problem that is not only related 
to bank managers pursuing higher interests, but also related to shareholders or even depositors 
having less incentive to screen banks; therefore information asymmetry among governments, 
shareholders and depositors might be the one reason of the recent Subprime Mortgage crisis. This 
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might be (one) possible explanation for the onset of the 2008 Subprime crisis, in that neither 
regulators nor shareholders paid much attention to the risk-taking of large banks and allowed 
them to become involved in risky activities. In addition to this, the author can verify that banks 
which have more deposits and fewer nonperformance assets are assumed to be more stable and 
less risky. The increase in the loan-deposit ratio suggests higher level of liquidity risk, which 
might force banks to be active in interbank markets. 
  
Moreover, a negative relationship has been found between interbank lending and banks’ risk 
taking for large banks in normal times, but it is the significant positive for small banks. A moral 
hazard problem is generated from LLR intervention, which encourages large banks to make an 
effort to be larger by increasing the capacity of bank activities in order to benefit from TBTF 
(too-big-to-fail) while the expansion of bank activities, especially non-traditional actives, may 
increase risk. It also suggest small banks are more willing to monitor borrowing banks in order to 
maximize the expected return and reduce the default risk level of interbank assets. But this 
positive relationship for small banks becomes insignificant during the financial crisis, which 
suggests that interbank lending market froze to small banks, at the beginning of summer of 2007 
as it did during the Asian banking crisis of the late 1990s. This result is consistent a interbank 
market study by Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar in 2011. 
 
Given the significant positive coefficient between the interbank lending and risk-taking for large 
banks during the financial crisis, we also argue that the interbank market was only active to large 
banks. And the observed evidence of precautionary actions of large banks, such as liquidity 
hoarding, were found aftermath the collapse of Lehman Brothers with deepening concerns about 
the credit quality of counterparties and the fact that the magnitude of the exposure to subprime-
related assets was unknown. In contrary to normal times, large banks became more willing to 
monitor borrowing banks in order to reduce the default risk level of bank assets. Although banks 
can also issue new loans from interbank market, but with high quality collaterals or high interest 
rates, all banks suffer from a liquidity shortage in this case, in turn, rather than lend surplus liquid 
assets out, most banking preferred to hold, in case their own need might increase. Insufficient 
bank liquidity could lead to inadequate allocation of capital if any problems happen in this 
market. This may impose adverse implications in the whole financial system as it could be 
contagious and spills over from one to the others. Our results highlight that interbank lending is 
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associated with substantially lower risk taking by borrowing banks in financial crisis, which are 
consistent with monitoring by lending banks. 
 
Our findings in Chapter 4 demonstrated ‘liquidity hoarding’ affected the normal functioning of 
short-term funding markets: due to increased uncertainty and the fear of prolonged restrictions to 
accessing interbank loans, banks that chose to hoard liquidity may have caused a rise in 
borrowing costs that had an adverse impact on less liquid banks. Therefore, the author also 
examined banks’ liquidity creation and funding ability during the interbank lending crunch in 
Chapter 5. All in all, we’ve found that banks curbed lending during the interbank lending crunch, 
when the interbank borrowing channel was broken. 
 
First, the empirical findings highlight important differences in the distribution of liquid assets 
across banks depending on their size. Understanding such differences is crucial in the context of a 
regulatory reform and must be taken into account in the implementation of capital and liquidity 
requirements for banking institutions. 
 
Second, to mitigate this problem, the author proposes two on-balance proxies for banks’ liquidity 
risk: (i) the unrealized security loss ratio and (ii) the loan loss allowance ratio. Comparing with 
previously suggested off-balance proxies for banks’ liquidity risk such as unused loan 
commitments, our finding suggests that unrealized security losses as well as loan loss allowance 
seem to better capture the risks stemming from banks’ asset management during the financial 
crisis and provide supporting evidence for the precautionary nature of liquidity hoarding. Banks 
choose to build up liquidity in anticipation of future expected losses from securities write-downs 
and loans charged-off. For example, unrealized losses in securities holdings represent the write-
downs of securities (a large portion of which are used as collateral in repo transactions) that result 
from mark-to-market accounting of investment portfolios. They reflect the exposure to future 
capital losses for banks if they had to sell those assets at fire sale prices. This source of liquidity 
risk has not been explored at length in the previous literature, due perhaps to the few balance 
sheet items related to credit exposure covered by collateral in those transactions.  
 
In addition to this, the author concludes that the same factors leading to precautionary liquidity 
hoarding also contributed to a sharp decline in interbank lending. We’ve found evidences of self-
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insurance motives and lending rationing by net borrowers. Moreover, net borrowers offered 
higher rates to attract external funding, and net lenders hoarded liquidity due to heightened 
counterparty risk. A ‘flight to quality’ is also found in my results: non-core deposits seeped out of 
banks and returned in the form of core deposits, first to hoarding banks and later to non-hoarding 
banks. Therefore, the dissertation finds evidence of inflows of core deposits at the onset of the 
crisis to banks that chose to hoard liquidity. 
 
What is more, the findings of this thesis demonstrate the crucial role of the interbank market in 
ensuring effective transmission of monetary expansion. If liquidity-hoarding banks have 
sufficient market power to manipulate asset prices, some form of predatory behavior may arise 
(Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer, 2012). The considerable fear associated with the riskiness of 
banks’ portfolios further limits the ability of policy actions to revamp credit growth and stimulate 
the real economy. 
 
Taken together, these observations and results offer a number of important implication for the 
optimal policy vis-à-vis large banks and the interbank market: 
 
First, many financial commentators have argued that ineffective/inadequate state regulation 
contributed or even caused the 2007/08 Sub-Prime crisis. If that is the case, one would expect to 
find a difference in the regulation regimes of financial institutions vis-à-vis bank size. Thus, one 
recommendation of this thesis is that policymakers re-consider the bank size effect in 
determining bank risk level. Other financial commentators have criticized the governance of 
banks and suggested that better governance would have led to greater resilience during the 
financial crisis. Within this context, banks were affected differentially because of different 
balance sheets; and thus the probable gain and losses to individual banks need be measured to 
prior to proposing polices. 
 
Recall section 1.1 and section 2.3, the policy actions of the Fed in mitigating the impact of the 
financial crisis 2007/08 can be summarized in two main fields: (1) liquidity injections; and (2) 
interest-on-reserve policy. Taken together, however, these policies are highly problematic. 
Liquidity injections were delivered through credit and liquidity facilities at the onset of the 
subprime mortgage crisis in late 2007, and were gradually replaced by quantitative easing (QE) 
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over the course of 2009. The injected liquidity pushed down the Federal funds rate, the policy 
rate, below the target. To set a floor for the Federal funds rate, the Fed started paying interests on 
reserves at 0.25% per annum. However, because banks base lending decisions on the spread 
between the return on loans and its opportunity cost (the return on reserves), low lending rates 
and interests on reserves discouraged bank lending and encouraged liquidity hoarding during the 
financial crisis. The average value of Total Interest Income Rate was 3.9% before the interbank 
lending crunch and 2.7% during the crunch. Further, unrestricted supply of liquidity by the Fed 
provided banks with all the more reason not to lend but to hoard instead. The Fed moved its focus 
almost entirely to QE from targeted supports through credit and liquidity facilities including 
those designed specifically for the interbank market (e.g., TAF, TSLF, and PDCF). However, 
because QE is performed outside the interbank market, it appears that efficient fund allocation 
among banks was not the concern of the Fed. The absence of a well-functioning interbank market 
could cost the Fed unnecessarily large amounts of liquidity injections as banks seek self‐
insurance and curb lending. 
  
On this basis, the thesis also recommends that the Fed should focus more on insuring efficient 
allocation of funds in the interbank market. Whenever liquidity injection is deemed inevitable, 
the author recommends that the central bank should subsidize interbank lending. The subsidy rate 
can be a function of the gap between the current state of the interbank market and its desired full 
efficiency. As such, the central bank should add a fraction of a percentage more to the rates at 
which banks lend to each other to encourage interbank lending, and taper off as the interbank 
market moves towards full efficiency. The interbank lending subsidy policy has some important 
advantages. First, interbank lending subsidy is compatible with liquidity injection policy: a close 
monitoring of the subsidy rate and the functioning of the interbank market will help the central 
bank analyze the optimal amount of liquidity to inject. Second, unlike the interest-on-reserve 
policy, the subsidy rate will not deter bank lending as the interbank market approaches full 
efficiency. Furthermore, as interbank lending subsidy encourages more lending activities in the 
interbank market, it can keep the policy rate from falling below the target. However, this requires 










Appendix 1: The main data file 
Main data file 
NO. Short name Ratio name Definitions  
1 intincy 
Yield on earning 
assets 
Total interest income (annualized) as a percent of average earning assets. 
2 intexpy 
Cost of funding 
earning assets 
Annualized total interest expense on deposits and other borrowed money as a percent of 








income to earning 
assets 
Income derived from bank services and sources other than interest bearing assets (annualized) 
as a percent of average earning assets. 
5 nonixy 
Noninterest 
expense to earning 
assets 
Salaries and employee benefits, expenses of premises and fixed assets, and other noninterest 
expenses (annualized) as a percent of average earning assets. 
6 noijy 
Net operating 
income to assets 
Net operating income (annualized) as a percent of average assets. 
7 roa 
Return on assets 
(ROA) 
Net income after taxes and extraordinary items (annualized) as a percent of average total assets. 
8 roaptx 
Pretax return on 
assets 
Annualized pre-tax net income as a percent of average assets.<P>Note: Includes extraordinary 
items and other adjustments, net of taxes. 
9 roe 
Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
Annualized net income as a percent of average equity on a consolidated basis.     Note: If 
retained earnings are  negative, the ratio is shown as NA.  
10 roeinjr 
Retained earnings 
to average equity 
(ytd only) 
Net income (year-to-date, annualized), less cash dividends declared (year-to-date, annualized), 
as a percent of average total equity capital.  If retained earnings are negative, the ratio is shown 
as NA. This ratio is presented on a year-to-date basis only. 
11 ntlnlsr 
Net charge-offs to 
loans 
Gross loan and lease financing receivable charge-offs, less gross recoveries, (annualized) as a 
percent of average total loans and lease financing receivables. 
12 elnantr 
Credit loss 
provision to net 
charge-offs 
Provision for possible credit and allocated transfer risk as a percent of net charge-offs. If the 
denominator is less than or equal to zero, then ratio is shown as NA. 
13 iderncvr 
Earnings coverage 
of net charge-offs 
(x) 
Income before income taxes and extraordinary items and other adjustments, plus provisions for 
loan and lease losses and allocated transfer risk reserve, plus gains (losses) on securities not 
held in trading accounts (annualized) divided by net loan and lease charge-offs (annualized). 
This is a number of times ratio (x) not a percentage ratio (%). * if the denominator is less than 
or equal to zero, then ratio is shown as n/a. ris definition = iderncvr = chfla / ntlnlsa  
14 eeffr Efficiency ratio 
Noninterest expense, less the amortization expense of intangible assets, as a percent of the sum 





Total assets in millions of dollars as a percent of the number of full-time equivalent employees. 
16 iddivnir 
Cash dividends to 
net income (ytd 
only)* 
Total of all cash dividends declared (year-to-date, annualized) as a percent of net income (year-
to-date, annualized). * this ratio is not available on a quarterly basis. if the denominator is less 
than or equal to zero, then ratio is shown as N/A. RIS definition = IDDIVNIR = (EQCDIVA / 
NETINCA) *100 
17 lnatresr 
Loss allowance to 
loans 
Allowance for loan and lease losses as a percent of total loan and lease financing receivables, 





Allowance for loan and lease losses as a percent of noncurrent loans and leases. 
19 nperfv 
Noncurrent assets 
plus other real 
estate owned to 
assets 
Noncurrent assets as a percent of total assets.     Noncurrent assets are defined as assets that are 
past due 90 days or more plus assets placed in nonaccrual status plus other real estate owned 




Total noncurrent loans and leases, Loans and leases 90 days or more past due plus loans in 
nonaccrual status,  as a percent of gross loans and leases. 
21 lnlsdepr 
Net loans and 
leases to deposits 
Loans and lease financing receivables net of unearned income, allowances and reserves as a 




Net loans and 
leases to core 
deposits 
Loan and lease financing receivables, net of allowances and reserves, as a percent of core 
deposits. The core deposit definition was changed in March 2011. core deposits held in 
domestic offices now includes: total domestic office deposits minus time deposits of more than 
$250,000 held in domestic offices and brokered deposits of $250,000 or less held in domestic 
offices. Prior to the March 2010, core deposits were calculated as total domestic office deposits 
minus time deposits of $100,000 or more held in domestic offices. RIS definition: IDLNCORR 
= (LNLSNET / COREDEP) *100  
23 eqv 
Equity capital to 
assets 




Tier 1 (core) capital as a percent of average total assets minus ineligible intangibles.   Tier 1 
(core) capital includes: common equity plus noncumulative perpetual preferred stock plus 
minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries less goodwill and other ineligible intangible 
assets. The amount of eligible intangibles (including mortgage servicing rights) included in core 
capital is limited in accordance with supervisory capital regulations. Average total assets used 
in this computation are an average of daily or weekly figures for the quarter. 
25 rbc1rwaj 
Tier 1 risk-based 
capital ratio 
Tier 1 (core) capital as a percent of risk-weighted assets as defined by the appropriate federal 




Total risk based capital as a percent of risk-weighted assets as defined by the appropriate 
federal regulator for prompt corrective action during that time period. 
Net charge-offs to loans 
11-b ntlnlsr 
Net charge-offs to 
loans 
Gross loan and lease financing receivable charge-offs, less gross recoveries, (annualized) as a 
percent of average total loans and lease financing receivables. 
27 ntrer 
% Net Loans 
Charged-off: 
Total real estate 
loans 
Net charged-off loans that are secured by real estate (annualized) as a percent of average total 
real estate loans. 
28 ntrecosr 




Net charged-off construction and land development loans secured by real estate (annualized) as 
a percent of average total construction and land development loans secured by real estate. 
29 ntrenrsr 




Net charged-off loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties (annualized) as a percent of 
average total loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties. 
30 ntremulr 




Net charged-off loans secured by multi-family (5 or more) residential properties (annualized) as 
a percent of average total loans secured by multi-family residential properties. 
30-b ntreresr 
% Net Loans 
Charged-off: 1-4 
family residential 
Net charged-off all loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties (annualized) as a percent 
of average total loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties. 
31 ntrelocr 




Net charged-off revolving, open-end loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties and 
extended under lines of credit (annualized) as a percent of average total revolving, open-end 
loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties and extended under lines of credit. 
32 ntreothr 
All other 1-4 
family - Percent 
of loans charged-
off, net 
Net charged-off all other loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties in domestic offices 
asa percent of all other loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties. Note: prior to march 
2001, listed as a memorandum item 
33 idntcir 




Net charged-off commercial and industrial loans (annualized) as a percent of average total 
commercial and industrial loans. ris definitions: ytd - idntcir = (ntcia/lnci5)* 100 qtr - idntciqr = 
((ntciq * 4) / lnci22) * 100  
34 idntconr 




Net charged-off loans to individuals for household, family and other personal expenditures 
(annualized) as a percent of average total loans to individuals. ris definitions: ytd - idntconr = 
(ntcona/lncon5) * 100 qtr - idntcnqr = ((ntconq * 4) / lncon2) * 100  
35 idntcrdr 
% Net Loans 
Charged-off: 
Credit card loans 
Net charged-off credit card loans to individuals (annualized) as a percent of average total credit 
card and related plan loans. note: prior to 2001, included revolving credit plans other than credit 
cards. ris definitions: ytd - IDNTCRDR = (NTCRCDA/LNCRCD5) * 100 QTR - IDNTCDQR 
= ((NTCRCDQ * 4) / LNCRCD2) * 100 
36 idntcoor 
% Net Loans 
Charged-off: 
Other loans to 
individual 
Net charged-off other loans to individuals for household, family and other personal 
expenditures (annualized) as a percent of average total other loans to individuals. ris definitions: 




% Net Loans 
Charged-off: All 
other loans and 
lease 
Net charged-off loans to depository institutions and acceptances of other banks, loans to foreign 
governments and official institutions, lease financing receivables, loans to finance agricultural 
production and all other loans (annualized) as a percent of average total other loans and leases. 
ris definitions: ytd - idntothr = ((((ntdep + ntforgv + ntother + ntls) * idann) + ntaga) / (lnotci5 
+ lnag5)) * 100 qtr - idntotqr = (((ntdepq + ntforgvq + ntothq + ntlsq + ntagq) * 4) / (lnotci2 + 
lnag22)) * 100 
38 ntcomrer 
% Net Loans 
Charged-
off:Coml. RE not 
secured by RE 
Net charged-off commercial real estate loans not secured by real estate (annualized) as a 
percent of average total commercial real estate loans not secured by real estate. 




Total noncurrent loans and leases, Loans and leases 90 days or more past due plus loans in 





Real estate loans past due 90 days or more plus loans placed in nonaccrual status as a percent of 




uction & land 
development 
Noncurrent construction and land development loans secured as a percent of total construction 






Noncurrent nonfarm nonresidential real estate loans as a percent of total nonfarm nonresidential 






Noncurrent multifamily residential real estate (5 or more) loans as a percent of total multifamily 





Noncurrent loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties (including all 1-4 family loans 
except home equity loans) as a percent of total 1-4 family residential mortgage loans. This only 








Noncurrent revolving, open-end loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties and extended 
under lines of credit as a percent of total revolving, open-end loans secured by 1-4 family 
residential properties and extended under lines of credit held in domestic offices. 
46 ncrereor 
Percent of loans 
noncurrent - All 
other family 
Noncurrent loans secured by 1-4 other properties (includes all 1-4 family loans except home 






Commercial and industrial loans 90 days or more past due and nonaccrual as a percent of total 
commercial and industrial loans. Note: For banks with assets of less than $300 million prior to 
2001, this item includes all other loans (loans to depository institutions, agricultural loans, 






Loans to individuals for household, family and other personal expenditures 90 days or more 
past due and nonaccrual as a percent of total consumer loans. ris definition: idncconr = 




Credit card loans 
Credit card loans to individuals for household, family and other personal expenditures 90 days 
or more past due and nonaccrual as a percent of total credit card and related plan loans. note: 
prior to 2001, included revolving credit plans other than credit cards. ris definition:idnccrdr = 






Other loans to individuals for household, family and other personal expenditures 90 days or 
more past due and nonaccrual as a percent of total other loans to individuals (includes single 
payment, installment and all student loans).<br><br>RIS Definition: IDNCCOOR = 




other loans and 
leases 
Other loans and leases (including loans to depository institutions and acceptances of other 
banks, loans to foreign governements and official institutions, lease financing receivables, and 
loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to farmers) which are 90 days or more 
past due and nonaccrual as a percent of total other loans and leases. ris definition: idncothr = 




mercial RE not 
secured by RE 
Loans to finance commercial real estate, construction and land development activities (not 
secured by real estate) which are 90 days past due or nonaccrual as a percent of total loans to 





partially US Gov. 
guaranteed 
noncurrent loans 
as percent of 
noncurrent 
Noncurrent Loans and leases wholly or partially guaranteed or insured by the U.S. Government 
as a percent of total noncurrent loans and leases. Noncurrent loans and leases are loans that are 
past due 90 days or more or in nonaccrual status. The U.S. Government includes its agencies 
and its government-sponsored agencies. Examples include loans guaranteed by the FDIC 
(through loss-sharing arrangements in FDIC-assisted acquisitions), the Small Business 
Administration, and the Federal Housing Administration. Excluded are loans and leases 
guaranteed or insured by state or local governments, state or local government agencies, foreign 
(non-U.S.) governments, and private agencies or organizations. Also excluded are loans and 
leases collateralized by securities issued by the U.S. Government, including its agencies and its 
government-sponsored agencies. Included in noncurrent total assets. ris definition = idncgtpr 
=(ncgtypar / nclnls) *100  
Net Loans and Leases 
 




Each bank must maintain an allowance (reserve) for loan and lease losses that is adequate to 
absorb estimated credit losses associated with its loan and lease portfolio (which also includes 
off-balance-sheet credit instruments). 
 
lnlsgr 
Total loans and 
leases 




Loans to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures including 
outstanding credit card balances and other secured and unsecured consumer loans. 
56 lnfg 




Loans (including planned and unplanned overdrafts) to foreign governments and official 









All loans (other than those secured by real estate), including overdrafts, to banks, other 
depositoryinstitutions, and other associations, companies, and financial intermediaries whose 
primarybusiness is to accept deposits and to extend credit for business or for personal 
expenditurepurposes.  Also the bank’s holdings of all bankers acceptances accepted by other 
banks thatare not held for trading. Acceptances accepted by other banks may be purchased in 
the openmarket or discounted by the reporting bank.  








All loans (other than those secured by real estate), including overdrafts, to banks, other 
depositoryinstitutions, and other associations, companies, and financial intermediaries whose 
primarybusiness is to accept deposits and to extend credit for business or for personal 
expenditurepurposes.  Also the bank’s holdings of all bankers acceptances accepted by other 
banks thatare not held for trading. Acceptances accepted by other banks may be purchased in 
the openmarket or discounted by the reporting bank.  
58 lndepcb 
To commercial 
banks in U.S. 
Total loans to commercial banks located in the U.S. and acceptances of such banks. Begginning 
in 2001, this item is not reported by institutions with less than $300 million in total assets. 
59 lndepusb 
To U.S. branches 
and agencies of 
foreign banks 
Total loans to U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks and acceptances of such entities.  




institutions in U.S. 
Loans to other depository institutions in the U.S. (other than commercial banks domiciled in the 
U.S.) and acceptances of such entities.  This item is not reported by institutions with less than 
$300 million in total assets. 
61 lndepfc 
To banks in 
foreign countries 
Loans to depository institutions and their branches that are located outside the U.S. and 
acceptances of such entities. This item is not reported by institutions with less than $300 million 
in total assets. 
62 lndepfus 
To foreign 
branches of U.S. 
banks 
Loans to foreign branches of U.S. banks and acceptances of such entities.  This item is not 
reported by institutions with less than $300 million in total assets. 
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63 obsdir Derivatives 
Represents the sum of the following: interest-rate contracts (as defined as the notional value of 
interest-rate swap, futures, forward and option contracts), foreign-exchange-rate contracts, 
commodity contracts and equity contracts (defined similarly to interest-rate contracts).  Futures 
and forward contracts are contracts in which the buyer agrees to purchase and the seller agrees 
to sell, at a specified future date, a specific quantity of underlying at a specified price or yield. 
These contracts exist for a variety of underlyings, including traditional agricultural or physical 
commodities, as well as currencies and interest rates. Futures contracts are standardized and are 
traded on organized exchanges which set limits on counterparty credit exposure. Forward 
contracts do not have standardized terms and are traded over the counter.  Option contracts are 
contracts in which the buyer acquires the right to buy from or sell to another party some 
specified amount of underlying at a stated price (strike price) during a period or on a specified 
future date, in return for compensation (such as a fee or premium). The seller is obligated to 
purchase or sell the underlying at the discretion of the buyer of the contract. Swaps are 
obligations between two parties to exchange a series of cash flows at periodic intervals 
(settlement dates) for a specified period. The cash flows of a swap are either fixed or 
determined for each settlement date by multiplying the quantity of the underlying instrument 
(notional principal) by specified reference rates or prices. Except for currency swaps, the 
notional principal is used to calculate each payment but is not exchanged.  This item is not 
available for TFR Reporters. 
Cash and Balances Due 
64 Chbal 




Total cash and balances due from depository institutions including both interest-bearing and 
noninterest-bearing balances. 
65-a chcic 
Cash items in 
process of 
collection 
Cash items in process of collection, including unposted debits and currency and coin.  
Beginning in 2001, this item is not reported by FFIEC Call filers with less than $300 million in  
total assets. Prior to 2001, this item also includes balances due from federal reserve banks for 
filers with total assets of less than $100 million.  It also includes noninterest-earning deposits 




Cash items in the process of collection and unposted debits (held in domestic offices) which are 
immediately payable upon presentation.  Beginning in 2001, this item is not reported by FFIEC 
Call filers with total assets of less than $300 million. Prior to 2001, this item also includes 
balances due from federal reserve banks for filers with total assets of less than $100 million.   
This item is not filed by TFR Reporters.  
65-c chcoin 
Currency and coin 
in domestic 
offices 
Currency and coin held in domestic offices. 
65-d chus 
Balances due from 
depository 
institutions in U.S. 
Cash balances due from depository institutions in U.S. include all interest-bearing and 
noninterest-bearing balances whether in the form of demand, savings or time balances, 
including certificates of deposit but excluding certificates of deposit held for trading. Beginning 
in 2001, this item is not reported by FFIEC Call filers with total assets of less than $300 
million. 
65-e chfrb 
Balances due from 
FRB 
The total cash balances due from Federal Reserve Banks as shown by the reporting banks 
books.  This amount includes reserves and other balances. Beginning in 2001, this item is not 
reported by FFIEC Call filers with total assets of less than $300 million. Prior to 2001, this item 
was reported in the Cash and balances due categories for FFIEC Call Report filers with total 
assets of less than $100 million.   This item is not filed by TFR Reporters.  
66 dep Total deposits 
The sum of all deposits including demand deposits, money market deposits, other savings 
deposits, time deposits and deposits in foreign offices. 
67 asset Total assets 
The sum of all assets owned by the institution including cash, loans, securities, bank premises 
















ADF KPSS NG-PERRON 
1 intincy I(0), 5%
52 I(0), 5%53 I(0), 5%54 




I(0), 5% I(1), 5% 
I(0), 10% 
4 noniiy I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
5 nonixy I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 




I(0), 5% I(1), 5% 
I(0), 10% 
8 roaptx I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
9 roe I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
10 roeinjr I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
11 ntlnlsr 













I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
15 astempm 














I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 




I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
21 lnlsdepr 
I(0), 5% I(1), 5% 
I(0), 10% 
I(0), 5% 
22 idlncorr I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
23 eqv I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
24 rbc1aaj I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
                                                 
 
52
 I(0), 5%: The null hypothesis- The variable contains a unit root- can be rejected using 95% confidence intervals  
under method of the ADF test; therefore, the series are found to be stationary in their levels.  
I(1), 5%: The null hypothesis- The variable contains a unit root- can be rejected using 95% confidence intervals  
under method of the ADF test; therefore, the series are found to be stationary in their first difference. 
 
53
 I(0), 5%: The null hypothesis- The variable is trend stationary- cannot be rejected using 95% confidence intervals  
under method of the KPSS test; therefore, the series are found to be stationary in their levels.  
I(1), 5%: The null hypothesis- The variable is trend stationary- cannot be rejected using 95% confidence intervals  
under method of the KPSS test; therefore, the series are found to be stationary in their first difference. 
 
54
 I(0), 5%: The null hypothesis- The variable contains a unit root- can be rejected using 95% confidence intervals  
under method of the Ng-perron test; therefore, the series are found to be stationary in their levels.  
I(1), 5%: The null hypothesis- The variable contains a unit root- can be rejected using 95% confidence intervals  




25 rbc1rwaj I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
26 rbcrwaj I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
11-b ntlnlsr I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
27 ntrer I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
28 ntrecosr I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
29 ntrenrsr I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
30 ntremulr I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
30-b ntreresr I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
31 ntrelocr I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
32 ntreothr I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
33 idntcir I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
34 idntconr I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
35 idntcrdr I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 















39 nclnlsr I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
40 ncrer I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
41 ncreconr I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
42 ncrenrer I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
43 ncremulr I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 




I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
46 ncrereor I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
47 idnccir I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
48 idncconr I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
49 idnccrdr 
I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(1), 5% 
I(0), 10% 
50 idnccoor 
I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
I(0), 10% 
51 idncothr I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
52 nccomrer I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
53 idncgtpr 
I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
I(0), 10% 
 
lnlsnet    
54 lnatres I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
 
Lnlsgr= TL    
55 lncon I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
56 lnfg    
57 lndepac 





   
58 lndepcb I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
59 lndepusb I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
60 lndepus I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
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61 lndepfc I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
62 lndepfus 
I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
I(0), 10% 
63 obsdir I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
64 chbal 
I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
I(0), 10% 
65-a chcic I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
65-b chitem I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
65-c chcoin I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
65-d chus I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
 
chusfbk    
 
chnus    
 
chnusfbk    
65-e chfrb I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
 
chbalni    
66-a chcic I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
66-b chitem I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
66-c chcoin I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
66-d chus 
I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
I(0), 10% 
 chusfbk    
 chnus    
 chnusfbk    
66-e chfrb I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
 chbalni    
67 chbal I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
68-a chcic I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
68-b chitem I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(1), 5% 
68-c chcoin I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
68-d chus I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
68-e chfrb I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(0), 5% 
69-a chcic I(0), 5% I(0), 5% I(0), 5% 
69-b chitem I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(0), 5% 
69-c chcoin I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(0), 5% 
69-d chus I(1), 5% I(1), 5% I(0), 5% 
























CHOW TEST BAI_PERRON 
TEST 
Zivot-Andrews Test 
Break point t-statistic 
1 intincy 2001Q4 2001Q4 N
55 2008Q1 2001Q1 -5.088595 
2 intexpy 2008Q1 2001Q4 N  1995Q2 2001Q2 -4.856170 
3 nimy 2003Q2 2007Q1 Y 2004Q1 2008Q1 -4.751490 
4 noniiy 2003Q3 2008Q1 Y 2008Q1 2002Q3 -6.587520 
5 nonixy 2007Q4 1996Q1 Y 1996Q1/2007Q4 1997Q3 -3.585799 
6 noijy 2010Q1 2007Q4 Y 1998Q4/2007Q4 2004Q1 -3.919833 
7 roa 1998Q4 2007Q4 Y 2007Q4/2010Q1 2004Q1 -3.848268 
8 roaptx 2005Q2 2005Q2 Y 2005Q2 2005Q2  
9 roe 2003Q2 2003Q2 Y 2003Q2 2003Q2  
10 roeinjr 2010Q1 2010Q1 N 2010Q1 2010Q1  
11 ntlnlsr 2009Q2 2009Q2 Y 2009Q2 2009Q2  
12 elnantr 1994Q4 1994Q4 Y 1994Q4 1999Q4  
13 iderncvr 2007Q1 2007Q1 Y 2007Q1 2007Q1  
14 eeffr 2010Q1 2010Q1 Y 2010Q1 2010Q1  
15 astempm 2009Q3 2009Q3 Y 2009Q3 2009Q3  
16 iddivnir 2009Q2 2009Q2 Y 2009Q2 2009Q2  
17 lnatresr 2007Q4 2007Q4 Y 2007Q4 2007Q4  
18 lnresncr 2007Q1 2007Q1 Y 2007Q1 2007Q1  
19 nperfv 2006Q2 2006Q2 Y 2006Q2 2008Q2  
20 nclnlsr 2007Q3 2007Q3 Y 2007Q3 2007Q3  
21 lnlsdepr 











23 eqv 2009Q3 2009Q3 Y 2009Q3 2009Q3  
24 rbc1aaj 2009Q3 2009Q3 Y 2009Q3 2009Q3  
25 rbc1rwaj 1997Q1 1994Q4 N 1997Q1/1994Q4 1994Q4  
26 rbcrwaj 2009Q1 2009Q1 Y 2009Q1 2009Q1  
11-b ntlnlsr 2008Q3 2008Q3 Y 2008Q3 2008Q3  
27 ntrer 2009Q2 2009Q2 N 2009Q2 2009Q2  
28 ntrecosr 2009Q2 2008Q3 N 2008Q3/2009Q2 2008Q3  
29 ntrenrsr 1995Q3 2008Q4 Y 1995Q3/2008Q4 2008Q4  
30 ntremulr 2008Q4 2008Q4 Y 2008Q4 2008Q4  
                                                 
 
55
 N: The null hypothesis- this is no break point - cannot be rejected under method of QUANDT-ANDRES 
UNKNOWN BREAKPOINT TEST; therefore, there is no breakpoint.  
Y: The null hypothesis- this is no break point – can be rejected under method of QUANDT-ANDRES UNKNOWN 
BREAKPOINT TEST; therefore, there is a breakpoint.  





























































39 nclnlsr 2009Q4 2009Q4 Y 2009Q4 2009Q4  
40 ncrer 2008Q1 2008Q1 Y 2008Q1 2008Q1  
41 ncreconr 2008Q1 2008Q1 Y 2008Q1 2008Q1  
42 ncrenrer 2008Q3 2008Q3 Y 2008Q3 2008Q3  
43 ncremulr 1998Q1 1998Q1 Y 1998Q1 1998Q1  




1997Q2 1997Q2 Y 1997Q2 1997Q2  
























50 idnccoor 1997Q1 1997Q1 N 1997Q1 1997Q1  
51 idncothr 1998Q1 1998Q1 N 1998Q1 1998Q1  
52 nccomrer 2008Q1 2008Q1 Y 2008Q1 2008Q1  
53 idncgtpr 2009Q1 2009Q1 Y 2009Q1 2009Q1  
 
lnlsnet       
54 lnatres 2009Q1 2009Q1 N 2009Q1 2009Q1  
 
Lnlsgr= TL       
55 lncon 1997Q4 1997Q4 N 1997Q4 1997Q4  




















      
58 lndepcb 2009Q2 2009Q2 N 2009Q2 2009Q2  
59 lndepusb 2006Q1 2006Q1 Y 2006Q1 2006Q1  
60 lndepus 2006Q1 2006Q1 Y 2006Q1 2006Q1  
61 lndepfc 2001Q2 2001Q2 Y 2001Q2 2001Q2  
62 lndepfus 2006Q4 2006Q4 Y 2006Q4 2006Q4  
63 obsdir 1998Q3 1998Q3 Y 1998Q3 1998Q3  
64 chbal 2008Q4 2008Q4 N 2008Q4 2008Q4  
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65-a chcic 2001Q3 2001Q3 Y 2001Q3 2001Q3  
65-b chitem 2001Q2 2001Q2 N 2001Q2 2001Q2  
65-c chcoin 2000Q4 2000Q4 Y 2000Q4 2000Q4  
65-d chus 2001Q3 2001Q3 Y 2001Q3 2001Q3  
 
chusfbk       
 
chnus       
 












chbalni       
66-a chcic 2000Q2 2000Q2 Y 2000Q2 2000Q2  
66-b chitem 2001Q3 2001Q3 N 2001Q3 2001Q3  
66-c chcoin 2000Q2 2000Q2 Y 2000Q2 2000Q2  
66-d chus 2001Q2 2001Q2 Y 2001Q2 2001Q2  
 chusfbk       
 chnus       



















1997Q1   
68-a chcic 2000Q2 2000Q2 Y 2000Q2 2009Q2  
68-b chitem 2001Q2 2001Q2 Y 2001Q2 2010Q2  
68-c chcoin 2000Q2 2000Q2 Y 2000Q2 2000Q2  









69-a chcic 2000Q1 2000Q1 N 2000Q1 2000Q1  
69-b chitem 2001Q2 2001Q2 Y 2001Q2 2001Q2  
69-c chcoin 2000Q2 2000Q2 Y 2000Q2 2000Q2  






















One Break  Lee Strazicich Test Two- Break  Lee Strazicich Test 
model t-statistics Break date model t-statistics 
 
Break date1 Break date2 
1 intincy C -4.6202 1998Q4 C -5.5008 2001Q3 2006Q2 
2 intexpy C -4.1928 2005Q3 C -5.4089 2001Q3 2006Q3 
3 nimy C -4.6431 2007Q3 C -6.1227 2004Q1 2007Q4 
4 noniiy C -3.3568 2002Q3 C -6.3870 2000Q4 2003Q3 
5 nonixy C -4.1901 1995Q4 C -6.6133 1996Q1 2007Q4 
6 noijy C -3.9191 2004Q1 C -5.9103 1998Q4 2007Q4 
7 roa C -4.0127 2004Q1 C -6.1291 2006Q4 2010Q1 
8 roaptx C  2005Q2 C  2001Q4 2005Q2 
9 roe C  2003Q2 C  1998Q1 2003Q2 
10 roeinjr C  2010Q1 C  1994Q4 2010Q1 
11 ntlnlsr C  2009Q2 C  2009Q1 2009Q2 
12 elnantr C  1994Q4 C  2008Q3 1994Q4 
13 iderncvr C  2007Q1 C  2009Q2 2007Q1 
14 eeffr C  2010Q1 C  2008Q3 2010Q1 
15 astempm C  2009Q3 C  2008Q4 2009Q3 
16 iddivnir C  2009Q2 C  2008Q4 2009Q2 
17 lnatresr C  2007Q4 C  1996Q1 2007Q4 
18 lnresncr C  2007Q1 C  1998Q4 2007Q1 
19 nperfv C  2006Q2 C  1996Q4 2006Q2 
20 nclnlsr C  2007Q3 C  2000Q1 2007Q3 
21 lnlsdepr C  2009Q3 C  1995Q2 2009Q3 
22 idlncorr C  2009Q2 C  2009Q2 2009Q3 
23 eqv C  2009Q3 C  2001Q3 2009Q3 
24 rbc1aaj C  2009Q3 C  2007Q1 2009Q3 
25 rbc1rwaj C  1994Q4 C  1997Q1 1994Q4 
26 rbcrwaj C  2009Q1 C  2007Q1 2009Q1 
11-b ntlnlsr C  2008Q3 C  1994Q3 2008Q3 
27 ntrer C  2009Q2 C  2006Q1 2009Q2 
28 ntrecosr C  2008Q3 C  2008Q3 2009Q2 
29 ntrenrsr C  2008Q4 C  1995Q3 2008Q4 
30 ntremulr C  2008Q4 C  2009Q1 2008Q4 
30-b ntreresr C  2001Q3 C  1994Q1 2001Q3 
31 ntrelocr 
C  2008Q4 
 
C  2008Q4 2009Q1 
32 ntreothr 
C  1996Q2 
 
C  1994Q2 1994Q2 
 
33 idntcir C  1999Q2 C  1994Q1 1999Q2 
34 idntconr 
C  1997Q2 
 
C  1996Q2 1997Q2 
35 idntcrdr C  2003Q1 C  1999Q4 2003Q1 
36 idntcoor 




37 idntothr C  1999Q3 C  2006Q2 1999Q3 
38 ntcomrer 
C  2008Q4 
 
C  1994Q1 2009Q2 
 
39 nclnlsr C  2009Q4 C  2008Q4 2009Q4 
40 ncrer C  2008Q1 C  1998Q4 2008Q1 
41 ncreconr C  2008Q1 C  1996Q1 2008Q1 
42 ncrenrer C  2008Q3 C  1998Q4 2008Q3 
43 ncremulr C  1998Q1 C  1996Q4 1998Q1 




C  1997Q2 C  2007Q4 1997Q2 
46 ncrereor C  2008Q4 C  2001Q3 2008Q4 
47 idnccir 
C  2008Q3 
 
C  2009Q1 2008Q3 
48 idncconr C  1996Q4 C  1994Q1 1996Q4 
49 idnccrdr 
C  2001Q1 
 
C  2001Q2 2009Q4   
50 idnccoor C  1997Q1 C  2008Q1 1997Q1 
51 idncothr C  1998Q1 C  1994Q4 1998Q1 
52 nccomrer C  2008Q1 C  1999Q1 2008Q1 
53 idncgtpr C  2009Q1 C  2008Q3 2009Q1 
 
lnlsnet C   C  2009Q2  
54 lnatres C  2009Q1 C  2008Q3 2009Q1 
 
Lnlsgr= TL C   C  2008Q4  
55 lncon C  1997Q4 C  2008Q4 1997Q4 
56 lnfg C   C  1996Q1  
57 lndepac 
C  2008Q3 
 
 






C   C  1996Q4  
58 lndepcb C  2009Q2 C  2000Q1 2009Q2 
59 lndepusb C  2006Q1 C  1995Q2 2006Q1 
60 lndepus C  2006Q1 C  2009Q2 2006Q1 
61 lndepfc C  2001Q2 C  2009Q3 2001Q2 
62 lndepfus C  2006Q4 C  2008Q3 2006Q4 
63 obsdir C  1998Q3 C  1996Q4 1998Q3 
64 chbal C  2008Q4 C  2009Q4   2008Q4 
65-a chcic C  2001Q3 C  1997Q1 2001Q3 
65-b chitem C  2001Q2 C  1998Q1 2001Q2 
65-c chcoin C  2000Q4 C  2008Q1 2000Q4 
65-d chus C  2001Q3 C  2009Q1 2001Q3 
 
chusfbk C   C    
 
chnus C   C  2009Q1 1994Q1 
 
chnusfbk C   C    
65-e chfrb 
C  2009Q4 
 
C  1998Q1 2009Q4 
 
chbalni C   C    
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66-a chcic C  2000Q2 C  1994Q3 2000Q2 
66-b chitem C  2001Q3 C  1999Q1 2001Q3 
66-c chcoin C  2000Q2 C  2008Q4 2000Q2 
66-d chus C  2001Q2 C  2008Q4 2001Q2 
 chusfbk C   C    
 chnus C   C    
 chnusfbk C   C    
66-e chfrb C  2010Q2 C  2009Q1 2010Q2 
 chbalni C   C    
67 chbal 
C  1997Q1 
 
C  1995Q1 2008Q4 
68-a chcic C  2000Q2 C  1999Q4 2000Q2 
68-b chitem C  2001Q2 C  2008Q4 2001Q2 
68-c chcoin C  2000Q2 C  2007Q4 2000Q2 
68-d chus C  2001Q2 C  2008Q1 2001Q2 
68-e chfrb 
C  2009Q1 
 
C  2009Q1 2010Q2 
69-a chcic C  2000Q1 C  2007Q4 2000Q1 
69-b chitem C  2001Q2 C  2007Q2 2001Q2 
69-c chcoin C  2000Q2 C  2008Q1 2000Q2 
69-d chus C  2001Q2 C  2009Q2 2001Q2 
69-e chfrb 
C  2008Q4 
 

















Appendix 5: Estimated regression with a structural break 
** and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. TB denotes the break date found by 
using Maximum LR/Wald F-statistic. 
 
NO. Ratios 
Break point Coefficients 
Constant (α) Dummy in level (D) Time trend (t) Dummy in trend (Dt) 
















































































































































Retained earnings to 





























































Cash dividends to net 






























Noncurrent assets plus 











Noncurrent loans to 
loans 
2007Q3 Nil Nil Nil Nil 
21 















































































% Net Loans Charged-


















-0.055      -0.258 
(-0.031)   (-0.142) 
-0.001** 
(-3.340) 
0.002        0.005 
(0.065)    (0.186) 
29 
% Net Loans Charged-






-4.681**   2.889 
(-7.895)    (0.586) 
-0.328** 
(-4.778) 
0.338**   -0.005 
(4.887)    (-0.070) 
30 












% Net Loans Charged-











% Net Loans Charged-




















All other 1-4 family - 





















% Net Loans Charged-











% Net Loans Charged-










% Net Loans Charged-










% Net Loans Charged-























% Net Loans Charged-











% Net Loans Charged-
off:Coml. RE not 









































% Loans Noncurrent: 






















% Loans Noncurrent: 





















% Loans Noncurrent: 1-











% Loans Noncurrent: 










Percent of loans 



































% Loans Noncurrent: 










% Loans Noncurrent: 


















% Loans Noncurrent: 











% Loans Noncurrent: All 










% Loans Noncurrent: 
Commercial RE not 










Wholly or partially US 
Gov. guaranteed 
noncurrent loans as 









 Net loans and leases=TL     
54 





-0.004**                     0.029** 
(-12.337)                    (5.616) 
 Total loans and leases     
55 





-0.059**                       -0.089** 
(-4.282)                         (-6.201) 
56 Loans to foreign 
governments and official 
institutions 
    
57 Loans to depository 
institutions and 









0.014                             -0.046* 
(5.630)                           (-1.688) 
 Loans to depository 
institutions and 
acceptances of other 
banks=TD 
    






0.205**                           -0.438** 
(18.696)                            (-2.098) 
59 To U.S. branches and 






-0.0143 *                         -0.073** 
(-1.617)                             (-2.196) 
60 To other depository 





-0.051**                           -0.057 
(-4.512)                             (-0.057) 






0.179 **                            -0.214** 
(6.135)                               (-5.847) 






-0.004*                             -0.004 







0.202*                              -0.262** 
(1.765)                               (-2.193) 
64 













































Balances due from 











U.S. branches of foreign 
banks 
     
 
Balances due from 
foreign banks 




Foreign branches of U.S. 
banks 
     
65-e 























     
66-a 

































Balances due from 











U.S. branches of foreign 
banks 
     
 
Balances due from 
foreign banks 
     
 
Foreign branches of U.S. 
banks 
     
66-e 
























     
67 
































Cash items in process of 

































Balances due from 
depository institutions in 































Cash items in process of 
collection / cash due 










Collection in domestic 











Currency and coin in 
domestic offices/ cash 










Balances due from 
depository institutions in 











Balances due from FRB/ 






















Appendix 6: summary of changes around break point 
Summary of changes 
NO. code ratios 
Break point 
 
Slope change Jump? 
1 intincy Yield on earning assets 2008q1 ---      →       ---  --- ↑ 
2 intexpy 
Cost of funding earning 
assets 
2008Q1 ---      →       ---  --- ↑ 
3 nimy Net interest margin 2003Q2 0 0 
4 noniiy 
Noninterest income to 
earning assets 
2003Q3 0      →       ---  --- ↑ 
5 nonixy 
Noninterest expense to 
earning assets 
1995Q3/Q4 ---      →       + ↓ 
6 noijy 
Net operating income to 
assets 
2010Q1 ---      →       0 0 
7 roa Return on assets (ROA) 
1995Q2 0                    ↑ 
2009Q4 N Y 
 
---      →       0 0 
2010Q1 N Y  ---      →       0 0 
8 roaptx Pretax return on assets 
2005Q2 0      →       ---  --- ↑ 
2009Q4 N Y 
 
---      →       0 0 
2010Q1 N Y  ---      →       0 0 
9 roe Return on Equity (ROE) 
2003Q2 0      →       ---  --- ↑ 
2009Q4 N Y 
 
---      →       0 0 
2010Q1 N Y  ---      →       0 0 
10 roeinjr 
Retained earnings to average 
equity (ytd only) 
2010Q1 ---      →       0 0 
 
11 ntlnlsr Net charge-offs to loans 2009Q2 0 0 
12 elnantr 
Credit loss provision to net 
charge-offs 
1994Q4 0 0 
13 iderncvr 
Earnings coverage of net 
charge-offs (x) 
2007Q1 +      →       ---  --- ↓ 
14 eeffr Efficiency ratio 
2010Q1 +      →       0 0 
 
15 astempm 
Assets per employee 
($millions) 
2009Q3 +      →       0 0 
 
16 iddivnir 
Cash dividends to net income 
(ytd only)* 
2009Q2 0 0 
17 lnatresr Loss allowance to loans 2007Q4 --- ---  →       + + ↑ tiny 
18 lnresncr 
Loan loss allowance to 
noncurrent loans 
2007Q1 +      →       ---  --- ↓ 
19 nperfv 
Noncurrent assets plus other 
real estate owned to assets 
2006Q2 ---      →       + + ↑ tiny 
 
20 nclnlsr Noncurrent loans to loans 2007Q3   
21 lnlsdepr 
Net loans and leases to 
deposits 
2009Q3 +   +   →       ---  --- ↓ 
22 idlncorr 




+   +   →       ---  --- ↓ 
23 eqv Equity capital to assets 2009Q3 +      →       + + ↓ 
24 rbc1aaj Core capital (leverage) ratio 2009Q3 +      →       + + ↓ 




26 rbcrwaj Total risk-based capital ratio 2009Q1 --- ---  →       + + ↓ tiny 
11-b ntlnlsr Net charge-offs to loans 2008Q3 0 0 
27 ntrer 
% Net Loans Charged-off: 
Total real estate loans 









---  →      0→       0 0                
0 
29 ntrenrsr 
% Net Loans Charged-off: 
Commercial real estate 
1995Q3/2008
Q4 
---     →    + →     0  ↓ tiny         
0 
30 ntremulr 
% Net Loans Charged-off: 
Multi-family residential  
2008Q4 0 0 
30-b ntreresr 
% Net Loans Charged-off: 1-
4 family residential 
2001Q3 0      →       + + ↓ 
31 ntrelocr 
% Net Loans Charged-off: 




2009Q1(5/10) 0 0 
32 ntreothr 
All other 1-4 family - Percent 
of loans charged-off, net 
1996Q2(15) 
 
--- ---  →       + + ↓ 
1994Q2(5) 0 ↓ 
33 idntcir 
% Net Loans Charged-off: 
Commercial and industrial 
1999Q2 +   +   →      + 0 
34 idntconr 
% Net Loans Charged-off: 
Loans to individuals 
1996Q2(5) 0 ↑ 
35 idntcrdr 
% Net Loans Charged-off: 
Credit card loans 
2003Q1 ---      →       +  ↓ 
36 idntcoor 
% Net Loans Charged-off: 
Other loans to individual 
1997Q1(15) 
 
0      →       ---  --- ↑ 
2010Q2(5) 
 
---      →       0 0 
37 idntothr 
% Net Loans Charged-off: 
All other loans and lease 
1999Q3 0 0 
38 ntcomrer 
% Net Loans Charged-








1994Q1 0 ↓ 
39 nclnlsr Noncurrent loans to loans 2009Q4 0 0 
40 ncrer 
% Loans Noncurrent: Real 
estate loans 





2008Q1 --- ---  →       + + ↑ 
42 ncrenrer 
% Loans Noncurrent: 
Commercial real estate 
2008Q3 --- ---  →       + + 0 
43 ncremulr 
% Loans Noncurrent: 
Multifamily residential 
1998Q1 --- ---  →       + + ↓ 
44 ncreresr 
% Loans Noncurrent: 1-4 
family residential 




% Loans Noncurrent: Home 
equity loans 
1997Q2 0 ↓ 
46 ncrereor 
Percent of loans noncurrent - 
All other family 







---      →       0 0 
2009Q1(5) ---      →       0 0 
48 idncconr 
% Loans Noncurrent: Loans 
to individuals 
1996Q4 ---      →       0 0 
49 idnccrdr 




+   +   →     -- 
(close to flat) 
↑ 
2009Q4  5 +   +   →     -- -- ↑↓ 
50 idnccoor 
% Loans Noncurrent: Other 
loans to individuals 
1997Q1 0 ↑ 
51 idncothr 
% Loans Noncurrent: All 
other loans and leases 




not secured by RE 




Wholly or partially US Gov. 
guaranteed noncurrent loans 
as percent of noncurrent 
2009Q1 ---      →       0 0 
 
lnlsnet Net loans and leases    
54 lnatres Loan loss allowance/TL 2009Q1 ---     →       + + ↑ 
 
Lnlsgr= TL Total loans and leases    
55 lncon Loans to individuals/TL 1997Q4 ---      →       ---  --- ↓ 
56 lnfg 
Loans to foreign 
governments and official 
institutions 
   
57 lndepac 
Loans to depository 
institutions and acceptances 








Loans to depository 
institutions and acceptances 
of other banks 
   
58 lndepcb 
To commercial banks in 
U.S./TDI 
2009Q2 +   +   →     -- -- 0 
59 lndepusb 
To U.S. branches and 
agencies of foreign 
banks/TDI 
2006Q1 0       →       ---  --- ↑ 
60 lndepus 
To other depository 
institutions in U.S./TDI 
2006Q1 +       →     0 0 
61 lndepfc 
To banks in foreign 
countries/TDI 




To foreign branches of U.S. 
banks/TDI 
2006Q4 ---      →       0 0 
63 obsdir Derivatives/TA 1998Q3 0       →       ---   0 
64 chbal 
Cash & Balances due from 
depository institutions/TA 
2008Q4 ---     →       + + ↑ 
65-a chcic 
Cash items in process of 
collection/TA 




Collection in domestic 
offices/TA 
2001Q2 +   +   →     -- -- ↓ 
65-c chcoin 
Currency and coin in 
domestic offices/TA 
2000Q4 +   +   →     -- 0 
65-d chus 
Balances due from 
depository institutions in 
U.S. /TA 
2001Q3 ---     →       + + ↓ 
 
chusfbk 
U.S. branches of foreign 
banks 
   
 
chnus 
Balances due from foreign 
banks 
   
 
chnusfbk 
Foreign branches of U.S. 
banks 
   
65-e chfrb Balances due from FRB/TA 
1998Q1(15) 
 
0     →       + ↓ 





   
66-a chcic 
Cash items in process of 
collection/TA 
2000Q2 +       →     -- 0 
66-b chitem 
Collection in domestic 
offices/TA 
2001Q3 +   +   →     -- -- ↑ 
66-c chcoin 
Currency and coin in 
domestic offices/TA 
2000Q2 +       →     -- 0 
 
66-d chus 
Balances due from 
depository institutions in 
U.S. /TA 
2001Q2 ---     →       + + ↓ 
 chusfbk 
U.S. branches of foreign 
banks 
   
 chnus 
Balances due from foreign 
banks 
   
 chnusfbk 
Foreign branches of U.S. 
banks 
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---     →       + + ↑ 




   
67 chbal 









2008Q4 ---     →       + + ↑ 
68-a chcic 
Cash items in process of 
collection /Total deposit 
2000Q2 +      →      ---   ↑ 
68-b chitem 
Collection in domestic 
offices/Total deposit 
2001Q2 0      →      ---   ↑↑ 
68-c chcoin 
Currency and coin in 
domestic offices/Total 
deposit 
2000Q2 +      →      ---   0 
68-d chus 
Balances due from 
depository institutions in 
U.S. /Total deposit 
2001Q2 ---     →       + ↓ 
68-e chfrb 




---     →       + + ↑ 
2010Q2(5) +  →       0 0 
69-a chcic 
Cash items in process of 
collection / cash due from 
depository  
2000Q1 +   +   →     -- -- ↑ 
69-b chitem 
Collection in domestic 
offices/ cash due from 
depository 
2001Q2 +   +   →     -- -- ↑↑ 
69-c chcoin 
Currency and coin in 
domestic offices/ cash due 
from depository 
2000Q2 +       →     -- ↓ 
69-d chus 
Balances due from 
depository institutions in 
U.S. / cash due from 
depository 
2001Q2 ---     →       + ↓ 
69-e chfrb 
Balances due from FRB/ 
cash due from depository 
2008Q4(15) 
 
---     →       + + ↑ 











































































































































































































































































Credit growth  ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Domestic credit to the private sector/GDP 
Capital inflows 
Real exchange rate 
 



























  ■ 
‘Northern’ output growth 
Budget surplus 
GDP/capita 
Deposits at banks/GDP 
Gross foreign liabilities/GDP 




























Banking sector loans to nonbank deposits 
 
Growth in GDP/capita 
 
Residential property prices 
 
Stock price index 










Region , country, or OECD  dummy 
 
Industry concentration 
■   ■     
■ 
  
‘Law and order’ index 
 








     




Moral hazard index 
































































Appendix 8: Overview of the FSIs (IMF, 2013) 
1. Financial Soundness Indicators: index of Summaries 
 
 
2. Financial Soundness Indicators: Reporting Countries and Economies 
 
























1 intincy 2001Q1 2008Q4 N 2008Q1 2001Q4 
2 intexpy 2001Q2 2001Q4 Y 1995Q2 2001Q2 
3 nimy 2008Q1 2007Q1 Y 2004Q1 2008Q1 
4 noniiy 2002Q3 2008Q1 Y 2008Q1 2002Q3 
5 nonixy 1997Q3 1996Q1 Y 2008Q4 1997Q3 
6 noijy 2010Q1 2007Q4 N 2007Q4 2004Q1 
7 roa 1998Q4 2007Q4 Y 2007Q3 2004Q1 
8 roaptx 2005Q2 2005Q2 Y 2005Q2 2005Q2 
9 roe 2003Q2 2010Q1 Y 2003Q2 2003Q2 
10 roeinjr 2010Q1 2009Q2 Y 2010Q1 2010Q1 
11 ntlnlsr 2009Q2 1994Q4 N 2009Q2 2009Q2 
12 elnantr 1994Q4 2007Q1 Y 1994Q4 1994Q4 
13 iderncvr 2007Q1 2010Q1 Y 2007Q1 2007Q1 
14 eeffr 2010Q1 2009Q3 Y 2010Q1 2010Q1 
15 astempm 2008Q4 2009Q2 Y 2009Q3 2009Q3 
16 iddivnir 2009Q2 2007Q4 Y 2009Q2 2009Q2 
17 lnatresr 2007Q4 2007Q1 N 2007Q4 2007Q4 
18 lnresncr 2006Q3 2006Q2 Y 2007Q4 2006Q3 
19 nperfv 2006Q2 2006Q2 Y 2006Q2 2008Q2 
20 nclnlsr 2007Q3 2007Q3 Y 2007Q3 2007Q3 




22 idlncorr 2010Q1 2009Q2 
N  2009Q3 
2009Q2 
N 2009Q2 
23 eqv 2009Q3 2009Q3 N 2008Q4 2008Q4 
24 rbc1aaj 2009Q3 2009Q3 Y 2010Q1 2009Q3 
25 rbc1rwaj 1997Q1 1994Q4 N 2010Q1 1994Q4 
26 rbcrwaj 2009Q1 2009Q1 Y 2009Q1 2009Q1 
11-b ntlnlsr 2008Q3 2008Q3 Y 2008Q3 2008Q3 
27 ntrer 2009Q2 2009Q2 Y 2009Q2 2008Q4 
28 ntrecosr 2009Q2 2010Q1 N 2010Q1 2008Q3 
29 ntrenrsr 1995Q3 2008Q4 Y 2010Q1 2008Q4 
30 ntremulr 2008Q4 2008Q4 Y 2008Q4 2008Q4 
30-b ntreresr 2001Q3 2001Q3 N 2001Q3 2001Q3 






Appendix 10 for Chapter 3: Three-stage Process of 2007/08 Financial Crisis  
The 2007/08 financial crisis was characterized by non-bank FIs acting as one of the 
main triggers of the distress, the so-called “the non-bank clue” (FCIC, 2010), which is a 
novel property of the financial crash and is presented below as a three-stage process. 
 
Stage 1 - Liquidity crisis of 2007 
In the financial markets, the first casualties were subprime mortgage lenders, investment 
funds that focused on the subprime mortgage market, and ABCP programs with 
subprime exposure. Concerns spread to hedge funds and commercial paper programs 
during the summer, and in August global central banks took unprecedented steps to 
loosen monetary conditions and to provide liquidity to the CO markets. 
 
By the end of 2007, most independent subprime mortgage lenders that relied on 
securitisation markets for their funding had failed or had been acquired. American 
Home Mortgage Corp., the 8
th
 largest prime mortgage originator with a $3.3 billion 
ABCP program, announced it could not fund its obligations on July 31, 2007, and 
declared bankruptcy on August 6. In early 2007, two hedge funds run by Bear Stearns 
Asset Management began to experience rising client redemptions following weakening 
returns. Both these funds were heavily invested in subprime assets and declared 
bankruptcy by the end of July. By the summer of 2007, uncertainty in the value of MBS 
and CDOs began to have more severe effects on the commercial paper market and on 
the money market, in which financial institutions lend to each other. 
 
Stage 2 - The run on Bear Stearns in early 2008 
As mortgage default rates increased and asset-based securities lost value, financial 
guarantors faced mounting payment obligations. In November an December 2007, the 
three leading credit rating agencies issued credit outlook warnings or placed on negative 
watch the top financial ratings of several financial guarantors because of the companies’ 
exposures to CDOs through credit default swaps. The collapse of the investment bank 
Bear Stearns was the next major crisis in the shadow banking system. It was unable to 
meet its obligations in March 2008. It arranged an emergency bridge loan from the 
Federal Reserve but after failing to secure additional capital, it was purchased by JP 




Stage 3 - The panic of 2008 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was the final trigger that froze the 
shadow banking system. Its failure had repercussions for many components of shadow 
banking system and the traditional banking system. Most notably, withdrawals 
increased substantially at money funds, commercial paper markets came under pressure 
and certain hedge funds also suffered. In sum, the 2007 financial crisis was triggered 
mainly due to the process of the expansion of credit risks through securitisation. First, 
banks sold the mortgages through securitisation in the form of Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (MBS) to other market participants. MBS was then sold by financial 
institutions to the financial markets as Asset-backed securities (ABS), which can be 
classified into different tranches as the so-called Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDOs). Tranches of the CDOs constituted the underlying of Credit Default Swap 
(CDS), the transactions of which was increasingly active before the distress. Credit 
derivatives were popular before the crisis as they provided relatively high returns. 
However, once the bubble of the subprime mortgage market collapsed, every financial 
institution involved in the housing market and the relevant credit derivatives of MBS, 




























Observation date Z-score LN(Z-score) 
29/12/1992 19.87 2.989211057 
31/12/1993 20.01 2.996232149 
31/12/1994 20.79 3.034472102 
31/12/1995 20.69 3.029650492 
31/12/1996 20.62 3.026261479 
31/12/1997 21.06 3.047375507 
31/12/1998 21.50 3.067983165 
31/12/1999 20.63 3.026940201 
31/12/2000 21.90 3.086372475 
31/12/2001 22.52 3.114181754 
31/12/2002 22.47 3.112069821 
31/12/2003 24.29 3.190126495 
31/12/2004 24.23 3.187385158 
31/12/2005 24.31 3.190908356 
31/12/2006 23.32 3.149418561 
31/12/2007 19.19 2.954389316 
31/12/2008 23.41 3.153077844 
31/12/2009 25.36 3.232995669 
31/12/2010 25.64 3.244173133 
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Appendix 12 for Chapter 4: The Basic Model and the Extended Model 
The estimated function is shown as below: 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 + Nonperformingloansratio 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑐 + 𝜀 
The preliminary results in terms of this function is shown as below: 

𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐼𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝑐 + 𝜀 














𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝜇 + 𝑐(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 ≥ 𝜏)




𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝜇 + 𝑐(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 < 𝜏)
 
Where, 
Risk is measured by Z-score 
 
SIZE, Lasset is bank size and is the log-transformation of bank total assets. 
 
IL, Interbank asset ratio is defined as the ratio of interbank assets to total bank assets. 
  
LD, Deposit ratio is defined as bank loans to total deposits. 
 
NPLL, Nonperforming loans ratio is defined as the ratio of nonperforming loans to total gross 
loans. 
 
EA, Equity ratio is defined as total equity to total bank assets.  
 
I, Interbank rate is 3-month interbank rate. 
 
C is a constant. 
 
𝜇 is the number of independent banking variables, and  𝜇 =1,…7. 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝜇 takes value of one for the period from the 4
th
 quarter of 2007 up to 3
rd
 
quarter of 2009 (Subprime mortgage crisis period), and zero otherwise. 
 
i is the number of banks, and i=1,2....1397. 
 
t is time period, t=1,2,...77 ( here we set 1992Q4 is base quarter, equal to 1; then 2011Q4 =77). 
 







Appendix 13 for Chapter 5: Bank Characteristics by Liquidity Hoarding Groups  
Variable (Mean) 
Before Interbank Market 
Crunch 
During Interbank Market 
Crunch 
Panel A: Liquidity Non-Hoarder 
Total Assets (in $ Million) 1405.16 1618.72 
Tier1 Capital ratio 0.163 0.151 
Loan Growth(% quarter) 2.144 1.764 
Liquid Asset / Assets 0.307 0.267 
Illquid Asset / Assets 0.679 0.738 
Unused Commitments ratio 0.098 0.091 
Unrealized Security Loss ratio 0.661 -0.166 
Loan Loss Allowance ratio 1.290  1.361 
Total Deposit growth(% quarter) 1.197 1.154 
Core Deposit growth(% quarter) 0.749  1.089 
Net Charge-offs / Assets 0.111 0.353 
Panel B: Liquidity Hoarder 
Total Assets (in $ Million) 1814.91 2387.86 
Tier1 Capital ratio 0.165 0.168 
Loan Growth (% quarter) 1.18  -0.075 
Liquid Asset / Assets 0.303 0.357  
Illquid Asset / Assets 0.684 0.670  
Unused Commitments ratio 0.087 0.077  
Unrealized Security Loss ratio 0.832 -0.228 
Loan Loss Allowance ratio 1.406 1.535 
Total Deposit growth(% quarter) 0.841 0.889 
Core Deposit growth(% quarter) 0.457 0.843 
Net Charge-offs / Assets 0.164 0.377 
Panel C: All Banks 
Total Assets (in $ Million) 1469.47 1808.48 
Tier1 Capital ratio 0.163 0.157 
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Loan Growth(% quarter)  2.012 1.401 
Liquid Asset / Assets 0.295  0.289 
Illquid Asset / Assets 0.697 0.714 
Unused Commitments ratio 0.093 0.089 
Unrealized Security Loss ratio 0.698 -0.178  
Loan Loss Allowance ratio 1.355 1.407 
Total Deposit growth(% quarter) 1.141 1.115 
Core Deposit growth(% quarter) 0.699 0.979 











































Appendix 14 for Chapter 5: Univariate tests of mean and median differences 
between Net Lenders and Net Borrowers 










































































Note: This table reports the mean in the first row and the median in the second row (in brackets) 
for each variable. Column (1) is for Net Borrowers and column (2) is for Net Lenders. Net 
Borrowers (Net Lenders) are those with Net Interbank Loans less (greater) than its 30th (70th) 
percentile value in the previous quarter. In column (3), the first (second) row shows p‐values of the 
significant tests for the mean (median) differences. Upper panel displays results for our dependent 
variables, and Lower panel for all bank‐level covariates. *** and ** indicate the 1% and 5% 
















Appendix 15 for Chapter 5: Results of Fixed Effect Regressions by bank sizes 
 Large Banks (Size ≥ 5.299027) Small Banks(Size < 5.299027) 












































































































































































Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quart. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.432  0.595 0.564 0.757 
Observ. 291291 291291 784630 784630 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Whole sample 
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